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ABSTRACT
An Organismic Approach to the Development
of a Comprehensive Science
Curriculum
September 1977
Leelavathee Cooppan McCullough, B
. A
.
,
Dip. Ed.
(Biological Sciences), Macquarie University, Australia
M.Ed.
,
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Daniel C. Jordan, Ph.D.
There is no doubt that science education is con-
sidered to be an important element in the lives of children.
Numerous innovative attempts over the last ten to fifteen
years have contributed greatly to improving the quality of
science instruction in elementary schools. Even though the
progress that has been made is encouraging, there is a
growing concern that the field of science education as a
whole requires a philosophical and theoretical perspective
that can guide the development of curricula, the prepara-
tion of teachers, teaching strategies and evaluation. Such
a philosophical and theoretical scheme can then serve as
the integrated system around which the teaching of science
can be organized.
This dissertation addresses the issue of science
curriculum development based on the organismic philosophy
and theoretical framework of the Anisa Model. From an
vi
organismic perspective the justification for any curriculum
is that it should sustain the actualization of human poten-
tial. A natural science curriculum can foster children's
understandings about the physical world so that the resul-
tant actualization of their potential can be organized
around the attainment of technological competence. This
means that children will gradually begin to understand,
discover and apply the laws and principles of natural
science in such a way that the quality of life can be con-
tinually improved. The primary goal of the natural science
curriculum, then, is the development of technological compe-
tence in interacting with the physical environment.
The purpose of this dissertation is:
(1) To investigate the extent to which an organis-
mic philosophy is consistent with contemporary
advances in the field of natural science.
(2) To interpret the role of natural science in
human growth and development from an organismic
perspective
.
(3) To show how an organismic philosophical per-
spective can guide the development of a possible
theoretical framework for a natural science cur-
riculum, the goal of which is the attainment of
technological competence.
(4) To indicate the way in which an organismic view
addresses the issue of integrating natural
Vll
science with the overall curriculum.
(5) To set forth the distinguishing features of the
proposed theoretical framework based on an
organismic perspective in comparison with other
science curricula that have been developed.
The proposed framework for the natural science
curriculum includes a detailed outline of the most funda-
mental laws and principles of physics, chemistry, biology,
geology, astronomy and ecology, together with a description
of the psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and
volitional processes that are involved in the attainment of
technological competence.
From a functional point of view, the proposed frame-
work may be used to prepare teachers to teach science and/or
to generate learning experiences in natural science for
children
.
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1CHAPTER I
SCIENCE EDUCATION: STATE OF THE FIELD
It has only been within the last one hundred years
that science has become a necessary and legitimate compon-
ent in the public school curriculum in the United States.
The first innovation in elementary school science according
to Rosen (1963) was the introduction of geography in the
Boston schools and this led to the creation of a new indus-
try in 1784--the manufacturing of scientific apparatus for
schools. The real entry of science was felt with the rise
of the Pestalozzi object teaching movement in the late
1850’s (Smith, 1963). Objects were placed before children
to develop their perceptive faculties. For example, they
had to name the object, describe its parts and state the
relationships among the parts. At about the same time
(1870’s) the writings of Herbert Spencer were becoming pop-
ular, particularly his essay "What Knowledge is of Most
Worth?" which pointed to the overwhelming importance of
science in the school curriculum (Showalter, 1975; Smith,
1975) . The influx of new views on science spurred American
universities to announce the acceptance of physics and chem
istry toward entrance requirements. By the early 1900 's
elementary school science was established as nature study.
2Ihe modern trend towards teaching science as inquiry
rather than passive observation has its roots in the philo-
sophy of pragmatism as espoused by William James and John
Dewey. In the 1920’s, Dewey’s emphasis on the knowledge of
the methodology of science as a valuable tool for the
growing child ousted the traditional nature study approach
(Dewey
,
1966) .
Integration of the processes of inquiry and the ac-
cumulated knowledge of science in a curriculum has been a
continuous concern for the National Society for the Study of
Education (NSSE) . An important first step by NSSE was the
publication of the Thirty-first Yearbook in 1932 which was
devoted to A Program for Teaching Science emphasizing inte-
grated science teaching. In 1947, the Forty-sixth Yearbook,
Science Education i n American Schools
,
focused on attitudes,
values and affective factors as they related to science and
society. The most recent document, the Fifty-ninth Year-
book (1960) on Rethinking Science Education stressed criti-
cal thinking, scientific process and inquiry.
Since 1960, the National Science Teachers Associa-
tion has organized numerous committees and conferences to
investigate and articulate position statements on science
education in relation to goals, teaching methods, cuiiicu-
lum innovations, teacher education, evaluation and research
procedures. The aim has always been to continually upgrade
3the quality of science teaching so that there is meaning and
relevance for the child.
Science Boom of the Sixties
The major impetus to science teaching in schools was
the launching of Sputnik by the Russians in 1957. Science
education in the U.S. blossomed as a direct reaction to
Sputnik (Saadeh, 1973) and the U.S. Office of Education,
the National Science Foundation and other public and pri-
vate organizations funded heavily projects on science cur-
riculum innovation. During the years 1960-1970, elemen-
tary and secondary school teachers witnessed what Brandwein
calls "the Revolution in Science Teaching" (Rosen, 1963) or
what is now referred to as "the science boom of the six-
ties." Fontaine (1970), in reviewing some of the federal
programs for the improvement of school science and mathema-
tics states that during the fiscal year of 1969, over 400
projects at the pre-college and undergraduate levels were
supported by the National Science Foundation at an estimated
cost of $142 million. In the Ninth Report of the Internat-
ional Clearinghouse on Science and Mathematics Curricular
Developments Internationally (1975), Lockhard piesents a
survey of K-adult science curricula for the years 1956-
1974, a span of 18 years during which science education
programs mushroomed all over the wrorld. A reworking of his
data reveals the following:
Continent Numbers of Curricula
Developed 1956-1974
4
Africa 15
Asia 50
Australia 17
Europe 87
Latin America 17
North America 206
Total 392
Of the 206 curricula in North America, 201 were
developed in the United States. Many of the curricula
started at Kindergarten and went through to adult levels.
Considering the tremendous significance of early childhood
education, it is noteworthy that not a single curriculum
was developed specifically for the preschool level in
those 18 years.
A comparison of Fontaine's figures of 400 projects
in one year and Lockhard's data of 201 curricula over 18
years shows quite a difference. Possible reasons for such
a large discrepancy could be that (1) many of the question-
naires sent out in Lockhard's survey were not returned by
the individuals or curricular organizations who had de-
veloped programs, or (2) many of the curricula developed
in 1969 were short-term projects which no longer exist. If
factor (2) is indeed a possibility, then the expenditure of
vast sums of money on short-term operations has to be
accounted for more seriously. It could be that funding
5agencies are aware of the problems as no new science cur-
ricula have been appearing in the last few years.
New Elementary School Science Curricula
in the United States
The new science curricula were developed by numer-
ous agencies, teams and individuals who held widely dif-
fering philosophical and theoretical perspectives about
the organization of the subject matter, the emphasis on
the processes of science, and the attitudes and values to
be inculcated in the child. In an attempt to demonstrate
the unity of science, various concepts were proposed as
being the fundamental realities of natural science.
In 1966, the Educational Policies Commission pub-
lished a report entitled "Education and the Spirit of
Science" which outlined seven values that undergirded the
whole scientific enterprise, e.g., values such as longing
to know and to understand; questioning of all things;
demand for verification; consideration of consequences.
Livermore (1964) of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, indicated that there were
fourteen processes that characterized the method of
scientific investigation. Processes such as the follot^ing
were emphasized: observing, classifying, inferring, hypothe-
sizing, formulating models.
In 1964, the National Science Teachers Association
6documented a Theory into Action paper in which seven major
conceptual schemes were set forth as the unifying prin-
ciples that cut across all of natural science. The schemes
were outlined as a guide to curriculum planners in the
elementary and secondary school. Most of the statements
were written in terms of matter and energy. For example,
all matter is composed of units called fundamental par-
ticles; units of matter interact; matter exists in the form
of units which can be classified into hierarchies of organi-
zation. Since the schemes were outlined in accordance with
physical science concepts, the proposed guide became a
controversial issue.
Bentley Glass (1965) vehemently opposed the seven
conceptual schemes, particularly from a biologist's point
of view. He stated that it was not possible to express
adequately the unique characteristics of a living organism
by referring solely to matter and energy. The present-day
debate on reductionism is an expression of the same senti-
ment. From a psychologist's standpoint, Ausubel (1964)
criticized the new matter and energy approach as being too
philosophical and too general for elementary and secondary
school students.
A counterview to Glass and Ausubel was presented
by Shamos (1966) who felt that the conceptual schemes of
science reflected the greatest intellectual achievements
of man and as such should be the focal point of the cui
7riculum. Shamos then became the principal director of the
Conceptually Oriented Program in Elementary School Sciences
(COPES) which was based on the seven conceptual schemes.
It is worth noting Ausubel's criticism in relation to the
following statement by Shamos in the preface of one of the
curriculum units on the Conservation of Energy Sequence;
The materials require some sophistication in
science on the part of the teacher, a sophistica-
tion which the average elementary school teacher
does not have. Consequently, we suggest that
only science specialists or teachers with more than
the usual background in science consider trying
this curriculum
. .
.
(1967 : iv)
The notion of identifying unifying principles in
science is valid and worthwhile. Conceptual schemes do aid
in focusing on what is most important in science content,
but the manner in which they are stated should reflect the
distinctive features of the physical and life sciences.
In an effort to show that curriculum development is
a continuous process, the National Science Teachers Asso-
ciation (1971) issued a revised position statement on
school science education for the seventies. Helpful
recommendations on goals, values, process and content are
presented as ideas to be considered when planning a cur-
riculum. Many of the new science curricula of the sixties
reflect a diversity of approaches in relation to selection
of content and process. The goal has been to show the
unity of science but in some curricula this is difficult
to discern because of the great emphasis that is placed
8on either content or process.
Hurd and Gallagher (1968) review twelve of the most
well-known science and mathematics curricula in their book
New Directions in Elementary Science Teaching
. The three
programs that have been used most widely are the Elementary
Science Study, the Science Curriculum Improvement Study,
and Science--A Process Approach. A brief overview will
illustrate the general thrust of each program.
The Elementary Science Study (ESS) does not appear
to have any specific philosophy or theory of learning
supporting it. However, it does not seem to be psychologi-
cally unsound or scientifically trivial. Children are
viewed as natural scientists and allowed to explore and
manipulate materials according to their own inclinations
and needs in an unstructured manner. The main purpose is
to motivate children to explore the world. Much of the
philosophy and psychology of Piaget, Dewey, Hunt, and
Berlyne are evident in ESS even though it is not explicitly
stated (Rogers and Voelker, 1970).
The Science Curriculum Improvement Study (SCIS) has
been guided by the work of Robert Karplus (1964; Karplus
and Thier, 1967). The goal of the SCIS is the development
of scientific literacy through the provision of scientific
activities in the early elementary school (Thomson £[ Voelker,
1970) . The program focuses on the conceptual framework ox
science as being the most crucial aspect about which child-
9ren should learn. SCIS has been guided and influenced by
the recent developments in psychology and reflects the
ideas of Dewey, Piaget, Bruner, and Almy (SCIS Teachers
Handbook, January 1974). The approach to the teaching of
science appears to be well-planned and educationally sound.
Science--A Process Approach (S-APA)
,
as its name
implies, is designed to teach the processes of science to
children. The cumulative learning model of the psychologist
Robert Gagne has guided the development of this program
(Gagne, 1963 and 1966; Livermore, 1964). The major prin-
ciple is the learning of general i zable process skills which
may be transferred across many subject matters.
Effectiveness of the New Science Curricula
What has been the impact of the new elementary
science curricula? Innumerable research studies have in-
vestigated the effects of the most popular science cur-
ricula such as ESS, SCIS and S-APA on children’s interests
and cognitive abilities, teaching styles and methods of
teacher education. It would be impossible to mention all
these studies. A variety of research surveys summarize a
great deal of information: Dunfee (1967); Gallagher (1972),
Reichard (1973); Saadeh (1975); Rowe and deTure (1975) and
Voelker § Wall (1976).
According to Rowe and deTure (1975), editois of the
Science Education Information Report, the results of many
10
of the research studies indicate the positive effects of
the new approaches of teaching- science on young children.
Most of the programs developed over the last ten years
help language, logic and interests to grow among disad-
vantaged and handicapped children. These groups of child-
ren benefit during the first three years of school from
activity-oriented science. Middle and upper class elemen-
tary school children show relatively less benefit as the
programs stand at present. Many of the early science cur-
ricula focus on sorting, classifying and ordering, etc.,
which are valuable learning experiences for the disad-
vantaged child whose environment may lack opportunities for
these kinds of interactions. The authors suggest that the
disadvantaged children who are usually denied science be-
cause they need to "catch up on basics" should be given more
science. Programs that are more challenging have to be
developed for the advanced primary grade students.
Many of the programs are organized in detailed
scope and sequence charts with particular activities for
each grade level. Even though the new curricula are de-
velopmental ly -based to some extent, teachers do not appear
to have a great deal of flexibility or experience in indi-
vidualizing instruction, especially with the more advanced
child. Scope and sequence charts are useful because they
reflect systematic and careful planning but they have the
disadvantage of introducing rigidity.
11
Ihe positive results of some of the research in
science education has helped to provide answers to some
specific issues that have been of concern to science edu-
cators. However, the overall conclusions drawn by the
authors of research surveys and appraisals of the future
direction of the new curricula are disappointing.
Rowe and deTure (1973) conclude that the quantity
of research efforts in elementary school science has fallen
off. Also, relatively little information is available on
the cumulative impact of four to five years of elementary
science. The authors state that even though many school
districts have now had almost four to six years or more
of exposure to and experience with some of the new projects,
very little research is being published on. the long-term
effects of science instruction. This kind of evaluative
information is vital in assessing the worth and the appro-
priateness of science programs. Curriculum developers, in
the early years of innovation, complained that the types
of attitudes, values and processes of inquiry which they
were trying to develop would take time. Although ample
time has elapsed, no long-term gains have been demonstrated.
Livermore (1968) , who was involved in the develop-
ment of Science--A Process Approach, reiterates the fact
that the proponents of many of the new programs profess
either explicitly or implicitly that their approaches should
foster an enthusiasm for and understanding of science that
12
should continue beyond high school. However, little has
been done to determine whether, and if so, to what extent
these programs do indeed have such an effect.
Saadeh (1973), in an extensive review of the re-
search on the direction of the new science programs, pre-
sents a pessimistic survey. He tries to assess curriculum
development, the effectiveness of science curricula, instruc-
tional procedures and teacher- training programs. The studies
that Saadeh cites are impressive and the immediate reaction
is to say that the situation really cannot be that hopeless.
However, the reality of the situation cannot be ignored.
Many critics attack the new science curricula particularly
on the score of how they were developed. In an evaluative
report on curriculum development in science, Herbert Smith
notes that
For more than a decade, professional scientists have
been almost exclusively responsible for national cur-
riculum reform. Their influence is evident in the
emphasis on the structure of science, the cognitive
and abstract aspects of the discipline, the diffi-
culty of the material, the grade level at which
abstract concepts are introduced, and laboratory
and inquiry experiences. The wisdom of some of
the new emphases was questioned by a few skeptics,
but the scientists’ judgments were uncritically
accepted for a time, even strangely enough, by most
science educators. (1969:398)
A similar sentiment on the "crises of principle in
curriculum” was echoed by Schwab. He found that out of
five widely-used high school science curricula, four were
controlled and developed by subject matter specialists such
that the educators' contribution was negligible and that
13
of curriculum specialists "near the vanishing point" (1970:
19). In elementary school science programs, a psychologist
v/as the guiding force in S-APA but again curriculum special-
ists were not included. The ESS program was greatly influ-
enced, in an advantageous manner, by educators who had
some expertise in curriculum development.
The criticism that scientists influenced the de-
velopment of programs more than curriculum specialists has
some merit to it, particularly when one considers surveys
that indicate the decrease in science achievement in ele-
mentary and secondary schools. Saadeh (1975) cites various
authors who charge that many curricula emphasize science as
an end in itself rather than pointing out the value of
science in solving social and practical problems. They urge
that the subject matter should be made more relevant to the
needs of the student and not only geared to the academically
superior student. Scientific literacy does not only mean
the intellectual understanding of science, but also learn-
ing how7 to apply the principles of science to problems that
are encountered in everyday life and to the persistent
challenges that beset mankind.
That the new science curricula have not had the
impact they were expected to have was shown in a recent
survey conducted by the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) . Ahmann et al . (1975) cite the lesults of
the survey. It was found that the knowledge of fundamental
14
scientific facts and principles declined among young Ameri-
can students between the years 1969 and 1973. Comparing
the results of the 1969-70 and 1972-73 national assessments
of science indicates that 9-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and
17-year-olds tended to perform less well in 1972-73 than
their counterparts had about three to four years ago. The
questions in the survey covered four broad educational
goals of science: knowledge of basic facts and principles
of science; the processes of science; understanding the
investigative nature of science and attitudes about the
value and appreciation of science. Achievement declined
in the biological and physical sciences, but the greatest
drops were in the physical sciences. It was notable that
the performance of black students did not improve at all
three levels, whereas some extreme rural and South-eastern
groups did improve relative to national norms. Another
noteworthy finding was that the science performance of
girls has not improved, but appears to be declining at
about the same rate as the boys. In assessing the results
of the survey, Ahmann et al . conclude that the downward
trend of science performance may only reflect the unusual
emphasis that was given to science education in the wake
of Sputnik. The results 1972-73 may really indicate a re-
turn to more normal levels of achievement which probably
existed before the 60s. Since we live in a scientific and
technological age, the concluding remarks of the authors
15
should be of grave concern to educators:
We must decide whether the observed decline in
science achievement can be tolerated, or, quite
to the contrary, whether we should reject even a
"steady state" and insist upon improved levels of
science achievement during the next four years.
(Ahmann et al
. ,
1975:25)
It could be that the decline of enrollment and
achievement in the physical sciences, especially at the
high school level, may be related to the complexity of the
ideas and the lack of input by curriculum specialists and
educators in many of the new science curricula. Many
authors have recently documented the problem in the
physical sciences (Bates, 1975; Ignatz, 1975; Rowe, 1975).
Bates states that between 1948 and 1964 the proportion of
twel fth- grade students enrolled in physics in the United
States dropped from 26 percent to 19 percent. By 1971
only 16% of senior students were choosing phys ics - - less
than one student in six. Reasons for the decline appear
to revolve mainly around the abstract nature of physics
concepts which students have difficulty in understanding.
Because students are in high school, they are assumed to
be in the formal operational stage and capable of dealing
with abstract ideas. However, preliminary evidence from
studies by Renner and Stafford suggest that only 30-50% of
high school age students in the United States function at
the formal operational level (in Bates, 1975). A solution
to the problem has been the inclusion of more concrete
16
manipulation of materials while studying abstract concepts.
Another area of apparent inadequacy in the new
science curricula has been in the effectiveness of "pro-
cess education." The goal of many new programs was to
teach children the processes of science, i.e., the pro-
cesses of inquiry which are considered to be the basic
tools of the young scientist. Cole (1972) in a book on
' Process Education * tries to assess to what extent the pro-
cess-oriented curricula have been used, what changes they
have effected in educational practice and whether they
realized their potential. His conclusion is discouraging-
-
not much has been done with the new curricula of the
sixties. Cole cites John Goodlad, who after an extensive
survey of educational practices, says that the process-
centered innovations have been "blunted on the classroom
door" (Cole, 1972, p. 20). Unfortunately, classroom prac-
tice has changed little--the needs of the children are not
being met emotionally or socially, lessons are dull, boring
and meaningless, teacher-directed learning from authorita-
tive textbooks and workbooks are still prevalent. In a
similar vein, Lippit observes the brute fact that
Our research is now rich with examples of oppor-
tunities provided, but nothing gained; with new
curricula developed, but lack of meaningful
utilization; with new teaching practices invented,
but nothing spread; with new richer school en-
vironments, but no improvement in the learning
experience of the child. (in Cole, 1972:20).
Writing specifically about the program Science--A
17
Process Approach, Saadeh (1973) cites research which indi-
cated that the attempt to teach science from a pure process
approach results in a spottiness and somewhat incoherent
presentation. This particular science program focuses on
process to such an extent that the learning of content is
incidental. Process and content are subject to develop-
mental considerations and systematic organization.
Commenting on the effectiveness of teacher- training
in the new science projects, Herbert Smith, a former presi-
dent of the National Science Teachers Association, appears
as a harsh, but realistic critic. In considering the
largest and most expensive in-service program in the history
of science education, the National Science Foundation Insti-
tute Program, Smith states that
These institute programs were viewed at their
inception as emergency arrangements. Unfortunately,
the history of such government activity is that
the emergency structures take on the character of
permanent fixtures. ... It still remains to be
demonstrated that the institutes have had a high
degree of effectiveness. (1966:800).
It is revealing to discover that science educators
were essentially excluded from effectively participating in
the NSF Institute programs. Smith goes on to point out
that millions of dollars were expended to partially educate
scientists in the fundamentals of public education and the
needs of teacher education programs. Not many authors are
as forthright as Smith in exposing the political factors
that influenced the science innovations of the sixties
18
after the launching of Sputnik I
. In trying to keep pace
with the Russians, the child who was being educated was for
the larger part by-passed and the focus fell upon the new
curricula. The priority in the educational process has to
be the nature of the individual who is being educated-
-new
curricula, new methods of teaching, teaching machines,
audio-visual aids and facilities are all secondary factors,
necessary but not sufficient in upgrading the quality of
education.
As a final note, many authors indicate that the
research studies in elementary science education suffer
from major inadequacies. Haney et al
.
pointed to four
weaknesses in the studies they examined for the years 1965-
1967: lack of precise terminology, poorly defined variables,
brief treatment periods on unrepresentative groups, and
inadequate instruction (in Gallagher, 1972). In a summary
of research in science education during 1968-1969 (elemen-
tary level)
,
Gallagher (1972) found many of the weaknesses
identified by Haney and his colleagues to be still ob-
servable. In addition, Gallagher states that the quality
of reporting is usually poor and faulty experimental design
was common.
In light of the various challenges that have yet to
be met in science education, Tyler (1968) cautions against
an uncritical acceptance of the new science curricula. Pro
grams should be carefully analyzed in terms of goals,
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attitudes, processes and products as they relate to the
society in which children have to live.
Need for a Philosophical and Theoretical
Perspective in Science Education
Despite the interest, time, effort, and money that
have been expended in improving science education, the
heart of the problem remains unaddressed. A survey of the
literature indicates that this is a critical juncture in
the history of science teaching. This is summed up by
Pella's (1966) comment that science education has been
floundering for many years because individuals are concerned
with make -shift remedies rather than trying to reach the
source of the problem. In fact, it is somewhat paradoxical
that scientists have not brought the methods of science to
bear on the improvement of science instruction (Skinner,
1968)
.
Other eminent science educators echo the same
sentiments. Paul DeHart Hurd, a leading educator in the
field, addresses the challenge with insight and indicates
the urgent need for a theoretical framework in science
education
.
Not to establish a theoretical position means that
we continue to attack educational problems on a
haphazard basis, always pot- shotting , and fragment-
ing our efforts rather than making a broad attack
on the frontier of the unknown. (1971:244)
Because the tendency is to operate on an atheoreti-
cal basis, every investigation is a separate problem. With-
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out an underpinning of theory, many research findings are
lost "in a fog of contradictions" (Hurd, 1971:244) and have
no impact on the educational process. Research results do
not i each the classioom teacher and the experiences and
accumulated insights of the teacher are never heard by the
investigator. The rich and rewarding interplay between
theory and practice is left untapped.
The reason proposed by St. John for the lack of a
viable theory in science education is that whatever form of
theoretical framework that exists (if indeed it does) is
based upon common sense. These frames of reference vary
with each investigator or with each new curriculum that is
developed. A viable theory which is based on synthesis of
the research findings of human growth and development should
be able to offer direction, leadership, power, and economy
to the field and provide a basis for decision making (St.
John
,
1966)
.
The function of a theory is to make simple the
complex and bring order to confusion. Education has been
dependent upon the social sciences for so long that it
has ignored the formulation of any theoretical framework.
Pella (1966) identifies some of the factors that need to
be considered in developing a workable theoretical base
for science education, namely, philosophy, the nature of
learning, the nature of knowledge, and the natuie of the
curriculum
.
2i
In the area of early childhood education llowe (1975)
has proposed a theoretical basis for science activities.
Her thesis is that pre-school teachers do not have a ra-
tional basis for making decisions as to what science ex-
periences are appropriate for the very young child. Howe
proposed Piaget’s theory of the stages of intellectual
development as a possible base from which teachers can
operate. Certainly knowledge of development is an in-
valuable guide in teaching, but an effective theoretical
scheme has to be more comprehensive and address other
issues rather than just cognitive growth. However, Howe's
proposal has merit in that it is one of the few articles
that confronts the issue of formulating a theoretical
scheme. Bowen (1975) offers Ausubel's learning model as
a conceptual framework that can guide science education
research.
Not only is a theoretical framework necessary in
science education but the necessity of an underlying
philosophical perspective is also emphasized by various
authors. Showalter (1975) states that a philosphic
rationale that can reflect the unity of the sciences will
be useful. Raven (1979), in an article on a philosophical
basis for selecting science curriculum content, leans to-
wards Margenau's metaphysical requirements of how scien-
tific knowledge is gained. As a most insightful science
educator, Hurd states that "We can contribute to the im-
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provement of our field (i.e., science education) by ex-
posing our educational theories to philosophic criticism"
(1971:244) .
The power of a philosophical perspective is elo-
quently described by Whitehead. He suggests that a philo-
sophy not only molds the life of the individual but it
also influences our type of society and even our civiliza-
tion. He claims that
Philosophy is the attempt to make manifest the
fundamental evidence as to the nature of things.
Upon the presupposition of this evidence, all
understanding rests ... It makes the content
of the human mind manageable; it adds meaning
to fragmentary details; it discloses disjunctions
and conjunctions, consistencies and inconsis-
tencies. (1968b : 48-49)
The position that I am setting forth and justifying
in this dissertation is that the fragmentation in science
education cannot be dealt with unless educational theory
and practice as a whole are guided by general philosophical
principles. For science education, as the particular focus,
the philosophical scheme of thought should be compatible
writh the advances in contemporary scientific thought.
In the next chapter, two broad streams of philo-
sophical thought, namely, mechanistic and organismic, will
be examined for the purpose of discerning which scheme
would be of most value to science education. I submit that
the kind of philosophical perspective that would be most
useful is one which includes an understanding of the nature
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of man, the essence of physical reality, and how these
two concerns are related.
CHAPTER II
TOWARD A SHIFT IN THE PARADIGM OF
CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT
24
A survey of the Western philosophical tradition
indicates the existence of two major antithetical systems
of thought; namely, the mechanistic system and the organ-
ismic system (Montalenti, 1974). For centuries, the pro-
ponents of these two schemes were opposed to each other.
Now, in the twentieth century, there appears to be a
gradual acceptance of some of the fundamental principles
of the philosophy of organism by adherents of the mechan-
istic tradition. Essentially, the change is occurring
in the contemporary scientific conception of the nature of
man, the nature of the physical universe and the nature of
life.
In the language of Thomas Kuhn, this change in our
world view constitutes a "paradigm shift" (1970). A para-
digm may be defined as a shared scheme of thought from which
arise certain scientific traditions. For example, it is
common to read about "Ptolemaic astronomy" or "Newtonian
mechanics." The prevailing tradition or paradigm is al-
ways accepted as the most workable system in relation to
our understanding of particular phenomena. In time,
anomalies or unexplainable events are recognized. Thio
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casts doubt on the established paradigm. At this point,
a nev. scheme of thought is proposed. If the new scheme
or paradigm not only accounts for the anomalies but also
includes ideas that worked in the past, then people will
eventually rally behind it and a "shift" occurs. For
example
,
this kind of a shift in paradigm occurred when
Einstein's theory of relativity superceded the older New-
tonian views of absolute space and time. The change in
our mental conception of the universe as a result of this
paradigm shift has been fundamental -
-physical events, life,
people and feelings are all viewed as being relative rather
than fixed and absolute.
Roots of the Mechanistic and Organismic
Systems of Thought
The roots of the mechanism versus organism contro-
versy date back to the philosophical thought of the early
Greeks (Montalenti, 1974; Smith, 1976). Atomism or
mechanism is most clearly associated with the Greek philo-
sopher Democritus. He held the view that the phenomenal
world was composed of an infinite number of small, in-
visible particles which came together and then fell apart
purely by chance and at random.
Aristotle vehemently challenged the Democritean
position on the fortuitous nature of existence. Instead,
he proposed a teleological theory, which stated that events
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in nature do not happen at random but do so with an end
in view. The word teleological is derived from the root
teleos" which in Greek means end, complete or perfect.
So, for Aristotle, the end state was one of the most impor-
tant reasons for the occurrence of any event. He included
this notion of the end state in the "doctrine of the four
causes." The concept of "cause" was used in a much broader
and general way than it is used today. The four causes may
be defined as follows:
(a) Material cause is that from which something is
created
;
(b) Formal cause is the form, design of pattern
of a thing;
(c) Efficient cause is the action which effects
some change from the original state, and
(d) Final cause is the reason why things happen
(i.e., the end or purpose).
The introduction of the final cause or internal
purpose represented a more organismic conception of the
universe. That is, efficient causes cannot account solely
for why events occur in the world. A philosophy of
mechanism, however, holds that all physical events can be
explained solely in terms of efficient causation and denies
the operation of any internal purpose or final cause. The
rise of the physical sciences in the seventeenth century was
characterized by the mechanistic views of Newton and strict
empiricism.
Today, in the latter half of the 20th century,
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there is a pressing and critical urgency to move beyond
atomism and mechanism while still retaining the advantages
of a successful mechanistic methodology. Scientists are
becoming aware of the need for integrative and holistic
approaches to understanding man and the universe. Issues
such as fulfillment, consciousness, purpose or goal-
directedness
,
organization, systems, hierarchy and emergence
have been, and will continue to be, discussed and debated
by scientists and philosophers of science (Koestler and
Sinythies, 1969 ; Ayala and Dobzhansky, 1974). A new world
view or a new paradigm is needed to account for the notions
mentioned above. Ultimately, any new successful paradigm
that is formulated by scientists has relevance for the
educator who has to distill and synthesize the accumulated
knowledge into a coherent and effective educational system.
In trying to discern the shift from extreme mechan-
ism to even moderate organismic views, I will concentrate
on the major issues that appear to be of greatest concern
to scientists. For the sake of clarity, the issues may be
grouped into three broad categories, namely
(1) the organization of systems
(2) hierarchical structuration and integration
(3) efficient and final causation.
To show the impact of these concerns upon con-
temporary scientific thought, the discussion will be placed
in a broader context and include the physical, life and
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social sciences.
Organismic Principles in Contemporary
Scientific Thought
Organization of Systems
The rise of the organismic or systemic view of
nature heralded the age of synthesis and integration.
Ortega y Gasset, with great insight, says
The need to create sound syntheses and systema-
tizations of knowledge . . . will call out a kind
of . .
.
genius which hitherto has existed only
as an aberration; the genius for integration. Of
necessity this means specialization, as all
creative effort inevitably does; but this time
man will be specializing in the construction of
the whole. (in Laszlo, 1973:35).
Holistic understandings of the world are by no
means new. Two millennia ago, the famous symbol of the
"Ouroboros" (the snake eating its tail) was well known in
ancient China and in Alexandria. It expresses the notion
of "the one, the all" which implies "that one entity in-
corporates into itself in some sense all other entities in
the universe" (Waddington, 1975:2-3). Five hundred years
ago, the German philosopher Nikolaus von Kues said, "ex
omnibus partibus relucet totum," that "from every part,
the whole shines forth" (Donath, 1973:117). This idea
remains valid even today when all the part-whole phenomena
prove the material unity of the universe.
In trying to understand the organization of systems
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it is first necessary to define the concept, "organization.”
The concept of organization is - of crucial importance in the
sciences. Bertalanffy (1968a) states that organization was
not considered as an integral aspect of a mechanistic world
in which isolated events were investigated. In fact, the
2nd principle of thermodynamics discussed the destruction
of order, but contained no corresponding principles for the
establishment of order and organization. Bertalanffy goes
on to point out that Whitehead never failed to emphasize
that "an atom, a crystal, or a molecule are organizations.
In biology, organisms are, by definition, organized things”
(Bertalanffy, 1968a:47). It was Berta?_anf fy
,
who in the
late 1920s originated the phrase, "organismic biology,” to
indicate the necessity of regarding the living organism
as an organized system.
Sinnott, in discussing the problem of organization
from a biologist's point of view, makes reference to
Whitehead's philosophy of organism. He says that
Our problem, though first the task of the biolo-
gist, must evidently transcend his domain and
enter that of philosophy. The list of philoso-
phers who have undertaken to deal with it is
considerable. Most notable among them, perhaps,
is Whitehead, who based an important part of
his system upon the fact of organization, not
only in living things but throughout the universe.
Biology for him is the study of the larger organ-
isms and physics that of the smaller ones. The
notion of particle he would replace by the notion
or organism. (1950:42)
In Whitehead's cosmological scheme, organisms are
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viewed as actual entities which are the final real things
of our perceptions and conceptual understanding. The or-
ganization of these actual entities is governed by various
principles such as the principles of process and rela-
tivity. An organism’s becoming or actualization is ex-
emplified in the process of change from one thing to
another; at the same time the becoming of one organism is
related to the becoming of every other organism in some
way, such that "... every item in its universe is involved
in each concrescence" (Whitehead, 1969:27). Concrescence
as used here means literally the growing together of a
unity of experience. Further on, he says that
Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is
atomism. The creatures are atomis . . . But
atomism does not exclude complexity and uni-
versal relativity. Each atom is a system of
all things. (1969:41)
It has to be understood that Whitehead’s termin-
ology does not carry the usual meanings that we attribute
to certain words. In the quote above, "atomism" reflects
the root meaning of the word, "unspl i ttable , " and means
that each organism can only be understood as a whole
which is more than the sum of all its parts. Organization,
then, for Whitehead is synonymous with interrelatedness or
a universe of relations.
The notion of "systems" as a complete set of ele-
ments with mutual interrelations (Blauberg et al . , 1973)
has gained widespread influence in the physical, life and
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social sciences. General systems theory was initiated and
developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in response to the
fragmentation and over- special izat ion of knowledge. Ber-
talanffy defines general system theory as
. . . the scientific exploration of "wholes" and
"wholeness" which, not so long ago, were con-
sidered metaphysical notions transcending the
boundaries of science. Hierarchic structure,
stability, teleology, differentiation, approach
to and maintenance of steady states, goal-
direct edness -- these are a few of such general
system properties . .
.
(in Laszlo, 1973:xviii)
General system theory was developed as an interdisciplinary
approach toward the unification of science but the achieve-
ment of this goal remains yet to be seen. A fruitful line
of enquiry blossomed into what may be called computerized
investigations such as systems analysis, systems engin-
eering, cybernetics, information theory, etc., which are
based on mechanistic notions. The concern in this dis-
sertation is with those aspects of system theory which may
be identified as "systemic," i.e., the relationship between
parts and wholes, mutual interconnections, goal - directedness
,
etc. Laszlo clarifies the systemic aspect of systems theory
when he writes that
... to have an adequate grasp of reality we
must look at things as systems, with properties
and structures of their own. Systems of various
kinds can then be compared, their relationships
within still larger systems defined, and a general
context established. . . . the system view always
treats systems as integrated wholes of their sub-
sidiary components and never as the mechanistic
aggregate of parts in isolable causal relations.
(1972 : 14 - 15 )
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System properties, which are in essence similar to
the basic propositions of an organismic philosophy, pre-
sent a view of the universe as unified diversity. The
ancient Ouroboros and the modern holon (after Koestler,
1969) are indicative of the necessity of seeing an entity
as a whole in its own environment and a part in the to-
tality. The oft-quoted phrase "the whole is more than the
sum of its parts" becomes a reality when the collective
behavior, of the parts is considered in an organized
group. As Weiss says
. . . carrying out this upgrading process . . .
is in effect ... no more than restoring informa-
tion content that has been lost on the way down
in the progressive analysis of the unitary uni-
verse into abstracted elements. (1969:11).
In the realm of the physical sciences, modern
atomic physics has already made a departure from a strictly
mechanistic and particulate view of the physical world.
One of the most remarkable principles of atomic physics
was formulated by Wolfgang Pauli in 1925 and was called
the Exclusion Principle. Simply stated, the Pauli Exclu-
sion Principle rules that no two electrons can occupy the
same position at the same time. Therefore, the excluded
electron moves beyond to occupy the next empty shell.
Margenau, in writing about the singular status of this
principle, says that "the peculiar integrative signifi-
cance of the exclusion principle passed from view and has
even now been rarely recognized in its philosophical full
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ness” (1972:63).
The philosophical significance is well-stated by
Margenau
:
Prior to that time (before the exclusion prin-
ciple) all theories had affected the individual
nature of the so-called "parts”; the hew prfnT-"
ciple regulated their social behavior. With -
respect to a single particle it has nothing to
say. And what it says for aggregates, though
most important, cannot be expressed in terms of
dynamic regulation. It is as though here, for
the first time, physics had discovered within its
own precincts a purely social law, a law that is
simple in its basic formulation and yet immense in
its collective effects. Mechanistic reasoning,
already far behind, has gone out of sight as a
result of this latest advance. (1950:442-3)
Thus, the tendency of two electrons to avoid each
other was of extraordinary importance and provided explana-
tions for phenomena that give rise to the ordered sequences
and arrangements in physical objects. Such apparently
"co-operative" effects in inorganic matter accounts for
such phenomena as atomic structure, chemical binding,
crystal shape, cohesion of solids, magnetism, electricity,
etc. Margenau (1972) thus calls the exclusion principle
a "postulate of symmetry." From a systemic or organismic
perspective, this principle becomes meaningful because it
has no relevance for single electrons but only at the level
of the interrelations among electrons in a collective.
Similarly, in biology, living organisms display
phenomena that may be called "group behavior" (Weiss, 1969).
It is only by virtue of "ordered interactions (that) . . .
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molecules become partners in the living process" (Weiss
1969:8). A description of the- parts of the living organ-
ism do not account for the emergence of higher principles
in the whole. Bertalanf fy
' s "organismic biology" of the
1920s is certainly applicable in modern biology today.
Weiss, in discussing living systems, states that
there is still a tendency amongst biologists to think that
given time and through the consistent application of the
analytic method and then the synthetic mode, will come to an
understanding of the phenomenon of life. This view, he
says, is not adequate.
We are concerned with living organisms
,
and for
those, we can assert definitely, on the basis of
empirical investigation, that the mere reversal of
our prior analytic dissection of the Universe by
putting the pieces togethe r again, whether in
reality or just in our minds, can yield no complete
explanation of the behavior of even the most
e lementary living system
. (1969:7)
An organismic perspective is concerned with the
unique characteristics of the whole as a system, as well
as the relationship between the parts that constitute the
unified entity. As important as analytic investigations
are, synthesis and integration are just as vital to give us
a complete picture of the nature of reality.
Hierarchical Structuration
and~Int egration
Lancelot Law Whyte, an eminent proponent of the
hierarchical nature of systems, traces the historical roots
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of the term "hierarchy” to the time of the Creeks. "llier-’
archy" is derived from the Greek "hiero," holy, and
"arkhia," to rule. According to Whyte
,
the earliest or
archaic meaning in Greek for "hiero" was "vigorous" or
"energetic," such that "hierarchy" could have meant "ener-
getic control." This meaning is remarkably similar to our
present day understanding of the hierarchical character of
systems
.
The concept of hierarchy may be defined generally
as "a set of things graded in levels by asymmetrical rela-
tions" (Whyte, 1973:275) or "
. . . each integration level
implies the appearance of new qualities, new relationships,
which impose the need of new criteria of explanation"
(Montalenti, 1974:13). Both these definitions relate the
notion of hierarchy to concepts of systems, wholeness,
order and interrelatedness.
Weiss (1969) points out that the mere mention of
the term "levels" is a fundamental distinction between the
mechanistic and holistic means of explaining phenomena.
From a mechanistic point of view, all phenomena are reduced
to ultimate particles and whatever relationship exists among
them is seen as a set of continuous gradations from the
single elements to infinite combinations of them. The
hierarchical nature of existence seems to imply some sort
of boundary condition as the transition is made from a lower
to a higher level (Polanyi, 1967, 1976). However, empirical
36
study reveals that all existence is hierarchically organized
and that more complex levels exemplify higher principles of
operation. Weiss states that even though different levels
exist, it is the organization of these levels in a "dynamic"
wholeness that was the sensitive point. He says
. . .the systems concept is the embodiment of the
experience that there are patterned processes which
owe their typical configuration not to a pre-
arranged, absolutely stereotyped mosaic of single-
tracked component performances, but on the contrary,
to the fact that the component activities have many
degrees of freedom, but submit to the ordering
restraints exerted upon them by the integral ac-
tivity of the "whole" in its patterned systems
dynamics. (1969:9).
Many hierarchical classifications of the physical
world have been postulated, most notably by Whitehead (1969),
Laszlo (1973), Whyte (1973), and many others. The most
frequently cited are those hierarchies which begin with
inorganic nature, that is, from elementary particles to
atomic nuclei, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, ecosys-
tems and a world system. Whitehead’s scheme is radically
different in that he begins with human existence and works
his way in reverse direction to the ultimate happenings in
atoms. This view is not in conflict with the part/whole
relationships and the hierarchical order of nature except
that in this scheme Whitehead is able to explain the emer-
gence of consciousness, purpose and intent ionality more
adequately
.
The problem of accounting for the phenomenon of
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hierarchical order has been largely the challenge of the
life sciences (in particular, biology) in the form of
reduct ioni siu
. Barbour’s definition of reductionism makes
clear why this is a problem especially if it is seen as
the attributing of reality exclusively to the
smallest constituents of the world, and the
tendency to interpret higher levels of organiza-
tion in terms of lower levels. (in Thorpe,
1974:110)
Elementary phenomena in biology can be reduced to
physical and chemical explanation and this is always fully
valid and in fact necessary, as far as it goes, but if
these explanations are used to account for integrations
above the molecular level, then they are no longer adequate
or sufficient. The enormous advances and successes in
molecular biology, genetics, and medicine would not have
been possible without the detailed analytic, reductionist
approach. Ayala (1974)
,
in the Preface to Studies in the
Philosophy of Biology
,
analyzes the kinds of reductionism
that a scientist may espouse or reject. He identifies three
types: (1) ontological reductionism, which reduces all
living phenomena to physical chemical processes and par-
ticles; (2) methodological reductionism, which is concerned
with the strategy of research, e.g., should lower levels
be studied first to explain the higher or should both
higher and lower levels be investigated?; and (3) epistemo-
logical reductionistic questions that ask whether "the
theories and experiential laws formulated in one field of
3d
science can be shown to be special cases of theories and
laws formulated in some other branch of science?" (Ayala,
1974. ix) . Most biologists can accept methodological re*
ductionism but differ in their acceptance of the other
two forms.
If the methodology is so successful, then, as
Thorpe (1974) maintains, it is necessary to look very care-
fully into those specific areas in which it does fail. It
appears that reductionism cannot explain the concept of
"emergence." Broad’s definition of "emergence" is clear
and illuminating.
Emergence is the theory that the characteristic
behavior of the whole could not, even in theory,
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of
the behavior of its components, taken separately
or in other combinations, and of their propor-
tions and arrangements in this whole. (in Thorpe,
1974:110)
For example, the emergence of life in a cell can-
not be explained by simply putting together various combina-
tions of molecules. In the field of animal behavior, con-
cepts such as memory, habituation, learning, peripheral
synthesis, etc., emerge which do not exist at the vegetable
level. Similarly, at the level of human existence, the
unique capacity of consciousness, purposiveness, values,
moral intentions and religious convictions make their ap-
pearance. It is indeed not possible to reduce these emer-
gent qualities solely to the operation of physical and
chemical processes even though without the material at the
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level of atomic and elementary particles, these qualities
would not emerge.
Even in the realm of atomic physics Margenau (1972)
identifies the emergence of more important laws at higher
levels of complexity. He states that it is possible to
aescribe the state of a small system of particles in terms
of position, velocity and forces as in Newtonian mechanics.
However, at the next level of aggregates such as a gas or
liquid it is useless to describe position, velocity and
force in terms of individual molecules. Concepts such as
temperature, pressure, entropy, etc. are now necessary-
- in
relation to single molecules these concepts have no meaning.
However, it is possible to infer through statistical
mechanics the collective properties of a gas if the posi-
tions and velocities of individual molecules are known.
The reverse, however, is not true. Margenau says
. . . that there is continuity of explanation
from below, but not from above. One can go con-
tinually toward an understanding of matters on
the higher plane if one starts with knowledge on
the lower plane, though not in the reverse direc-
tion. But in this ascent, knowledge on the lower
plane becomes irrelevant because new concepts like
temperature, etc., emerge and these have no direct
reference to particles. (1972:42)
Similarly, the behavior of individual elementary
particles is explained by the Schroedinger equation which
in a way is similar to Newton's 2nd law as it relates to
force, mass and motion. If several elementary particles
of the same kind are present, then the more important Pauli
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Exclusion Principle operates.
In writing about social hierarchies, Arthur Koestler
presents an interesting analysis of the individual as a
part, and of society as a whole.
The single individual constitutes the apex of
the organismic hierarchy, and at the same time the
lowest unit of the social hierarchy. Looking in-
ward, he sees himself as a self-contained, unique
whole; looking outward as a dependent whole.
. . .
His self-assertive tendency is the dynamic mani-
festation of his unique wholeness as an individual;
his integrative tendency expresses his dependence
on the larger whole to which he belongs, his part-
ness. (1969:302)
Koestler states that the self-assertive tendency is
associated with the biological concerns of survival at the
level of the individual. The emotions that are triggered
through this tendency are defense and aggression, hunger,
fear and rage. Integrative tendencies give rise to what may
be called "sel f- transcending or participatory" emotions
such as the human being's need to be part of a larger whole,
e.g., social groups, bonds and ties of affection, belief and
value systems. The individual functions as an autonomous
being but at the same time is a part of, but different from,
the larger reality or nation.
An organismic perspective is concerned with patterns
of organization that are reflected at different integrative
levels. A particular pattern of relations as exemplified in
a whole is unique to that whole and cannot be reduced to the
pattern of the part.
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Efficient and Final Causation
A satisfactory cosmology must explain theinterweaving of efficient and final causation
. . . The two spheres of operation should beinterwoven and required, each by the other.
But neither sphere should arbitrarily limit the
scope of the alternative mode. (Whitehead.
1958:28)
An organismic perspective, if it is to remain faith-
ful to its principles of wholeness and interrelatedness,
must acknowledge the operation of both efficient and final
causes. Emphasis on one to the exclusion of the other leads
to contradiction. The rejection of final cause dates back
to the 17th century and the rise of modern science. The
inevitable outcome of the early empiricist scientific
philosophy led to the belief that
Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless,
colorless, merely the hurrying of material end-
lessly, meaninglessly
.
(Whitehead, 1967:54)
It was this kind of a perspective that propelled the
French astronomer and mathematician Pierre Laplace, in the
mid-17th century, to formulate a principle which today is
called the "Laplacian Illusion." He stated that if one
knew the exact position and motion of every atom then the
entire future of the world could be predicted. Causality
'in this narrow sense is called determinism by which is
meant "that there are immutable laws that uniquely deter-
mine the future state of any system from its present state"
(Heisenberg, 1970:34).
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Even though such strict deterministic and mechan-
istic views are not adhered to so vehemently by scientists
of today, the notion of final cause or teleology, is not
readily affirmed. Criticism of the use of teleological
concepts is traditionally based on several objections.
Mayr
,
a strong opponent on this score, outlines the major
objections as being (1) teleological explanations impart an
unverifiable metaphysical or theological doctrine into
science; (2) the assumption that a pre-conceived future
goal was the cause of current events is contrary to the
concept of causality; and (3) teleological language seems
to involve "objectionable anthropomorphism" (1974:93-94).
To overcome these objections in living organisms
which do display goal-seeking as intrinsic phenomena, the
term "teleonomy" was coined by Pittendrigh (in Mayr, 1974).
His reasoning went along these lines:
What it was that the biologist could not escape
was the plain fact--or rather the fundamental fact--
which he must (as scientist) explain: that the ob-
jects of biological analysis are organizations (he
calls them organisms) and as such, are end- directed
.
Organization is more than mere order; order lacks
end- dir ectedness
,
organization is_ end- directed.
(Pittendrigh in a letter to Mayr, 1974:115).
Pittendrigh ' s intention was to describe the end- dir ected-
ness of a mechanistic system, the only kind of system that
was acceptable to scientists. Mayr presents a modified
definition of teleonomy which is still strictly causal and
mechanistic
:
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A tel eonomic process or behavior is one which owesits goal
-directedness to the operation of a pro-
gram. (1974:98)
This definition refers only to living organisms and man-
made machines, in which a program may be the DNA code or
a computer program, respectively.
At the level of evolutionary biology where scien-
tists are dealing with crucial issues such as the origin
of life and the emergence of man, the tendency to maintain
only an efficient causal explanation is still evident.
Waddington cites Mayr's views on 20th century Darwinism in
the following two postulates:
(1) that all the events that lead to the production
of new genotypes, such as mutation, recombination
and fertilization, are essentially random and not
in any way whatsoever finalistic, and
(2) that the order in the organic world, manifested
in the numerous adaptations of organisms to the
physical and biotic environments is due to the
ordering effect of natural selection. (Waddington,
1962:85)
From these postulates, the neo -Darwinists hold that
"natural selection is an ordering process which brings
design out of randomness" (Birch, 1974:227) and this is
logically indisputable. For Dobzhansky "Evolution is
’ nomogenes is ' . . . Its 'law,' nomos , is natural selection"
(Dobzhansky, 1974:312). He goes further and attributes
creativity and the rise of the diversity of organic forms
to natural selection alone. Mayr (1961) also subscribes to
the view that natural selection is the sole instrument of
evolution
.
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The crucial question is identified by Birch (1974)
when he asks whether natural selection is the one and only
ordering process in organic and biological evolution. Mon-
talenti (1974), a neo-Darwinist who acknowledges the omni-
potence of natural selection, refers to the above sentiments
as "unresolved questions." The rise of phenomena such as
consciousness and purpose in man do not receive adequate
explanations from the process of natural selection.
It appears that other factors have to be included
if goal - directedness
,
consciousness and intentions are to
be accounted for. Waddington notes that
We have considerable grounds for believing
then, that mentality in the broad sense, or at
least behavior (biologists tend to be very timid
about mentioning the mind)
,
is a factor of impor-
tance in evolution . . . The situation is that
existing modes of behavior [themselves controlled,
with greater or lesser latitude, by heredity] com-
bine with the external circumstances to determine
the nature of the effective environment. (1962:91)
He expands on the notion of "mentality" in what he calls
a four-factor theory of evolution comprised of "the genetic
system, the natural selective system, the exploitative
system, and the developmental or epigenetic system" (Waa-
dington, 1975:270). The exploitative system is the area
in which the organism or entity has some "internal determi-
nation" in interacting with the environment. Waddington
(1962) cites the example of letting loose a hare and a
rabbit in an open grassland. Instinctively, the hare makes
its home in the open field and the rabbit in the hedge or a
4 5
bank. However, it is not possible to predict exactly where
in the field or which actual site in the hedge will be
chosen. For Waddington, having been deeply influenced by
Whitehead, it is the interaction between the internal state
of the organism and the external pressures of the environ-
ment that constitute the epigenetic principle reflected in
the shift to organismic thinking in evolution (Waddington,
1962 ) .
Internal determination is one of the main proposi-
tions of the Whiteheadian organismic thesis. Whitehead
terms it the "subjectivist principle," that everything is
in part determined by its own internal state. This does
not imply that there is no external agency, such as the
environment, that influences this state. But the environ-
ment does not fully determine the behavior of any given
entity. In man, the ability to determine the future course
of his evolution is unbounded. Consciousness and the
capacity for symbolization allow man to store information
in his memory, make plans for the future, and so affect what
he will become. The subjectivist principle in man is trans-
lated into subjective aim or purpose or intentionality . If
man is viewed as an integral part of nature, having evolved
from other forms, then that which is inherent in man must
also exist in some form in other levels of existence.
Whitehead says
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Mankind has gradually developed from the low-
liest forms of life, and it must therefore be ex-
plained in terms applicable to all such forms.
But why construe the later forms by analogy to the
earlier forms? Why not reverse the process? It
would seem to be more sensible, more truly empiri-
cal, to allow each living species to make its own
contribution to the demonstration of factors in-
herent in living things. (1958:15)
The contribution of existence at the mineral, vege-
table and animal levels is that some internal determination
exists in what they become, but not as consciousness, pur-
pose or aspirations which are unique to man. A stone has
very little determination over what it becomes, but even so
its atoms have some determination over where they finally
reside. Similarly, in the plant and animal spheres, some
internal state is operative, in a small way in plants, but
much more evident in animals. The subjectivist principle
is Wrhitehead’s equivalent of final cause in evolution; ran-
domness and chance are characteristic of events which are
not completely determined by some external agency.
In his major work, Process and Reality
,
Whitehead
accords the notion of efficient and final causation a par-
ticular status in his categorical scheme. He claims
That every condition to which the process of
becoming conforms in any particular instance, has
its reason either in the character of some actual
entity in the actual world of that concrescence,
or in the character of the subject which is in the
process of concrescence. This category of explana-
tion is termed the "ontological principle." It
could also be termed the "principle of efficient,
and final, causation." (1969:29)
The efficient cause in the evolutionary process is
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natural selection, which acts upon the organisms that al-
ready exist in tne physical world. Final cause is a factor
in the character of the subject or the internal "urge" or
determination towards self-completion in the process of
becoming
.
Charles Birch (1974), in an essay on "Chance, Neces-
sity and Purpose" in evolution, examines the issue of
teleology from a Whiteheadian perspective. He cites the
views of Thomas Huxley on evolution and teleology.
The doctrine of evolution is the most formidable
opponent of all the commoner and coarser forms of
Teleology . . . Nevertheless, it is necessary to
remember that there is a wider teleology which is
not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is
actually based upon the fundamental proposition of
Evolution. The proposition is that the whole
wrorld, living and non-living, is the result of
mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of
the powers possessed by the molecules of which the
primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed.
If this be true, it is no less certain that the
existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor
. . . The teleological and the mechanical views of
nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive.
(Huxley, in Birch, 1974:228)
The key phrase, "the existing world lay potentially
in the cosmic vapor" can be interpreted in terms of White-
head’s organismic philosophy, which elaborates upon the
process of translating potentiality into actuality. All
the determinate actual entities in the world of existence
did not arise out of nothing--the potential for actualiza-
tion existed. Something does not come from nothing, but
from something, and for Whitehead this something is the
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realm of potentiality or possibility, which has the capacity
for actualization in some future state.
Birch explains the notion of potentiality in evolu-
tion as follows:
We tend to take for granted the potentialities
nascent in the unevolved cosmos from its founda-
tions and writhout which the emergence of life and
consciousness would not have been possible. Poten-
tialities are unseen realities. In Huxley's state-
ment is the idea of the potentiality of the phe-
nomena of the universe residing in the primordial
particles. Far from being a preformist view this
is an epigenetic view of nature. There is no
necessity that what is potentially possible must
eventuate. What eventuates depends upon chance
and circumstance. (1975:228)
The philosophy of organism as set forth by White-
head is comprehensive enough to account for not only final
cause as internal determination and the potential for
realization, but also for natural selection as the effi-
cient cause in the process of evolution.
In the field of atomic physics, the Pauli Exclusion
Principle and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are in
essence measures of the internal determination in a system.
Heisenberg, in discussing the statistical nature of quan-
tum theory, says
. . .
that quantum theory actually forces us to
formulate these laws precisely as statistical laws
and to depart radically from determinism. (1970:
39)
He continues:
. . .
incomplete knowledge of a system must be an
essential par t of every formulation in quantum
theory
.
(1970:41)
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The very act of trying to measure the position and
velocity of an atomic particle- obscures the required data.
Under these conditions the particle "behaves" differently.
Heisenberg provides examples of some of these
uncertainty relations in quantum theory. In discussing the
alpha-radiation of a radium atom, he says that quantum
theory, through statistical laws, can give some information
of the probability of an alpha particle leaving the nucleus
. . . but it cannot predict at what precise point
in time emission will occur, for this is uncertain
in principle. We cannot even assume that new laws
still to be discovered will allow us to determine
this precise point in time . .
. ( 1970 : 41 )
Similarly, in calculating the strength of an atomic
bomb, only the upper and lower limits of the magnitude of
explosion can be predicted. Exact calculations are im-
possible because it depends on the behavior of only a few
atoms when the detonation occurs. The particular atoms
which will take part in the fission cannot be predicted
precisely. That is, the atoms which actually participate
in the process must somehow be determined internally in the
system. In Whiteheadian terms this is the subjectivist
principle in operation, that is, the final cause or "purpose"
is to some extent determined by internal relations in the
collective system of atoms.
Even in the social sciences, ever since the diver-
gence of psychology from philosophy, man has been conceived
of in mechanistic terms or just efficient causes. The sig-
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nificant event was the publication of Newton's Principi a
which set forth the major principles of classical mechanics.
The prevailing idea was that the behavior of man could be
explained in terms of Newton's mechanical model. Science
viewed man in terms of input and output and cause and
effect explanations of behavior which created the vision
of a robot or a puppet. Michael Polanyi (1974) discusses
this notion in a thoughtful manner, having first been a
scientist and then turning to philosophy to disclose the
nature of the scientist's thought, his beliefs and convic-
tions, and his influence upon society. He says, "A complete
causal interpretation of man and human affairs disintegrates
all rational grounds for men's convictions and actions. It
leaves you with a picture of human affairs construed in
terms of appetites and checked only by fear" (Polanyi, 1974:
64) .
This view was widely held by experimental psycholo-
gists in the early 1900s in the established behaviorist
tradition. Psychological thought processes were explained
by efficient causes, i.e., cause and effect relationships.
The notion of man as being guided by final cause, i.e., the
ingression of purpose and will in his life was ruled out
as unscientific. Any evidence that lay outside the suc-
cessful methodology was ignored. Scientists spend years of
their lives patiently designing experiments for the purpose
of proving that animals are only motivated by psychological
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drives and needs. Whitehead's comment is apt: "Scientists
animated by the purpose of proving that they are purpose-
less constitute an interesting subject for study" (White-
head, 1958:16).
Purpose is the driving force in man; it gives di-
rection, guidance and power in the pursuit of a successful
and meaningful life. Society is plagued with individuals
who are on the verge of absolute despair or who display
crass hedonism because of a purposeless existence. Towers
(1971), in citing Frankl's notion of the "existential
vacuum," states that the insignificance of man has been
caused by (1) astronomy, which is the science of the in-
finitely large; (2) the uncertainty principle, which robs
us of any belief in certainty and stability; and (3) psycho-
therapy, which analyzes and reduces praiseworthy human ac-
tions to nothing but inner, unconscious, unresolved drives
and conflicts. The result has been the overwhelming spirit
of "being adrift in a totally meaningless universe." Frankl
says that
We may define the existential vacuum as the frus-
tration of what we may consider to be the most
basic motivational force in man, the will to
meaning. . . . It is an inherent tendency in man
to reach out for meaning to fulfill, for values
to actualize. (1969:398-400)
However, the rise of humanistic psychology and organismic
philosophy have presented the necessity of viewing man as a
being who is purposeful, forms goals, makes choices, and
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who is endeavoring to become his unique, individual self
(Rogers
,
1964)
.
Just focusing on efficient causes either in nature
or in man presents only a limited view of reality. An
organismic perspective in adhering to the principle of
relatedness seeks to reunite both the external and internal
aspects of events in nature and in human experience. Ef-
ficient and final causation reflect the patterned unity
that is necessary if we are to have any meaningful under-
standing of reality.
Toward an Organismic Perspective
in Science Education
The preceding discussion on the organization of
systems, hierarchical structuration and integration, and
efficient and final causation was undertaken so that the
organismic perspective in scientific thought could be made
more explicit. Certainly not all scientists would sub-
scribe to such a viewpoint. However, in trying to ascer-
tain where contemporary scientific thought stands, one
necessarily focuses on the work of those who are at the
forefront of knowledge, those prominent figures who see
the growth of our understanding about reality in an evolu-
tionary perspective. These are the scientists who effect
revolutions in our accustomed and comfortable ways of
thinking, who capture visions of the future, and who seek
to interpret the totality of reality. The new patterns of
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thinking in science, imperceptible as they may seem, per-
vade our consciousness and have the power, as Whitehead
claims, "to recolor our mentality." Anshen, in the Pre-
face to the World Perspective series, clearly describes the
impact of the scientific view of reality:
For our problem is to discover a principle of
differentiation and yet relationship lucid enough
to justify and to purify scientific, philosophic
and all other knowledge, both discursive and in-
tuitive, by accepting their interdependence. This
is the crisis in consciousness made articulate
through the crisis in science. This is the new
awakening. (1971 :xi)
The point of view adopted in this dissertation is
that an organismic philosophy can accommodate the merits
of mechanism but can also transcend its limitations with
an emphasis on wholeness, unity and organism and so pro-
vide a comprehensive view of the nature of man and the
nature of physical reality. Whitehead’s process philosophy
or philosophy of organism was found to be the most expan-
sive, particularly in the range of issues which it could
address
.
The organismic philosophy advanced by Whitehead
views the universe as being characterized by change and
dynamic interactions rather than static actuality. Change
implies process which automatically presupposes potentiality.
Potentiality becoming actuality is the central thesis of a
philosophy of organism. Any active, developing, open sys-
tem, rather than maintaining a steady state, can be seen to
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exhibit the powerful processes of change, growth and
adaptation. At every moment these dynamic systems are in
the process of actualizing a potential state of being.
Whitehead states that "the actual world is a process, and
that the process is the becoming of actual entities"
(1969:27) .
Man, as a flexible and active system, is also an
integral part of this hierarchically structured universe.
He may be viewed as being in a continuous, dynamic process
of development and transformation with the capacity to per-
t
petually actualize his potentialities and fulfill his in-
tentions and aspirations. The perpetual actualization of
potentiality is manifested in the tremendous strides that
man has made in the fields of science, medicine, and tech-
nology, such that he has the power to constantly improve
the quality of his life, if these powers are used wisely.
Maintenance of a high quality of life is conditioned by the
continuous translation of potentiality into actuality at an
optimal rate. Whitehead (1958) postulates the facilitation
of actualization of potential as the primary purpose of life,
since the aim of survival is not only to live but to be
alive in a more satisfactory manner.
I propose that science education should appeal to
the central proposition of the philosophy of organism: that
the reality of all of creation on every level is to be found
in the process of becoming and that man must be accepted as
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a purposeful being who has the power to actualize his
potential and contribute to the collective survival of
mankind. Science curriculum development then, in its
broadest sense, will have to focus not only on fostering
the growth of understanding of scientific concepts, but
also on how that knowledge is to be applied.
The following chapter sets forth a possible ap-
proach to solving some of the problems raised in Chapter
I. The Anisa Model is presented as one viable scheme that
incorporates an explicit philosophical base (derived from
the work of Alfred North Whitehead)
,
and a coherent theo-
retical framework that can address the issue of science
curriculum development in a wider context.
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CHAPTER III
THE ANISA MODEL: AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE
ACTUALIZATION OF HUMAN POTENTIAL
The abstract, general principles of a philosophical
scheme of thought do not directly issue in action. These
principles need to be translated into a coherent theoreti-
cal framework that can guide practice. Jordan 6 Shephard,
in describing the role of philosophy, say that
A more specific function of philosophy is to
stimulate the formation of theory from which
testable hypotheses may be deduced. (1972:23)
Broudy, in the following statement, touches on the
need for a comprehensive theory in education:
This unifying principle is a theory of education
which rationally weaves together the objectives of
the culture, life outcomes, school outcomes, the
training of teachers, specialists and adminis-
trators, as well as the facilities and resources
by means of which the whole enterprise goes or
falters. The consistency of this theory, its
inclusiveness and sophistication, its faithfulness
to the demands of the culture, to social reality,
to the facts of pedagogical life constitute cri-
teria for curriculum decisions that transcend
establishments. It is, I shall argue, the only
rationally defensible basis for educational de-
cisions. (1966:18)
Without such an integrative framework, educational
practice will to a large extent remain ineffective. Frag-
mentation, frustration and the lack of meaningful experi-
ences are frequent problems that plague teachers. The
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accumulated knowledge from experience and research find-
ings has to be organized into a useable form and this can-
not be done unless a coherent body of theory is formulated
(Jordan and Streets, 1973). Information on human growth
and development, learning, and teaching can be so organized
that the classroom teacher has the benefit of a solid base
from which to operate. A teacher can then be freed from
being tied to specific instances and activities and can
use the general theoretical principles as a guide to prac-
tice.
The continual interplay between theory and practice
is well-stated by Belth:
Most important, we are freed from the impossible
distinction between theory and practice in edu-
cating. The study of education, then, can be
the study of practice which is developed on the
grounds of some definable, analyzable theory of
man, knowledge, experience and value. (1965:35)
In this manner, theory guides practice, and prac-
tice informs theory. At its best, a theory should be pre-
dictive and if the predictions are not borne out, then
changes have to be made in the theory. If education is
viewed as a process of unfoldment of the developing indi-
vidual, then educational theories have to be flexible and
tentative so that new research findings on human growth
and learning can be continually incorporated.
Tentativeness, relativeness and predictability
are guiding principles in theoretical construction and re
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construction. The power of theories are most familiar in
the natural sciences and in mathematics. Briefly, theories
are sets of abstract, conceptual constructs from which in-
ferences can be made about the world (Belth, 1965). A
theory is a tool that aids in going beyond that which is
directly observable. In some cases, theories are based on
experimental evidence and said to be inductive; in other
cases theories are derived deductively from fundamental
propositions about the nature of reality, but they
have to be substantiated inductively. For example, Ein-
stein’s general theory of relativity was deduced from pro-
positions about the nature of gravity and light, but the
theory was accepted after experimental confirmation.
Similarly, in education, what goes on in the child's
mind cannot be observed but has to be inferred from behavior
or products of behavior such as written work. In most
cases, only content or factual knowledge can be assessed by
tests or observation. However, since so much of learning
and the effects of teaching cannot be seen directly,
theories that are based on fundamental assumptions about
the nature of the child and on research findings are essen-
tial .
The plea by science educators for a viable theory
in science education can now be viewed in some perspective.
Science education could be rendered more effective if there
were a comprehensive theory about the nature of the child,
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learning and the teaching process. The challenge to
science education is acute, as reflected in the words of
Hurd: "We now have sixty years of cumulated research in
science teaching and yet little notion of where we stand
on practically any question" (1971:246).
The Philosophy and Theory of the
Anisa Model^
The Anisa Model is the expression of the hope that
it is possible to create a scientifically-based educational
system that can equip parents, teachers and children with
the power to be in charge of their own destiny. Anisa may
be viewed as a socio- cultural endeavor whose aim is to show
people how to obtain and use knowledge, so that not only
will their own potential be actualized, but also, they can
contribute to the betterment of the society in which they
live. Such a task is not easy and comfortable. It calls
for a sustained, prolonged and systematic effort that can
effect changes in the traditional ways of perceiving,
thinking, feeling and willing.
Over the last fifteen years efforts have been ex-
^"This brief discussion has been drawn from articles
published on the Anisa Model, namely: D. Jordan and R. Shep-
hard, "The Philosophy of the Anisa Model." World Order re-
print 7(1) (Fall 1972P: 23-31); D. Jordan and D. Streets, "A
New Basis for Educational Planning," Young Children 28(5)
(June 1973) : 289-307 ; Jordan and Streets, '“Guiding the Pro-
cess of Becoming: The Anisa Theories of Curriculum and
Teaching," World Order reprint 7(4) (Summer 1973):29-40.
Every major proposition will therefore not be documented.
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erted in the direction of establishing the fundamental
premises of the Anisa Model. An explicit philosophy with
carefully defined first principles forms the foundation
upon which the Anisa Model rests. The process or organis-
mic philosophy of the philosopher, mathematician and logi-
cian, Alfred North Whitehead, was adopted in an attempt to
transcend the limitations of a mechanistic and material-
istic view of man. Whitehead's philosophy of organism
serves to highlight those features that are characteristic
of man, such as consciousness, will, purpose and creativity.
An organismic perspective is essential and vitally needed
if we are to view education as the process of drawing out
the latent, inherent potentialities of every individual.
Man's growth or becoming is characterized by the continual
translation of potentiality into actuality such that the
primary focus of development is on process rather than
static actuality.
The organismic philosophical perspective served as
a framework so that the accumulated knowledge about human
growth, development and learning could be synthesized into
a comprehensive, coherent, and logical body of educational
theory. Explicit theories of development, curriculum,
teaching, evaluation and administration have been derived
from the basic philosophical principles and address the
issue of how the actualization of potential may be effected.
The Anisa theory of development identifies two
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basic categories of potentialities: biological potentiali-
ties which are released through proper nutrition, and
psychological potentialities which are actualized through
learning. Psychological potentialities may be further
classified as psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affec-
tive and volitional potentialities. The separation and
distinction amongst the different categories of psycho-
logical potentialities was made only for the ease of under-
standing and fostering a particular dimension of develop-
ment; it is fully understood that every act of experience
will involve all five categories, each to a greater or
lesser extent. The theory affirms that development as a
whole is sustained through interaction with the environ-
ment. Thus the quality of environment influences the
quality of the interaction which in turn influences de-
velopment .
The theory of curriculum describes what informa-
tion is to be learned (content)
,
how it is to be learned
(process)
,
and what children do to learn both content and
process. Content curriculum goals are organized around the
hierarchical classification of environments- - in ascending
order from mineral, vegetable, animal, human to the un-
known. A grouping of the first three environments repre-
sents the physical environment (the realm of natural
science) . Process curriculum goals are arranged around
the categories of psychological potentialities, so that in
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interacting with the environment, psychomotor, perceptual,
cognitive
,
affective and/or volitional processes may be
actualized
.
In interacting with the environments, a learner
will utilize three interrelated symbol systems: mathe-
matics, language, and the arts. Some environments may
be mediated predominantly by one mode of symbolization,
whereas at other times a combination of modes may be used.
Potentialities, when they are actualized, are ex-
pressed as patterned uses of energy. When the learning of
some content is fused with the patterned use of energy
(process)
,
attitudes and values are formed which reflect
the character and personality of the learner. Interaction
with the physical, human and unknown environments results
in the formation of material, social and philosophical
values respectively. Upon these values rest the higher
order competencies, that is, technological, moral and
fiducial. The combination of the three higher-order com-
petencies results in self- competence or personal effectance,
i.e., learners who are self - competent , with balanced and
wel 1 - integrated personalities who can take charge of their
own learning by knowing how to apply their knowledge to
life
.
In searching for an integrative system that could
answer some of the issues facing science education, I found
the comprehensiveness, conceptual clarity and coherence of
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the Anisa philosophy and theory to be particularly at-
tractive (see Figure I). Since the focus of this dis-
sertation is on science curriculum development, I feel that
the Anisa Theory can serve a valuable function in the
generation of a possible framework for the development of
a natural science curriculum.
Science and the Actualization of
Human Potential
The attempt to place education on a scientific
basis has been a major goal of the Anisa Model. According-
ly, the study and the teaching of science occupies an
important place in the theoretical framework of the Model.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an elabo-
ration of some of the Anisa propositions as they relate
to science and the investigation of nature, the process of
symbolization, the formation of material values, the attain-
ment of technological competence and its relation to
moral and fiducial competence.
Purpose of Science
Throughout recorded history man has been driven by
his quest for explanations and answers about the phenomena
in the physical world. This process of inquiry, together
with the desire to know and to understand, was the impetus
to the rise of modern science. Not only is there the
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search to know why and how things happen, but there is also
the drive to find relationships between events and see how
all events are integrated into the unity of existence.
Bronowski
,
in describing the scientific endeavor, says that
the goal is
. . to find nature one, a coherent unity
. . . that every research carries the sense of drawing
together the threads of the world into a patterned web”
(1967:138)
.
The desire to explore, to discover order and
patterned relationships has been amply demonstrated and
documented in the field of psychology and is worth review-
ing briefly. One can understand the power of the need to
find and create order when its relationship to survival is
made more evident. Gibson (1967), in her extensive work
on perceptual learning, states that out of the welter of
stimuli that impinge on the sense organs, the organism ex-
tracts certain bits of information. It is the detection
of the distinctive features of objects and events and their
patterns of invariant relations that is of most value to
the organism. These invariant features and relationships
aid in the reduction of uncertainty and hence create order
and a sense of predictability and stability. The organism
or the individual gains meaning from ordered events and not
from disordered or chaotic situations. In the continual
reduction of subjective uncertainty, survival can be sus-
tained and enhanced. Reinforcement for the detection of
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of invariants may be provided by external rewards or know-
ledge of the results but primarily the satisfaction is
internal
.
Psychologists, such as Berlyne (1966) also sug-
gest that curiosity and exploration act as strong internal
motivating factors. Berlyne found that there were two
kinds of exploratory responses. Firstly, specific ex-
ploration occurs when an organism is disturbed by lack of
information and thus left prey to uncertainty and conflict.
Activities such as science, philosophy and mathematics bear
a close affinity to this type of exploration, with curio-
sity being the motivating factor. Secondly, diverse ex-
ploration is of a more general type where what is sought is
an optimum amount of novelty, surprise, complexity, change
or variety. Berlyne has investigated this latter type in
many experiments with subjects ranging from young infants
to adults. Complexity, irregularity and incongruity of
pattern was investigated. An optimum range of these fac-
tors increased exploratory behavior, but if they were
extremely irregular, then the responses declined. Even
babies of 3-9 months were attracted by patterns that were
more complex as these possessed more internal contour.
In man the spirit of inquiry into nature is more
than the desire to know and to understand. It also en-
tails the sense of achieving mastery or gaining control
over nature by applying its laws.
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In his classic paper on "Motivation Reconsidered:
The Concept of Competence," White (1959) reviews the various
theories of motivation based on primary drives and presents
a new conceptualization which accounts for the previous
gaps. Competence is defined as "an organism’s capacity to
deal effectively with its environment" (White, 1959:297).
Exploration, play, manipulation and producing changes serve
to create a certain "feeling of efficacy" in dealing with
the environment, a sense of mastery and satisfaction over
environmental situations. These types of activities lead
the organism to discover how the environment can be changed
and the consequences that flow from these changes. The
motivating force behind such behavior is what White terms
"competence motivation" or effectance. It is directed,
selective, persistent and satisfies an intrinsic need to
deal effectively with the environment. Above all, this
view of effectance has adaptive and survival value.
A further discussion by Whitehead on the role of
curiosity helps to make the connection between the impel-
ling power of curiosity and the conceptual understanding
that accrues from such a drive. In the following quota-
tion, he extends our conception of curiosity and endows
it with added significance:
. . .
the word 'curiosity' somewhat trivializes
that inward motive which has driven man. In the
greater sense . . . 'curiosity' means the craving
of reason that the facts discriminated in experi-
ence be understood. It means the refusal to be
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satisfied with the bare welter of fact, or even
with the bare habit of routine. The first step
in s c i enc e and philosophy has been made when it
is grasped that every routine exemplifies a prin-
ciple which is capable of statement in abstrac-
tion from its particular exemplification.
(1967a: 141)
The statement of general principles in abstraction
from the immediate facts stand as a testimony to some of the
greatest achievements of the mind of man. Broad, general-
ized propositions that could be articulated led to the
formation of theories and laws about the working of nature.
Having general theoretical conceptualizations about the
numerous events in the physical world has allowed man to
display a sense of mastery or competence in dealing with
natural phenomena. Through these theories man now has the
power to test out possible consequences of certain events,
make predictions about novel events and plan and choose
alternative routes of inquiry and action. He can make
what Whitehead calls ’’the creative advance into novelty."
The purpose of science in the conceptual, intellec-
tual and theoretical vein may be seen as possessing a
transcendent function: philosophical and theoretical know-
ledge about nature provide man with a vehicle with which he
can transcend his present lack of understanding and per-
petually move beyond into the realm of unknown possibilities.
Application of theoretical knowledge in uplifting
the quality of lifs of mankind is also an important func-
tion of science. The distinction that is frequently made
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between 'pure science' and 'applied science’ is artificial
and unnecessary. Both areas feed each other, as is evident
in Whitehead's statement about the rise of modern science:
Invention stimulated thought, thought quickened physical
speculation" (1976c: 5).
Much of the poverty, disease, and ill-health in
the world have been successfully attacked by advances in
science. Scientific and technical progress have certainly
given men all over the world visions of the power of science.
However, for all the advances in science and technology, the
level of the conscious awareness of preserving the earth as
an inhabitable planet has yet to be realized. Pollution,
depletion of energy resources, and the threat of nuclear
destruction haunt us daily. As Huxley says, "... the
human race is, in fact, surrounded by a large area of un-
realized possibilities, a challenge to the spirit of ex-
ploration" (1957:15). The time has certainly arrived when
the challenge to discovery and invention has to be closely
allied to moral concerns. Science does not exist in isola-
tion from the people--its true power lies in its capacity
to enhance the quality of survival of mankind, both intel-
lectually, emotionally and physically.
Mediation of the Physical Environment
Through the Process of Symbolization
-
Interaction with any environment can be mediated by
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the use of symbols. One of the propositions of the Anisa
Model is that there are three symbol systems which mediate
our encounters with the world; namely, mathematics, lan-
guage and the arts. Scientific investigation of nature
depends upon the use of math and language (e.g., English
terminology) primarily; the role of the arts per se is
negligible except in the sense of aesthetic awareness and
holistic integration of various events into some unitary
experience, which is a vital concern in science.
The process of symbolization is defined by Marks
(1976:91) as "the capacity to use (entities) symbols to
represent abstractions (conceptions or meanings) The
data of experience are received through perception (sight,
hearing, smell and touch) and are repsented by symbols. A
symbol is an entity that can stand for something else in the
absence of it. For example, words, numbers, pictures or
graphs are symbols.
For Whitehead any phase of human experience has
two aspects -- intell ectual and aesthetic, i.e., the act of
symbolization may be seen as logical and/or aesthetic
(1968b; 1969). 2 Interactions which are designed to insure
^For a detailed elaboration of the role of symboli-
zation and abstraction in the Anisa Model see Marks (1976).
^Current developments in the Anisa Model center
around the explication of the logical and aesthetic modes
of symbolization. Since these developments are still m .
process, this dissertation will not dwell on these facts m
great detail.
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control of the environment depend on scientific understand-
ing and this is only possible when symbols are used to sus-
tain logical modes of thought. Logical modes of symboli-
zation are used as a means of expressing the 1:1 corres-
pondence between appearance and objective reality, i.e.,
the representations are as accurate, precise and true to
the original as possible. The scientist in the logical
investigation of nature is analytic and endeavors to be as
objective as possible. However, it is fallacious to assume
that scientists are wholly objective in their interactions
with the physical environment. From an interact ionist
point of view, the unity of experience is exemplified in the
integrated action of the subjective and the objective, the
internal and external states of the organism. The nature of
scientific thought is marked by the interplay of these two
elements: while a scientist attempts to be as objective as
possible in the light of the given evidence, he is nonethe-
less continually guided by inner, subjective states--pur-
poses, intentions, aspirations. Despite its air of strict
empiricism and objectivity, science can be understood as
a deeply humanistic endeavor. Polanyi, in a discussion on
objectivity in science, recalls how scientific theory came
to be reduced to a ’’convenient contrivance" in the modern
mind. It appears, however, that reality as painted by
science cannot escape being viewed from a singularly human
perspective. He claims that
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as human beings, we must inevitably see the uni-
verse from a center lying within ourselves and
speak about it in terms of a human language
shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse.
Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human
perspective from our picture of the world must
lead to absurdity. ( 1958 : 1 )
The human perspective that Polanyi speaks about may
be seen as the aesthetic mode of symbolization in the scien-
tific process in inquiry. Aesthetic symbolization serves as
a means of expressing the subjective or internal phase of
human experience. The logical analysis of nature is ac-
companied by an intimate sense of awe, wonder and joy in
the harmony of existence. A scientist expresses this sub-
jective experience of nature in the elegance and beauty of
the mathematical formulations or in the simplicity of
general principles.
On the one hand, it is true to say that scientific
inquiry is primarily a logical, rational, and analytic
process, but on the other hand it is inadequate because it
fails to account for the integrative and holistic aspect of
thought. The problem appears to be one of emphasis and
purpose rather than deliberate exclusion. In the logical
and aesthetic modes of symbolization, the purpose for the
expression is different and therefore the principles of
translation or method of representation also differs. A
scientist will use precise, systematic, mathematical
formulae to describe the laws of gravity whereas the artist
may write a poem, paint a work of art of create a dance to
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describe the same law. The scientist will rarely use
aesthetic symbols to express his discoveries but only
logical symbols like language and mathematics. However,
the general frame of reference within which he operates
proceeds from aesthetic assumptions such as the order of
nature and the unity of all existence.
The patterns in nature are represented symbolically
in a variety of ways by scientists: mathematical formulae
and graphical representations describe the relationships
between phenomena in the physical world; accurate works or
treatises are written about the principles and laws of
physics, chemistry, biology and geology; and diagrams
which are precise, pleasing in appearance and true to
form are used to represent plants, animals, molecular struc-
tures and geological formations. In all these instances,
the goal is to clarify the 1:1 correspondence between ap-
pearance and reality.
Whitehead’s philosophy expressed the relationships
among the notions of appearance, reality, truth, beauty,
science and art. He says that the method of investigation
in science is dedicated to the pursuit of truth. The mean-
ing of this is made more explicit by Whitehead (1967) in
his discussion of appearance and reality: reality is that
which exists or that which is. Appearance is only an
’’incredibly simplified edition of real ity” - -what is seen or
observed is limited to our human way of looking and under-
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standing. The measure of truth exists insofar as appear-
ance corresponds with reality, which of itself can never be
known directly. Whitehead writes that "Truth is the con-
formation of Appearance to Reality. This conformation may
be more or less, also direct or indirect" (1967:241).
Experimentation and investigation can make closer and
closer approximations to the way things are and so present
a clearer picture of events in the world. Scientific laws
are never more than an approximation to the truth, although
at times it may be a very close one (Huxley, 1957).
Beauty, for Whitehead, is "the mutual adaptation of
the several factors in an occasion of experience" (1967:252);
that is, it represents the integration of various items into
a patterned unity of experience. Integration, pattern and
unity are elements of order and in this sense the scientist's
search for the order of nature is the pursuit of beauty.
At a deeper and less obvious level, the universe is har-
moniously well-ordered, which makes Whitehead's claim fit-
ting: "The teleology of the Universe is directed to the
production of Beauty" (1967a:265).
Traditionally, beauty has been associated only or
primarily with artistic pursuits and the implication is
that science and art are somehow incompatible. Bronowski
says that the dichotomy between science and art has been
one of "the most destructive modern prejudices" (1967:9),
and C.P. Snow (1959) has amply described the schism in his
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k00 ^ The Two Cultures
. Science and art, when truly sig-
nificant, incorporate both truth and beauty. For the
scientist, the discovery of the laws of nature is a
beautiful truth, and for the artist, a work of art is a
truthful beauty.
Role of Mathematics in Science
As mentioned previously, the primary means of in-
quiry in science is through the processes of logical
thought that can be clearly symbolized. Language and
mathematics are the tools of the scientist. However, at
higher and higher levels of generality, mathematics be-
comes the indispensable instrument of explanation and
expression.
Historians and philosophers of science concur on
the point that the rise of modern science in the 16th and
17th centuries would not have occurred without mathematics
(Whitehead, 1967c; Butterfield, 1965; Kemeny, 1969; Cas-
sirer, 1944; Toulmin, 1960). A concise and brief descrip-
tion of the history of mathematics can be found in White-
head's work (1968a: 285-286; 1 967c : 1 9- 37) . The Greeks were
thought to have created the sciences of geometry and number
by reviving and expanding some of the pre-existing ideas
from the Egyptians and the Phoenecians. Pythagoras was the
first man to have delved into an understanding of the impor-
tance of number as an abstract entity. From the medieval
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period until today, the most sophisticated forms of
mathematical theories have been developed: algebra, trig-
onometry and differential calculus to Riemannian geometry
and catastrophe theory. In most instances of scientific
discovery, new forms of mathematical equations had to be
developed to fit the observed facts, e.g., Heisenberg dis-
covered matrix calculus, which was invaluable in calculat-
ing some of the properties of atomic systems; Von Neumann
extended Heisenberg’s conception to a statistical matrix
calculus which combined the basic propositions of quantum
mechanics and probability theory (Margenau, 1950). Some-
times, mathematical structures are entirely deduced to
explain the harmony of the world. Piaget, as an eminent
mathematician and logician in trying to explain the harmony
that exists between mathematics and the real world, says:
. . . deduction sometimes takes place before and
not after the experiment, that is, in anticipation
. . . But even more striking and more common is
the construction of purely abstract mathematical
structures, which afterward serve as indispensable
frameworks for physical phenomena, without having
been intended as such beforehand. Well-known
examples of this are Riemann’s expression of space
and Einstein's use of tensorial calculus as well
as the many geometric and algebraic models used
in microphysics. (1971:341)1
The key phrase in the above quote is the "c.onstruc-
1Einstein, in the early 40s, suggested to Piaget
that an investigation of the child's understanding of
time, velocity and movement would be of interest to epis-
temology. Piaget then, published The Development of Child'
s
Conception of Time and The Development of the Child's Con-
ception of Movement and Speed (Ginsburg 5 Opper , 1969)
.
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tion Oi purely ab s tr act mathcinat ical structures." To
abstract or the process of abstraction is the power that
underlies symbolization. According to Marks (1976)
,
the
word abstract or abstraction commonly refers to "
.
thought that entertains ideas and that is based on but is
essentially divorced from concrete experience" (p. 47) and
may be taken literally to mean the separation between the
actual and the ideal. The scientist's capacity to antici-
pate as expressed in the above quote by Piaget reflects
the ability to think in terms of the ideal state or the
possibilities that could be. The formulation of the great
theories and laws in science could never have been achieved
without man's capacity for abstraction and the urge to
transcend his present state of knowledge and move into the
realm of potentiality. Hypothetico- deduct ive thought
allowed Galileo to conceive of a purely isolated system
(which never occurs in nature) and which led to his science
of dynamics (Cassirer, 1944:49; Whitehead, 1967c:46).
Einstein, in his autobiography, discusses the
power of abstract thought in investigating nature and the
"free play with concepts:"
Out yonder there was this huge world, which exists
independently of us human beings and which stands
before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least
partially accessible to our inspection and think-
ing. The contemplation of this world beckoned
like a liberation . . . The mental grasp of this
extra personal world within the frame of the given
possibilities swam as highest aim half-consciousiy
and half-unconsciously before my mind's eye. (1970:
5)
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Heisenberg (1971) reports on Einstein's remarkable
"thought experiments" which reflected his mental grasp of
the inmost essence of physical phenomena. In the early
days of the formation of the uncertainty principle, Einstein
would present innumerably imaginary experiments to refute
the new law. He would present an experiment at breakfast,
and if after a whole day of discussion the uncertainty
principle was not shaken, by next morning he was ready
with a new imaginary experiment more complicated than the
previous one.
Much of the emphasis in Piaget's work has been on
the development of abstract conceptual thought in children.
Piaget (1970a) describes the understanding of logico-
mathemat ical relations as the most basic form of knowledge.
The young child, in learning to conserve, has to learn that
certain aspects of objects remain invariant even after
transformations occur. The qualities of number, substance
and area have to be abstracted from the perceptual input
and held in the mind's eye though changes take place in
the environment.
The notions of abstraction, ideal, actual and good
in relation to mathematics was first explored by the Greek
thinkers. The Greeks instinctively searched for general
abstract principles that explained the nature of reality
(Whitehead, 1967c) and it was Pythagoras, who in his study
of music, discovered the independent existence of ratios
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between numbers that could express musical intervals
(Cornford, 1971). It was Plato, however, who maintained
the overwhelming importance of math in relation to the
ideal forms in nature-
-he continually sought for the "forms
in the facts" (Whitehead, 1969:25). In a discussion on
"mathematics and the Good," Whitehead notes that
Human intelligence can conceive of a type of things
in abstraction from exemplification. The most ob-
vious disclosures of this characteristic of humanity
are mathematical concepts and ideals of the Good--
ideals which stretch beyond any immediate realiza-
tion.
Any practical experience of exactness of reali-
zation is denied to mankind: whereas mathematics,
and ideals of perfection, are concerned with exact-
ness. (1968a:104)
The abstract formal properties of mathematics are
exactly suited to the scientific description of events.
Abstractions help us to deal with the forms of relation-
ships or with the unchanging aspects of reality. White-
head, as a mathematician with few equals, explains the
abstract nature of mathematics in a clear manner.
. . . it applies to everything, to tastes and to
sounds, to apples and to angels, to the ideas of
the mind and to the bones of the body. The nature
of the things is perfectly indifferent, of all
things it is true that two and two make four.
Thus we write down as the leading characteristic
of mathematics that it deals with properties and
ideas which are applicable to things just because
they are things, and apart from any particular
feelings, or emotions, or sensations, in any way
connected with them. This is what is meant by
calling mathematics an abstract science. (White-
head, 1972:2)
Scientific laws are usually expressed in the form
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Ox mathematical equations because they exemplify the opera-
tion of general principles apart from every specific in-
stance. Discovery of patterned relationships in nature
is what concerns the scientist and "Mathematics is the most
powerful technique for the understanding of pattern, and
for the analysis of the relationships of patterns (White-
head, 1968:109).
Dealing in the realm of abstract principles confers
upon science its power of prediction and explanation. Con-
sequences of events and alternative solutions can be con-
ceived of theoretically before the events actually transpire.
Man is thus able to gain control over the physical environ-
ment and endeavor to enhance and sustain the quality of life
of mankind.
Whitehead sounds a cautionary note in relation to
science and abstraction. The procedure of analysis in
exact thought is vital and necessary but "... it weakens
the sense of reality" (1968a : 11 3) . By this he means that
science investigates parts of reality but a more compre-
hensive philosophical scheme is needed to interpret all
aspects of the ultimate nature of reality.
Science education, then, should infuse children
with a sense of the truth and beauty in nature. Mathe-
matics and language are necessary logical tools for expres-
sing the precise cause and effect relationships in physical
events. However, the aesthetic mode of symbolizing the
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imaginative joy in the beauty and harmony of nature should
not be neglected.
Formation of Material Values
Through Scientific Inquiry
Since the formation of values is a characteristic
of man and the Anisa Model is concerned with the actualiza-
tion of human potential, it necessarily addresses the role
of values and attitudes in the development of the individual.
The Anisa theory of value formation has been elaborated
upon by Raman (1974) . The aim of this section is to review
the major propositions of the Anisa value theory and to try
to make explicit the kinds of values, attitudes and feelings
that are actualized through scientific inquiry into the
physical world.
Trying to find a definition of the term ’value’
presents a bewildering task because the word has been used
in so many ways. The Oxford Dictionary (1971 edition) has
numerous meanings for ’value' but the one that is applicable
to the present context is: "the relative status of a thing,
or the estimate in which it is held, according to its real
or supposed worth, usefulness or importance." Most people
would associate value with something that is deemed to be
worthy or important. The problem with this commonly-held
view is that it is not always possible to discern the values
that a person holds because there is a lack of congruence
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between value statements and acts of behavior. Very often,
the behavior that is observed is exactly the opposite of
a value that is verbally claimed to be strongly held.
An operational definition that appears to be more
useful has been suggested by Jordan and Streets (1973) and
Raman (1974). These authors state that interaction with
the environment occurs in a patterned manner and that the
resulting actualization of potential or the release of new
energy for use by the individual is structured in certain
ways. The new energies are not expressed in a haphazard or
random manner, but in a patterned fashion. A value, then,
may be defined as relatively enduring patterned uses of
energy such that it reflects certain new ways of perceiving,
thinking, feeling, intending and doing things. This defini-
tion allows one "to see” what values a person holds because
energy will be expended in ways that are observable and
predictable, i.e., the energy use defines the values.
Interactions with the different environments, i.e.,
physical, human and unknown, are characterized by different
patterns of energy utilization or values. Patterns of
interactions with the physical environment are material
values. Social values are defined as those aspects of
interactions that relate to the human environment. Patterns
of interactions with the unknown environment are called
philosophical values.
In order to define material values, it is necessary
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to define the term "physical” environment more closely.
The term "physical" refers to those aspects of the environ-
ment which human beings can interact with and which can be
analyzed in terms of efficient causation. This definition
does not include those elements of the environment and
those interactions with the environment which can only be
effectively explained in terms of psychological causality.
For example, in the human environment, there are aspects
of the human body which can be analyzed in terms of ef-
ficient causation and which would be the subject matter of
natural science. However, there are important aspects of
human beings that can only be analyzed effectively in terms
of psychological causation and therefore would be dealt
with in the social sciences (psychology, sociology, anthro-
pology, etc,).
Material values, then, focus primarily on the ef-
ficient causation aspect of interactions. This does not
mean that final causation, purpose of internal determina-
tion is excluded in efforts to understand the nature of
physical events. As discussed in Chapter II, it is neces-
sary to consider both efficient and final causation if
one is to truly understand physical phenomena.
Given the Anisa definition of value as the
relatively enduring patterned utilization of energy, it
is not possible to say whether particular values are more
desirable or less desirable until some relative standard,
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criterion or ideal has been established. One such relative
standard adopted by the Anisa Model is whether or not values
(energy uses) are effective in gaining mastery and control
over one's interactions with the environment. Robert
White's (1959) paper on competence motivation is helpful
in understanding this idea. He identifies competence or
effectance as the ability to interact as effectively as
possible with the environment so that a sense of mastery is
achieved. Because competence enables one to control one's
interactions with the environment and so enhance the quality
of survival
,
White postulates that human beings will be in-
trinsically motivated to attain competence. Some values
then can be judged as being more effective or less effec-
tive to the extent that they help or deter a person from
interacting effectively with the environment. Therefore,
competence is one standard or ideal against which values
can be judged, and may be defined as the optimal organiza-
tion of energy utilization to achieve particular objectives.
To insure the best use of their energy, scientists
put their efforts into trying to expose the fundamental
relationships or patterns of relationships among events
in the physical environment. One can say that the utiliza-
tion of their energy is organized around the discovery of
the fundamental laws and principles of science. These laws
and principles are usually stated as "optimal formulations,"
that is, they reflect the best possible statements of the
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patterned relationships among physical events under ideal
circumstances
.
In fact, some of these laws and principles which
have been articulated in natural science are stated in a
form that explicitly reflects an optimal or ideal nature,
e.g., the Ideal Gas Law. This law and other laws in
natural science can be said to be ideal or optimal formu-
lations because they describe relationships that obtain
only under conditions that never actually exist. Hence,
the relationships can never be observed exactly. Laws and
principles are ideal statements of relationships which can
be confirmed by their increasing approximation to observed
events
.
The laws and principles of natural science are
formulated on the basis of some ultimate ideals or funda-
mental assumptions. These ultimate ideals lure the
scientist to reach out continually into unknown territories.
Order, truth, beauty, elegance and simplicity are some of
the ultimate ideals that guide scientists in the optimal
formulations of relationships between events. Whitehead
claims scientists hold an "instinctive conviction in the
Order of Nature" (1967c : 4) - Watson, in describing the
search for the structure of DNA, says that he was driven
"by the belief that the truth, once found, would be simple
as well as pretty" (1968 : ix) . All of the requirements of
order, beauty, truth and simplicity reflect the overwhelming
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guiding influence of ultimate ideals in the formulation of
scientific laws and principles.
Attainment of Technological Competence
Through the Discovery and Application
-
of Scientific Knowledge
Often, the word "technology" is viewed in a
restricted sense as meaning machinery or weaponry. It is
possible to place our understanding of the word in a larger
context. According to the Oxford Dictionary (1971 edition),
technology means "A discourse or treatise on an art or
arts; the scientific study of the practical or industrial
arts." The root word is from the Greek "teckne" which
refers to an art or craft. Usually, the artistic element
is excluded from our usage of technology.
Whitehead states that science consists of two
levels: theoretical and practical, which correspond to
what is most frequently heard "science and technology."
He acknowledges the essential unity of the two when he
says
Science is a river with two sources, the practical
source and the theoretical source. The practical
source is the desire to direct our actions to
achieve pre- determined ends. . . . The theoretical
source is the desire to understand. ... I most
emphatically state that I do not consider one
source as in any sense nobler than the other, or
intrinsically more interesting. I cannot see why
it is nobler to strive to understand than to busy
oneself with the right ordering of one's actions.
(1967b: 103-104)
The practical and the theoretical are inextricably
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interwoven. In the above quote the "right ordering of
one’s actions" in science derives from the logical and
coherent theories that are formulated and then put to use
in the proper manner that can be of service to mankind.
It would appear that Whitehead’s comment in relation to
the practical side of science involves a moral concern,
particularly in relation to how scientific knowledge is
used. Certainly, the word technology today carries conno-
tations of automation, war and destruction. The goal of
the Anisa science curriculum is to harmonize the desire to
understand the physical world and to direct the resultant
knowledge to practical and useful ends.
Historically, the modern scientific revolution came
about largely throughout "the merging and mutual stimula-
tion of the separate traditions of scholarly, speculative
science and experimental craftsmanship and technology"
(McKenzie, 1973:7). The rise of the industrial system in
the 17th century stimulated thought and this in turn in-
creased the investigation into the laws of nature (White-
head, 1967c; Butterfield, 1965). In the times of the
Egyptians, even though astronomy involved systematic ob-
servation, technological advances were not made because
there was no practical impetus to experiment. Similarly,
the Greeks took the first steps in abstraction and genera-
lization, but the Greek intellectual "desired to understand
the world rather than control and change it" (McKenzie,
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1973:4). Invention or practical uses of knowledge really
began in the 16th century with mining, metallurgy, and the
creation of waterwheels, which led to the early growth of
the factory system. Together with the rise of experimental
science in the 17th century and movement of the Renais-
sance, modern science and technology was firmly established.
Today, in the late 20th century, the intellectual
rift between what is called "pure science" and "applied
science" is evident. The former term implied knowledge for
the sake of knowledge and is thought to be better than the
application of the knowledge. The fallacy of this type of
reasoning is that neither science nor technology can exist
without each other. What needs to be made clear is that
both pursuits are infused with the element of artistry--
that form, elegance, harmony, simplicity and beauty are
fundamental guiding principles in the practical and theo-
retical aspects of science.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the
original usage of the word ’tekne’ included a meaning that
was based on the ideal of artistry or beauty. Therefore,
in the Anisa Model, competence in discovering and applying
the laws and principles of natural science is called tech-
nological competence.
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Definition of Technological
Competence ~ *
Technological competence can be defined as the con-
scious ability to understand, discover and apply the opti-
mal formulations, or the laws and principles of natural
science in such a way that it maximizes the capacity to
interact effectively with the physical environment. Tech-
nological competence also includes the ability to interact
effectively with the physical environment in a way that
gives one the feeling that the quality of one's viability
is enhanced. Since effective interaction with the physical
environment is related to one's feeling of enhanced via-
bility, the definition of technological competence can be
seen to include both objective or logical, and subjective
or aesthetic, elements.
The logical aspect of the definition of techno-
logical competence is related to the accurate formulation
of laws and principles in relation to the physical environ-
ment such that there is a one to one correspondence between
appearance and reality. The laws and principles of natural
science may be called optimal formulations because they
reflect the most perfect or the best representation of
physical events at this point in time in the intellectual
evolution of man. As we develop better instruments for
observation and measurement, and can refine our descriptions
of relationships among events, then the laws and principles
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will be further developed to accommodate the new insights.
Describing relationships in terms of efficient
causation is a logical process, i.e., it involves analytic
thought processes. As mentioned previously, final causa-
tion is also vital in understanding the operation of the
universe. However, the relationships involved in final
causation are quite complex and are more difficult to iden-
tify clearly. Efficient causation is a description of
physical cause and effect relationships in which there is
some kind of transfer or transformation of energy so that
two or more events are necessarily connected. This con-
nection may be quite complex and may require explanations
in terms of interaction rather than in terms of simple
linear succession of events. However, the relationship
will always be explained in terms of efficient causes.
Since the laws and principles describe cause and effect
relationships, it could be said that they describe the
transfer or transformation of energy in physical events.
The non-logical, subjective or aesthetic aspect
of the definition of technological competence is related
to the notion of enhanced viability in both a theoretical
and practical sense. An optimal formulation is the best
possible theoretical formulation of a relationship (or
relationships) among events such that order, beauty, ele-
gance, simplicity and harmony are reflected in the state-
ment of the relationship. The intuitive sense of order,
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and the organization of elements in an elegant and simple
style depends upon the scientist's subjective or aesthetic
awareness. There is a 'feeling' that the diverse elements
fit together in a unified manner, and give an impression
of beauty and wholeness.
The practical part of the subjective experience is
that because one is effect ive-
- can make things work--there
is a feeling of enhanced viability when the optimal formu-
lations are applied in interactions with the physical
environment. A person who can apply the laws and prin-
ciples of natural science will have a sense of mastery of
competence in being able to interact effectively with the
physical environment.
A law or principle, if it meets or fulfills all the
aesthetic requirements and the logical necessity of truth
and accuracy, is said to be an optimal formulation. The
test of the formulation, however, lies in practice, i.e.,
to whatever degree it works, then to that degree it is
true, and if it is true then it should reflect the elements
of order, beauty, elegance and simplicity. An optimal
formulation can be applied in a manner that increases the
quality of life and guarantees survival. The actualization
of human potential then, on the one hand, finds expression
in the attainment of technological competence, and on the
other hand it is sustained by it.
Since technological competence is related to the
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lives and the actualization of potential of individuals in
relation to the human environment, it must necessarily be
constrained by moral concerns. For example, a murderer can
be a technologically competent person because the principles
of killing are well understood and can be applied in the
best possible manner. However, when they are applied in
this wTay
,
the viability of the victim is drastically
reduced to zero. From the point of view taken in the Anisa
definition of technological competence, we would say that
the murderer is technologically competent but not morally
competent because moral concerns are completely ignored.
Ultimately, the overall viability of an individual or
individuals is affected by the close relationship between
technological, moral and fiducial competence. Thus, tech-
nological competence is a subordinate achievement whose
ultimate value is determinable by appeal to moral (social)
and fiducial (philosophical) concerns. These are briefly
discussed in the next section.
Relationship Between Technological,
Moral and Fiducial Competence
In the Anisa Model, the balanced and harmonious
integration of technological, moral and fiducial compe-
tence results in personal effectance. A person who can
understand, discover and apply the basic laws and prin-
ciples which guide interactions with the physical, human
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and unknown environments so that viability is enhanced, can
be said to have personal effectance. Usually the ultimate
goal of growth and development is to achieve personal
effectance
.
Moral competence may be defined as the conscious
ability to understand the basic principles of human inter-
actions and to apply them in such a way that social via-
bility is enhanced. Relating to people in a way that en-
hances their viability will reflect a certain level of moral
competence.
Fiducial competence may be defined as the conscious
ability to generate and be guided by fundamental assump-
tions or principles about the nature of ultimate unknowns.
Such ability is based on faith. To the extent that these
principles have a truth-value, they will, when applied
result in enhanced viability. This competence has been
called fiducial competence because effective organization
of our interactions with the ultimate unknowns must be
based on faith, trust, confidence or reliance. The word
fiducial is derived from the Latin root f iducia meaning
trust or confidence. Without fiducial competence, courage
and hope are non-existent and fear is sovereign. Fear is
an internal emotional state that influences interaction
patterns and to the extent that it has no justification,
it will impair development.
The detailed relationship between technological
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and moral competence, and technological and fiducial
competence, will be discussed more fully in the following
sections
.
Technological and Moral
Competence
The relationship between science and moral concerns
surfaces when our knowledge of the laws of nature is put
to practice. In the purely investigative activities and
theoretical constructions in science, morality is not likely
to be an issue. Polanyi, in describing the moral indif-
ference that is appropriate on this level in modern science,
cites Fisher:
We attempt, so far as our powers allow, to under-
stand the world, by reasoning, by experimentation,
and again by reasoning. In this process moral
or emotional grounds for preferring one conclu-
sion to another are completely out of place.
(in Polanyi, 1958:153)
Experiments are designed to discover valid rela-
tionships as they exist in the physical environment. Re-
gardless of the scientist's personal moral convictions or
emotions about reality, the experimental evidence is the
final word. As Whitehead declares, there is a "remorseless
inevitableness" (1967c:ll) about the laws of nature.
However, in the application of scientific knowledge,
the issue of morality assumes importance. There are, of
course, moral and ethical questions involved in the type
of experiments that are conducted by scientists, particu-
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larly in the fields of genetics and embryology. The con-
cern here is the effect of the application of scientific
knowledge on the lives of men, women and children all over
the world.
The Anisa Model would maintain that to be a tech-
nologically competent person is a necessary but not suf-
ficient qualification for a fully actualized human being.
Being aware of the impact of the application of one's
knowledge on other human beings is equally vital. Thus
moral competence must be acquired along with technological
competence. To be morally competent means that in one's
encounters with other people, one endeavors to behave in
a manner such that the needs, emotions and actions of others
are taken into consideration.
Because of the implications of scientific knowledge
for the survival of society and the individuals within it,
moral standards cannot be ignored by scientists. The view
that science is amoral, that it is without morality of
any kind, is tied to the technical exploitation of know-
ledge. Large-scale industrial and economic concerns have
contributed to the problems of pollution and conservation.
The build-up of the world's arms race reflects the direct
participation of scientists in activities that are not
wholly conducive to uplifting the quality of the life of
man. In a recent report in Scientific American (April 1976)
it was documented that the cumulative total of the world's
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military expenditures between 1960 and 1974 was nearly four
trillion dollars. The authors - of this report stated that
this potential for cataclysmic destruction represents:
an immediate and heavy burden on the world economy.
It is destructive whether or not the weapons are
put to use in war. It contributes to inflation,
retards economic and social development, and
diverts resources urgently needed for human well-
being. Until it can be put under control, it
undermines the national and international security
which it is intended to protect. (Scientific
American
,
April 1976:54)
Einstein’s comment in the following quote is worth
noting. "Concern for man himself and his fate must always
form the chief interest of all technical endeavor, in order
that the creations of our minds shall be a blessing and
not a curse to mankind" (in Andrews, 1974:380).
If scientists are technologically competent it
does not necessarily follow that they will be morally com-
petent too. A brilliant and successful methodology can
breed an indifference to morality, right judgment and good
conduct. Polanyi's insight into moral judgments and intel-
lectual understanding is valuable.
But moral judgments cut much deeper than intel-
lectual valuations. A man may be consumed by
an intellectual passion; he may be a man of
genius, yet be also sycophantic, vain, envious
and spiteful. Though a prince of letters, he
would be a despicable person. For men are
valued as men according to their moral force . . .
(1958:214-15)
It is evident then that technological advances
should be subservient to, and guided by, moral values,
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because ultimately all discoveries have an impact on the
life of humanity. Von Bertalanf fy
• s optimism is encourag-
ing when he says that science "may still be able to pre~
sent a grand view and become deeply humanistic in its
endeavor" (1968b : 68- 69)
.
Science education has to meet the challenge of
how to present science as a humanistic endeavor. Hurd
states that "the task is to invent and then mould the
future to suit human needs, but within a firm system of
moral and ethical considerations" (1975:307). He goes on
to say that with an emphasis on values, society, and tech-
nology, science education can become a reasonable venture
with a future orientation.
Technological and Fiducial
Competence
We continually confront unknowns in the course of
our lives and instead of being paralyzed by the thought of
not knowing something with certainty, we must learn to
deal with such circumstances in some way. People who are
crippled by contemplating the unknown future lack fiducial
competence. Their effectiveness as individuals is greatly
reduced or severely impaired. Those who do organize their
lives effectively do so on the basis of xaith. The idea
of faith has religious connotations because one of the
main purposes of religions has been to provide a framework
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for reJating to the unknown on faith. Fiducial competence
is often related to traditional functions of religion.
However, in this dissertation, fiducial is used purely as
a psychological term, and refers to the capacity to face
unknowns through trust, which everyone must do, whether he
regards himself as a religious person or not.
In a chapter on ’Religion and Science,' Whitehead
presents a remarkable conception of the essential charac-
ter of religion in general psychological terms:
Religion is the vision of something which stands
beyond, behind and within, the passing flux of
immediate things; something which is real, and yet
waiting to be realized; something which is a remote
possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts;
something that gives meaning to all that passes,
and yet eludes apprehension; something whose pos-
session is the final good, and yet is beyond all
reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and
the hopeless quest. (Whitehead, 1967c:192)
He concludes by saying that religion "is an adven-
ture of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable" that
is not couched in safety and comfortable ways of thinking.
This insight into the nature of religion, when
applied to the work of scientists in their eternal quest
after truth in the vast unknown "which stands beyond" is
clearly a fiducial act. The step into the unknown is
marked by an act of faith. Whitehead (1967) states that
scientists hold an instinctive conviction or instinctive
faith in the order of nature; for Polanyi (1974) such con-
victions contain "fiducial elements," that is, trust or
Men have always tried to achieveconfidence in nature.
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definite convictions or form ideas about the material
world. Polanyi says that "no part of the human race has
ever been known to exist without a system of such con-
victions and it is clear that their elimination must
mean intellectual death" (1974:23).
In essence, faith is courage in the face of un-
certainty. Without this faith, trust, or conviction,
scientists would be immobilized. The description by
Polanyi of the dynamism of human faith seems to echo
Whitehead's sentiments. Polanyi remarks that
There is no way of approaching a hidden meaning
than by entrusting ourselves to our intimations
of its yet unseen presence. And such intima-
tions are the only path toward enlarging and up-
holding our intellectual mastery over our sur-
roundings. (1974:125)
The relationship between technological and fiducial
competence is important because children have to learn how
to relate to the world of physical phenomena, which for the
most part are not directly observable or capable of being
fully understood. There are always unknowns to be en-
countered. Einstein describes how as a child of 4 or 5
years of age, seeing the behavior of the needle of a
compass made a deep and lasting impression upon him. His
reaction as he recalls was that "something deeply hidden
had to be behind things" (1970:9).
The insatiable desire to want to know about the
world, the dedication to the pursuit of truth and the
ability to have faith in the order of nature, are qualities
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that should be fostered in children so that the adventure
of spirit can be kept alive and alert.
The next chapter will discuss the nature of scien-
tific thought and its development in children as a pre-
paration for the presentation of a possible framework for
a natural science curriculum.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMENTAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF
CHILDREN'S SCIENTIFIC THINKING
The development of a curriculum should be guided
by ideas that explain how the child develops an awareness
of the world, i.e., of people, of objects, of plants and
animals.- In particular, a science curriculum should be
guided by information on a child's developmental under-
standing of physical reality or the natural world. How
does a child come to think and know about physical phe-
nomena? What are the distinguishing characteristics of the
developmental sequence that can be of assistance to the
curriculum developer? If a science curriculum is to meet
the needs of children, developmental- epistemological con-
siderations are absolutely vital, especially since all
children, even though they are the same age, are not at all
similar in their understandings, past experiences and
attitudes
.
Before launching into a discussion on children and
scientific thinking, it will be useful to consider the
epistemological basis of contemporary science, i.e., how
do scientists, who reflect a mature level of thinking,
come to know about physical reality? Essentially this ques
tion comes down to considerations of what scientists do to
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find out about nature. The reason for including this dis-
cussion on the scientist's thought is that it is always
valuable to have a basis of comparison so that the danger-
out fallacy of believing that a child is a miniature adult
can be avoided. There may be similarities between how a
child thinks about physical events in the world and how a
scientist proceeds in his investigations, but essentially
a child's thought is qualitatively different.
The Nature of Scientific Thinking
In reviewing the nature of scientific thinking, the
question arises as to whether science is invention or dis-
covery. Is the organized thought which we call science a
construction of the human mind because of our need to repre-
sent the physical world in a meaningful manner to our-
selves? Or, do scientists just describe what they see? To
construct or invent means to devise, to build or to ori-
ginate mentally; to discover means to find out, to reveal,
to uncover. In practice, the scientist is both an inventor
and a discoverer.
To find out what scientists actually do is not easy
because they rarely write about the process itself. Scien-
tists very seldom describe when precisely the hypothesis
occurred to them or when it was that they made a prediction.
One has to rely on the philosophers of science for accounts
of the scientist's procedure or what is customarily called
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'scientific method,' i.e., what is it that goes on in the
head when discoveries are made. Medawar cites Einstein,
who said that if you want to know what methods a theo-
retical physicist employs, stick closely to one principle:
"don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their
deeds" (Medawar, 1969:10).
Cohen and Nagel present a useful definition of
scientific method, since it can be applied in many situa-
tions: "... scientific method is simply the way in which
we test impressions, opinions, or surmises by examining
the best available evidence for and against them" (1934:
192 ) .
The method is the means by which scientists find
out about events and the relations among events in the
physical world. Such relations are found to be invariant
and ordered, i.e., they are constant and remain so even
under certain transformations. Scientists are primarily
concerned with finding causal relations or causal order in
the physical environment. The essence of a causal rela-
tionship is one event (B) occurs only, and always, when
it is preceded by a certain other event (A) or events.
Event A is then said to cause event B. The relationship
always involves a transfer of energy in some form which
necessarily connects the two or more events. Whitehead
emphasizes the notion of physical causality in science
when he says that there is
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. . . the inexpugnable belief that every detailed
occurrence can be correlated with its antecedentsm a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying
general principles. Without this belief the in-
credible labors of scientists would be without
hope. (1967c : 12)
Ultimately a thorough understanding of the funda-
mental relationships inherent in and among phenomena leads
to an articulation of the complex natural laws and prin-
ciples which operate in the physical environment. The
power to control the socio- cultural evolution of man lies
in part in being able to predict the consequences of events
in the physical world and to plan accordingly to meet the
necessary changes. Understanding causation increases the
probability that survival will be guaranteed and its quality
continually improved.
Rise of the Scientific Method:
The Role of Induction
Historically, the rise of the modern views on
scientific method can be traced back to the work of Francis
Bacon in the sixteenth century. Aristotle’s powers of
observation and description were admittedly the very
earliest manifestation of some method but it was Bacon’s
work that initiated a formalized statement on scientific
method. Bacon's view was that the simple deductive methods
of formal logic could not by themselves lead to progress in
science mainly because the rules of logic did not deal vith
discovery but only with the results of discoveries. His
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most important contribution was his awareness of the
problem of induction, i.e., "how is it ever possible to
conclude a material fact from another material fact?"
(Fowler, 1962:42). The early Greeks had exercised a mini-
mum of observation in drawing their conclusions. However,
Bacon maintained that in dealing with the physical world,
facts must be checked by observation of other facts and for
every line of reasoning, experiments should be conducted.
Fowler quotes Bacon as saying that "man can act and under-
stand no further than he has observed" (1962:42). Even
though he outlined the processes of scientific discovery,
Bacon did not realize that in practice it is not possible
to test every possibility. In this way, he neglected the
guiding factors that assisted the scientist in selecting
what to observe. Imagination, inspiration and guiding
hypotheses were ignored in the act of discovery.
The next major contribution to scientific method
was by John Stuart Mill (early nineteenth century) . Mill
maintained that the most vital task of science was to dis-
cover causes and that the notion of causation only could
account for the observed sequence of events in nature.
Fowler (1962) comments that Mill’s main concern was to dis-
cover a method that worked in the natural sciences and then
could be transferred to the social sciences. Mill formu-
lated Four Canons that could serve as guides for experi-
mental inquiry and focused on the relations between causes
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and their effects. In his outline of scientific proof,
Mill refused to acknowledge the role of hypothesis. He
f elt that all scientific knowledge rested on pure induc-
tion alone. Classical inductivism in science arose from
these positions taken by both Bacon and Mill, such that
observation and experimentation were accounted for but not
the role of hypothes is - format ion
.
Mill defined induction as "the process by which we
conclude- that what is true of certain individuals of a class
is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain
times will be true in similar circumstances at all times"
(in Fowler, 1962:74).
A clearer and more explicit definition of induc-
tion is given by Medawar. He states that "Induction . . .
is a scheme or formulary of reasoning which somehow empowers
us to pass from statements expressing particular 'facts’ to
general statements which comprehend them" (1969:23).
In both definitions, the emphasis is on the ob-
servation of concrete events and the articulation of a
general rule or principle which could explain all the ob-
served events. Focusing on the experiences of the senses
only is in keeping with the tradition of strict empiricism,
a view which states that if something is not verified by
observation then it is meaningless. An empiricist per-
spective can only provide a simplified edition of reality
because it only focuses on appearance. The limitations of
107
totally objective knowledge is stressed by Whitehead when
he notes that
. . . the exclusive reliance on sense-perception
promotes a false metaphysics. This error is the
result of high-grade intellectuality. The in-
stinctive interpretations which govern human life
. .
.
presuppose a contemporary world throbbing
with energetic values. It required considerable
ability to make the disastrous abstraction of our
base sense-perceptions from the massive insis-
tency of our total experience. Of course, what-
ever we can do in the way of abstraction is for
some purposes useful - -provided that we know what
we are about. (1967:219)
A major shortcoming of the inductive scheme is that
science is made out to be a wholly logical and objective
activity. According to Whitehead, such a rigid method
"if consistently pursued, would have left science where
it found it" (1969:7). Einstein himself commented that
"There is no inductive method which could lead to the
fundamental concepts of physics ... in error are those
theorists who believe that theory comes inductively from
experience" (in Fowler, 1962:95).
A rigid, totally logical process such as induction
fails to account for those internal, non-logical (outside
logic) factors that can guide the scientist. Imagination,
inspiration and intuition cannot be objectively accounted
for, but they play a vital role in scientific research. In
discussing the failure of the Baconian method of induction,
Whitehead claims that
What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagina-
tion, controlled by the requirements of coherence
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and logic. The true method of discovery is like
the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the
ground of particular observation; it makes a
flight in the thin air of imaginative generaliza-
tion; and it lands for renewed observation rendered
more acute by rational interpretation. (1969:7)
Imaginative construction enters into the formula-
tion of theories and hypotheses. In some cases there is
an intuitive ’hunch’ or just luck that guides observation;
in other cases the framing of a hypothesis or a theory
after observation is an imaginative act. Scientists have
been known to dream of a solution to the problem, such as
Kekule, who discovered the structure of the benzene ring.
He dreamed of a snake catching its own tail in its mouth,
thereby forming a ring. Polanyi, himself an eminent chem-
ist and philosopher of science, describes scientific re-
search in the light of non-logical and non-rational factors.
He says that
Though the task is definite enough, the solution
is none the less intuitive. It is essential to
start in science with the right guess about the
direction of further progress. . . . All the time
the scientist is constantly collecting, develop-
ing and revising a set of half -conscious surmises,
an assortment of private clues, which are his
confidential guides to the mastery of his subject.
(1974:18)
Another criticism of the inductive view is the
focus on facts alone. Very rarely does a scientist just
collect facts upon facts. Even Darwin contradicts himself
on this score. In his autobiographical sketch he claimed
that he worked on "true Baconian principles" and just col-
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lected facts, but in a letter to a friend he wrote "I
have an old belief that a good observer really means a
good theorist" (in Madawar, 1969:11). Observational
discrimination is a theory-laden enterprise and most
authors agree with this view (Hanson, 1958; Madawar, 1969;
Pol any i , 1974 ; Popper, 1962 ; Whitehead, 1967c). Observa-
tion is selective and is related to the needs and inter-
ests of the scientist via some working hypothesis or
theory. •
Modern Scientific Method: Induction
and Deduction or the Hypothetico"
Deductive Scheme
The predominant view of scientific method today is
that it involves both induction and deduction as well as
intuitive and imaginative processes. Traditionally there
has been a history of opposition between the adherents of
one view or the other. Deduction may be regarded as a
scheme of reasoning that argues from the particular to the
general and if properly executed from true premises can
lead with certainty to the truth (Medawar , 1959). Mathe-
matical theory is a deductive system that derives its
theorems or proofs from true premises or axioms, and not
by observation. Even Einstein claimed that "the supreme
task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal
elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by
pure deduction" (in Northrop, 1970:401). However, it seems
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pointless to focus on one or the other view since induc-
tion and deduction complement each other in the acquisition
of knowledge about physical reality.
Scientific method as induction and deduction in-
volves the triad of observation, hypothesis formation and
experimentation. The first step involves observation of
some event or phenomenon but no conclusions are drawn.
Then the hypothesis (or hypotheses) is formulated on the
basis of what is observed. Campbell defines a hypothesis
in the following manner: "A hypothesis is ... a proposi-
tion which is put forward for consideration, and concerning
the truth or falsity of which nothing is asserted until the
consideration is completed” (1953:290).
In Campbell's definition, the hypothesis is asso-
ciated with doubt which consists of a suspense of judgment
rather than the inclination to disbelieve. A description
of how a hypothesis should be formulated is given by Cohen
and Nagel. "... a hypothesis must be formulated in such
a manner that deductions can be made from it and that conse-
quently a decision can be reached as to whether it does or
does not explain the facts considered" (1934:207).
Hypotheses can be regarded as suggested statements
of possible connections between actual facts and imagined
ones. Hence the truth or falsity of the hypothesis itself
is never tested or directly verified. The hypothesis must,
however, be stated in such a manner that predictions can be
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deduced from it and then tested experimentally. In this
way, the hypothesis should finally provide an answer to the
problem which generated the inquiry.
Confirmation of predictions is a vital part of
scientific method. Cohen and Nagel describe the value of
a prediction in the following quote. "The logical func-
tion of prediction is to permit a genuine verification of
our hypotheses by indicating, prior to the actual process
of verification, instances which may verify them" (1934:
210) . Predictions indicate the power of the deductive
system of thought--if the premises (that is, hypotheses)
are true, then the conclusions can also be shown to be
true, even before any experiments are conducted. A good
example of this can be seen in Einstein's formulation of
the general theory of relativity (1915) which made three
predictions. The actual tests were not carried out until
1919 when all three predictions were confirmed.
Experiments or sets of experiments are designed to
confirm the predictions and so verify or validate the hypo-
thesis. A clear definition of verification is given by
Cohen and Nagel. ". . .a function of verification is to
supply satisfactory evidence for eliminating some or all
of the hypotheses we are considering" (1934:210).
Rarely is there just one experiment that can
eliminate one or all of the hypotheses. In most cases
scientists proceed through numerous experiments, some
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relevant and some seemingly irrelevant, to arrive at some
degree of certainty. A description of how Watson and Crick
uncovered the structure of DNA shows the numerous set-backs
suffered and hours of frustration spent over experiments
that appeared to lead nowhere (Watson, 1968). However, the
ultimate test of verification is the assurance that what is
observed is as close an approximation to reality as can be,
otherwise we shall be out of touch with reality and be led
into error.
A theory may be viewed as a set of hypotheses or
propositions (Campbell, 1953) and as such is neither true
nor false. The overwhelming significance of a theory is
that it. exhibits systematic connections between events and
is capable of deducing predictions that can be tested.
Science viewed as induction and deduction estab-
lished itself as the official alternative to induction in
the middle nineteenth century. Medawar describes the whole
process as the hypothetico-deductive scheme, and the main
modern advocate of this view is Karl Popper. The hypo-
thetico-deductive scheme, as its name implies, places an
emphasis on the role of the hypothesis- -the formation of
the hypothesis is the generative act in scientific research.
The well-known philosopher, C.S. Pierce, said that "we must
entertain some hypothesis or else forego all further know-
ledge” and that hypothetical reasoning "is the only kind of
argument which starts a new idea" (in Medawar, 1969:46).
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Porterfield echoes similar sentiments on the value of the
hypothesis
.
Imagination is the method of hypothesis, and hypo-
thesis is an indispensable aspect of scientific
method. For the field in which the scientist works
is a hypothetically constructed field. (1941:111)
Medawar presents a sound and useful synthesis of
the various vital aspects of scientific method as it in-
cludes induction and deduction. He says that
Scientific reasoning is an exploratory dialogue
that can always be resolved into two voices or
two episodes of thought, imaginative and critical,
which alternate and interact. In the imaginative
episode we form an opinion, take a view, make an
informed guess, which might explain the phenomena
under investigation. The generative act is the
formation of a hypothesis . . . The process by
which we come to formulate a hypothesis is not
illogical but non-logical, i.e., outside logic.
But once we have formed an opinion we can expose
it to criticism, usually by experimentation; this
episode lies within and makes use of logic, for it
is an empirical testing of the logical consequences
of our beliefs. (1969:46)
In the imaginative realm, the formulation of the
hypothesis is a means by which possibilities are enter-
tained.
.
It is an inventive, creative and constructive
phase. The critical episode provides the basis for veri-
fication, justification or validation of the ideas that
have been entertained; it is a phase in which there is a
discrimination of possibilities on the basis of empirical
evidence
.
The question posed at the beginning of this section
sought to address the issue of whether science was invention
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or discovery. In reviewing the hypothet ico-deduct ive
method, it is evident that scientific method is concerned
with the construction or invention of a system of beliefs
about the world and that it is also concerned with dis-
covering whether the system is as close an approximation
to reality as possible. Braithwaite claims that science is
invention and discovery when he says that
Man proposes a system of hypotheses; Nature
disposes of its truth or falsity. Man invents
a scientific system, and then discovers whether
or not it accords with observed fact. (1959:368)
The Interaction Between Hypothesis-
Formation and Experimentation
Interactions between observation, hypothesis
formation and experimentation are indispensable to scien-
tific method as a regulative and sel f- correct ive process.
Feedback is provided such that the performance can be moni-
tored by the consequences of the acts undertaken (Medawar,
1969). If the empirical evidence does not verify the
hypothesis, then changes have to be made either in the
original premise or in the experimental procedure. Such
an active and dynamic view of thinking is very much in
line with the work of Piaget. He says that
Scientific thought,, then, is not momentary, it is
not a static instance; it is a process. More
specifically, it is a process of continual con-
struction and reorganization. (1970a:2)
Popper (1962) regards the continual interplay
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between conjecture and refutation as the sel f- correct ive
feature of science. His view is that conjectures (that is,
hypotheses) are boldly put forward for trial and if they
clash with the observations, they are refuted. Theories
are tested with the hope of obtaining, if possible, a 'de-
cisive refutation. ' Popper also comments on how scientists
may come to hold or formulate erroneous propositions. Ac-
cording to the traditional inductive views, error arises
from a misreading of the facts in Nature either through
blindness (poor observation) or prejudice. The consequence
is that the inferences that are then drawn are mistaken.
Such an account of the role of error in science is inade-
quate- - theories are not, as a rule, found to be in error
because of mistaken or poorly interpreted information.
Usually, it is the contradictory evidence of new observa-
tions that highlight or indicate what the errors are in
the theory that is currently accepted. The error does not
lie in poor initial vision, but in the ideas which were
previously held.
Scientific method, then, is a valuable means by
which error can be taken out of our understanding of the
physical environment, thereby improving our technological
competence. Usually our thinking is of a routine charac-
ter, and we are only shaken into doubt if something un-
familiar presents itself to us or if we are moved by
curiosity. Most of our beliefs rest on the unquestioned
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acceptence of current modes of thinking about issues.
Cohen and Nagel (1934) in an analysis of our beliefs, state
that when we are challenged we resort to various methods,
such as
(1) the method of tenacity, in which we cleave
tightly to our system of beliefs and deliberately
close out other evidence,
(2) the method of authority, which is an appeal
to a highly respected source to substantiate the
views that are held,
(3) the method of intuition in which propositions
are self-evident to the individual only and to
no one else, and
(4) the method of science or reflective inquiry
which is a method that develops the utmost possible
doubt and which calls for the best available
evidence before a view can be accepted.
Cohen and Nagel continue that methods one to three
are not free from "human caprice and willfulness." The
authors' appeal is to scientific method.
As a consequence, the propositions which are held
on the basis of these methods [that is, 1-3] are un-
certain in the range of their application and in
their accuracy. If we wish clarity and accuracy,
order and consistency, security and cogency, we
shall have to resort to some method of fixing
beliefs whose efficacy in resolving problems is
independent of our desires and wills. Such a
method, which takes advantage of the objective con-
nections in the world around us, should be found
reasonable not because of its appeal to the idio
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syncracies of a selected few individuals, but
because it can be tested repeatedly and by all
individuals. (1934:195)
The Development of Scientific Thinking
in Children
The preceding discussion examined the means by
which scientists construct a meaningful picture of physical
reality. Scientific thinking was found to be synonymous
with scientific method, i.e., the actual application of
scientific method is an external manifestation of internal
thought processes. We come to know the nature of the
thought of scientists by observing what they do and then
drawing inferences about their patterns of thinking.
Similarly, the thought processes of children can be
assessed most effectively by observing their actions and
listening to the kinds of statements that they make in
different situations. It was precisely in this manner that
Jean Piaget developed his theories on how children think.
Naturally, information on the internal thought processes of
children is vital in the development of a science curricu-
lum. Piaget’s writings on the intellectual development are
extensive, so only the most pertinent facts will be reviewed
here to provide a context within which a child's developing
notions of physical reality may be understood.
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Development of Th inking in Children:
A Piagetian Perspective
Piaget's theory of the development of thinking is
essentially a construct ivist- interact ionist point of view.
The influence on development is neither biological matura-
tion nor environmental determination, but a combination of
both. The resulting theory is an epigenetic one in which
'epigenesis' is defined by Piaget as the "sense of con-
struction by interactions between genome and the environ-
ment" (1970b :710). From an int eractionist perspective there
is an interdependence between a knowing subject and the
object to be known such that it is impossible to dissoci-
ate the "knowing subject" from the "knowable object"
(Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, 1974). The development of
psychological processes or patterns of thinking occurs
through a continual interplay between the individual and
the environment. The goal is to achieve some sort of
equilibrium between the organization of psychological pro-
cesses or structures and the functioning of these struc-
tures so that a reasonably stable picture of reality may be
maintained. This is a dynamic equilibrium within which new
pieces of information can continually be integrated in a
holistic manner.
For Piaget, then, human knowledge is essentially
active. Knowledge grows through the transformation of
experience, not through the passive absorption of ideas
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presented by other agencies. The following quotes express
Piaget's view of the construction of knowledge: "Knowledge
results from continuous construction, since in each act of
understanding, some degree of invention is involved"
(Piaget
,
1970a:77). "Actually, in order to know objects,
the subject must act upon them, and transform them: he
must displace, connect, combine, take apart, and re-
assemble them" (Piaget, 1970b:704).
In the construction of a view of reality certain
stable relationships are sought between objects or events.
Gibson's work (1967) on the detection of perceptual in-
variance was discussed in Chapter III. The detection of
patterns of distinctive features of objects and events
and their invariant relations aided in the reduction of
subjective uncertainty and so enhanced the survival of the
individual. Bruner and his colleagues (1969) have postu-
lated that the detection of invariant features of objects,
events and people leads us to categorize or form classes
so that a response is made in terms of class membership
and not on the basis of each occurrence. For these authors,
categorization is the major aspect of thinking and involves
"an act of invention" (Bruner et al . , 1969:2).
Piaget, in his book on The Construction of Reality
in the Child (1954), identifies the major categories within
which invariant relations are sought. These classes are
the spatial and temporal field, and causality. Children
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gradually develop notions of invariance as they relate to
features of objects (solids), liquids, weight, length,
area, density, volume, time, speed, velocity, number,
physical and psychological causality. The understanding
of these concepts develops through stages that are essen-
tially invariant and qualitatively different. Even though
all children do not pass through the same stage at a
similar age, the sequence of development is still invariant.
At each stage, there is a qualitative difference in the
thought of children. It is not a question of how much or
how little children’s thought resembles adult thought.
The point is that children's thoughts are completely dif-
ferent from the adult way of thinking.
Four major stages of intellectual development have
been identified by Piaget. These stages can be distin-
guished by the following characteristic ways of thinking
(from Chittenden, 1970; Ginsburg and Opper, 1969):
Sensori-motor Stage (Birth to approx. 18 months) .
As the name implies, this stage is characterized by sen-
sory and motor reflexive behavior. The infant learns to
differentiate various features of the immediate environ-
ment and behavior can be modified in accordance with the
demands made by changes in this environment. For Piaget,
this kind of activity in the early years reveals the ori-
gins of intelligent behavior.
Initially, the world is undifferentiated for the
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child. At the end of this stage, objects and events in
the world tend to take on some identity of their own. The
most significant feature of the sensor i
-motor stage is the
attainment of object permanence, i.e., the realization that
an object still exists even if it cannot be perceived
directly
.
Pre-operational Stage (18 months to approx. 6
years) . With the onset of language and symbolic functioning,
children' are capable of mentally representing objects and
events. This can be observed in instances of deferred imi-
tation, i.e., imitating a situation after some time has
elapsed, and in children's symbolic play.
Two major characteristics of this stage are (1)
thought based on perception and (2) egocentric thought.
Young children are said to be percept-bound when their
judgments are formed purely on the basis of what is seen.
Such thought is essentially static and tied to the imme-
diate situation. The egocentric nature of children's
thought is manifested in their preoccupation with "me”
or "I." There is no differentiation between internal and
external environments or objective and subjective states,
so that "me" and the world outside are all one and the same.
It is difficult for children to co-ordinate other points of
view into their thinking as well because they do not
realize that others may think differently from them.
Concrete operational Stage (6 years to approx. 1_1
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years
)
. A profound re-orientation occurs at this stage
because children are not bound by their perceptions alone.
Their thinking is now transformative and reversible, i.e.,
they can perform changes, and move back and forth mentally.
Instead of being tied to the immediate situation, they
begin to make inferences about reality. However, children
are still tied to the concrete rather than the abstract.
Characteristic operations that children can per-
form at this stage are classification, seriation and con-
servation. The major attainment is that of conservation
which involves the realization that things remain in-
variant even after certain changes are made or occur.
Formal operational Stage (11 years oneward) . This
is the stage when true abstract thought develops. Possi-
bilities can be conceived, hypotheses can be formulated
and alternative strategies can be planned in the mind and
in the absence of the actual event or situation.
The Relationship Between Children's
Thinking and Their Questions About
-
Causal Order ~
The kind of invarient relations that are most sig-
nificant in interactions with the physical environment are
those that deal with causal order. Understanding physical
causality is of supreme importance in the life of the child,
just as it is in the work of the scientist. Causal know-
ledge, from simple associative beliefs to the most sophis-
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ticated forms of causal dependence and interdependence,
offers an assurance of control, security and practical
application. Isaacs, in a book on Children's Ways of
Knowing
,
emphasizes the fact that a knowledge of the causal
structure of the world is indispensable to the growing
child. He says that
Behind most of the checks which the child's
expectations or assumptions receive from the world,
there are unknown or insufficiently known or mis-
construed causal facts; the right kind of explana-
tion will disclose these to him. Endless unexpected
happenings, failures of expected happenings, de-
viations or differences from the customary, will
turn out to be explained by unsuspected causes,
by intervening or preventing causes, unknown de-
termining or conditioning causes. Thus, causes
and causal relations should come to be looked for
as the important controls of what does or does not
happen; and new or better causal knowledge, as the
most potent means to true and successful expecta-
tion, and the key to secure and controlling know-
ledge of the course of things. Thus followed up,
"causes" branch out into activating events on the
one hand, controlling structures, compositions,
natures, relations, etc., on the other hand. They
become extended to include every kind of relevant
or possibly relevant circumstances or conditions
or facts of immediate or wider setting; everything
which, if it were different, would make any given
thing different. Carried right through, causal
inquiry becomes, of course, eventually the basis
for our most systematic and comprehensive investi-
gation into the construction and controls, the
general structure, of our world; in other words,
the warp and woof of science. (1974:50)
The development of a critical attitude of mind is
indispensable to the attainment of technological competence.
Scientific method is a valuable tool in helping children to
understand cause and effect relationships in the physical
environment
.
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Since cause and effect relationships are formally
expressed in the optimal formulations or laws and prin-
ciples of natural science, it will be necessary to iden-
tify these laws and principles in a science curriculum.
The science curriculum should be organized in such a
manner that children at different developmental levels can
understand the laws and principles.
The following chapter outlines some of the major
laws and principles of natural science and gives examples
of how they may be organized so that they are appropriate
for children in different stages of development.
Isaacs places the child’s desire to find out about
causal events within the broader context of the types of
questions that are asked concerning objects, events and
people. The subject of children’s ’’why” questions is ana-
lyzed thoroughly and an explanation is ventured as to why
they occur so frequently at certain ages. Isaacs’ thesis
is that children have a genuine ’epistemic’ concern about
the state of their knowledge. Challenges to their systems
of belief regarding reality present the sense that some-
thing is wrong with their knowledge- - it may be some un-
suspected error, confusion, insufficient information or
misunderstanding. Children do not formulate or articulate
this epistemic concern in a conscious manner, but they act
it out by posing the "why” question.
’’Why” questions do not always ask for a causal
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explanation. Because of their developing language ability
children may frame a "why” question but really be seeking
something other than an explanation. The multiple usages
of ’why" make it somewhat difficult to discern exactly what
is being sought. However, if a satisfactory answer is
not forthcoming, the unremitting "why” is bound to reappear.
Three basic types of "why" questions have been
identified by Isaacs (1974). There are questions that seek
information, explanation or logical justification.
Informational Questions
Essentially, these questions seek to inquire into
motives, intentions, purposes, uses or functions. They
are usually demands for familiar classes of information
rather than explanation. These "why" questions are more
closely allied to question forms such as "where," "when,"
"what," "who" - -quest ions that arise out of simple igno-
rance or lack of knowledge and not from a state of puzzle-
ment and helplessness. So when a child says "Why is this
a cup?" the answer that is being sought is not an explana-
tion but something that has to do with the differences
between classes of objects such as cups, glasses, and mugs.
Explanatory Questions
This group of questions is derived from the initial
but becomes limited to causal inter-informational questions
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vention or control or analysis. The real interest here
is one of explanation which does involve a measure of in-
formation but this is of secondary importance. Informa-
tion that is given is accepted if it really explains the
observed anomaly or confusion. According to Isaacs this
type of "why” question is unmistakable in children from
about four years and onward. A sudden jar or onset of
surprise creates a condition of disturbance and children
may ask such questions as (from Isaacs)
:
’’When you hold up a fountain pen, why doesn't
the ink fall out?"
"Why don't we see two things with our two eyes?"
"You aren't dead, so why don't you get up?"
Answers to these questions are not simple to explain to
a child. Adults may provide an acceptable answer by some
demonstration, identification of a rule or pointing out
some distinction. However, it is evident that erroneous
notions and superstitions can creep into the child's
thought by the appropriateness and the truth-value of the
answer
.
Justificatory Questions
These questions are neither explanatory nor in-
formational. They demand the grounds for rules, commands
and prohibitions as they relate to behavior. Principles
or reasons which presuppose some standard are sought--
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these may be moral, social or conventional standards of
individuals, families or of the society as a whole.
Children who ask "Why do I have to do what you say?" are
seeking what the basis of one’s authority might be. The
difference between these types of questions and the other
two types is that an attitudinal or emotional factor may
be involved which may or may not lead to a clash of views,
rebuttal of ideas or disregard. Discussion and an exchange
of ideas and beliefs are required when these "why" questions
occur
.
Children's understandings develop to a greater or
lesser extent depending upon their experiences as they
look for causal factors that control events. A greater
voluntary interest develops in discovering causal rela-
tionships not only because it provides information but
also because it fulfills the need to bridge the gaps in
the child's knowledge that arise out of genuine puzzlement
or contradiction in experience. Once developed and if it
is successfully sustained, causal inquiry becomes an in-
valuable tool that can assist the child in learning to
understand the laws and principles that govern the organi-
zation of the world of nature.
Development of Children’s Understanding
of Physical Causality
A child's developing notions of cause and effect
relationships in the physical world appear to follow a
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pattern or sequence. Most of the systematic research has
tended to focus on children aged three or four. Research
on infants is not so extensive but it is possible to
piece together a picture of the earliest form of causal
orientation from isolated reports. Piaget's investigations
into the sensor i-motor stage of development are by far, in
an indirect manner, the most comprehensive treatment of
causal interest in very young children. The sequence of
development begins with what may be termed "contingency
awareness," followed by a stage of pre-causal thought and
finally the period of true causal thinking.
Contingency Awareness
As early as a few weeks after birth, infants ex-
plore their environment both visually and physically.
When they discover that one action leads invariably to
another in a regular fashion, a rudimentary form of
causal awareness begins to grow. Stern reports that at
the age of three months, infants play with objects by
touching, rolling, dropping or holding them and in these
ways give themselves simple lessons in physics and geo-
metry (in Huang, 1943). Gesell and Thompson found that
infants of nine months of age engage in ceaseless manipu
lations and initiate the development of later understandings
of physics (in Huang, 1943). In a string toy experiment,
the authors found that infants would constantly pull the
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string to bring the toy within their reach.
Piaget's book on The Origins of Intelligence in
Children (1952) is filled with numerous examples of chil-
dren's developing notions of cause and effect relation-
ships. In the early stage, when the child is about one-
two months old, movements are usually centered on the
child's body, e.g., sucking a thumb or hand, waving the
arms or grasping other parts of the body such as a foot or
a hand. During the next stage, called the "secondary cir-
cular reactions," (about three months) the child's actions
tend towards repetition. After reproducing some of the
results that were discovered by chance by actions on the
body, the child then tries to repeat certain events in the
external environment. The characteristics of this stage
are that "... the movements are centered on a result
produced in the external environment and the sole aim of
the action is to maintain this result; furthermore it is
more complex, the means beginning to be differentiated from
the end, at least after the event" (Piaget, 1952:157).
During the secondary circular reactions stage
children devote their energies to "procedures to make the
interesting spectacle last." Piaget describes how his son,
when given a paper knife, started shaking it so that the
sound of a rattle (which he had played with previously)
could be reproduced. In another example, his daughter
would shake her foot or body to cause swinging- - she had
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learned that this type of shaking could cause certain
things
,
e.g.
,
a bassinet, to rock or swing. However, when
other objects such as a watch or eraser were just held
above her
,
she would shake her feet to reproduce a previous
interesting result. For Piaget, the activities of this
stage are the ’’highest intellectual manifestations of which
the child is capable” (1952:207). Later in the infant’s
development more deliberate exploration and simple experi-
mentation can be witnessed.
Watson (1966) postulated the term ’’contingency
awareness” to refer to any early form of causal association,
when the only reward was the observation of the event. He
played a game with his two-month old son. The contingent
event was the opening and closing of a fist when the child
looked at Watson’s outstretched arms. When the child
turned away the activity ceased, but when his gaze fell on
the fist again the movement was repeated. Learning the
contingency led to the repetition of the head-turning re-
sponse. Further experiments conducted by Watson and Ramey
(1972) utilized a contingency mobile which an infant could
activate by means of a pressurized pillow. Eight week-old
babies learned to turn their heads frequently so that the
mobile would move. The authors were surprized to discover
an emotional effect in that the infant's response was
accompanied by cooing, smiling and laughing. The authors
cite a cautionary note that the experiment may have over-
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stimulated the infants, which may have some disadvantageous
consequences. However, an important implication of this
experiment is that even very young infants find the de-
tection of causal relationships satisfying and rewarding.
Pre-Causal and Causal Thinking
In a book on The Child's Conception of Physical
Causal ity (1930)
,
Piaget investigated the underlying cog-
nitive structures that assist children in discovering cause
and effect relationships. He utilized the clinical method
of interviewing children by presenting questions and demon-
strations on various natural phenomena such as air, clouds,
water, shadows, dreams and machines. The answers that the
children gave fell into seventeen types, the first nine of
which were characteristic of pre-causal thought and the
remaining eight of causal thought. According to Piaget,
before the ages of seven or eight children's explanations
of natural phenomena are basically magical, or animistic,
i.e., a belief that the physical world of objects, plants
and animals are endowed with life. True causal thinking
appears at about seven or eight years of age but is not
prevalent until' eleven or twelve years of age. Explana-
tions now begin to be logical and refer to physical laws
and principles, and the earlier animistic explanations tend
to disappear gradually.
Piaget states that the development of physical
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causality is characterized by two major processes: (1) the
progressive objectification of causality and (2) the forma-
tion of temporal series.
The first process is related to the egocentric
world of the child-
- subj ective elements predominate. Pre-
causal children do not make the following distinctions:
between psychological or motivational factors and physical,
external events because there is very little differentiation
between the internal self and the outside world; between
muscular or body activity and mechanical action; and be-
tween the influence of the mind on the body and the influ-
ence of external objects on each other. Because of the
basic lack of differentiation between themselves and the
external world, young children feel that they can make the
moon follow them, or that the moon likes to follow, that
objects float because they like to do so, that the clouds
walk and the moon goes with them, or that clouds move
because they feel cold.
The constitution of a temporal series is the second
process that affects developing notions of causality. Very
young children (3-6 years) are not concerned about how long
it takes something to happen- - events in their lives are
either immediate or extra- temporal in nature. The sun or
the moon follow as soon as the child begins to walk. Pre
causal children believe in the immediacy of events such
that no thought is given to any intermediaries or contact
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between cause and effect relationships. Children of four
or five years of age think that cars move only because of
the wheels, whereas an eleven or twelve year old may not
know all the details of operation of the car but will
presuppose a system of belts, pipes and chains. Notions
of before and after may be present in precausal children
but it is the idea of a temporal order in time that is
absent, e.g., beginning, middle and end or the fact that a
particular tree is the same tree during summer, winter,
fall and spring.
For Piaget, the stage of pre-causal thought is in-
explicable unless some system of internal origin is postu-
lated as an intermediary between the environment and the
mind. The child begins without any distinction between the
self and the environment, and gradually an awareness of the
body as a separate entity develops. Piaget does not believe
that causality develops as an a priori form, fixed in the
structure of the mind, for if this were so, then causality
should appear in its completed form at the outset. Also,
the fact that causality evolves through so many types of
explanations leads Piaget to the conclusion that an under
standing of physical causality develops through interaction
with the environment and that the child passes through
stages of development of structures that are continually
adapting to the environment and being modified by changes.
Criticism and Confirmation of
the Pre-Causal Stage
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Piaget’s identification of the pre-causal stage as
being characterized by magical and animistic forms of
thought has not been accepted by many researchers in this
field. Numerous studies have been conducted in the hope of
confirming Piaget's views. The outcome has been mixed--
there are just as many studies that confirm pre-causal
thinking as there are studies that do not find any evi-
dence for this early form of causal thought.
In a highly critical review of Piaget’s work, Huang
(1943) put forward the idea that children only sometimes
explain natural phenomena in animistic terms. He studied
American and Chinese children and found that pre-causal
thought, especially mystical and anthropomorphic answers,
were completely absent. Deutsche (1937) used some of
Piaget's questions to which she added ten simple physical
experiments, and discovered that children very rarely
relied on precausal forms of explanation. Most explana-
tions called upon physical or mechanical concepts. Certain
cross-cultural studies have also pointed out that animistic
explanations are not always prevalent- -Mead with the
Manus
tribes on the Admiralty Islands and Jahoda with
children
in West Africa (in Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962).
On the face of this evidence it would seem
that the
existence of a precausal stage should be
abandoned or re-
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jected. However, there have been a series of investiga-
tions that have definitely confirmed the various types
of precausal thought. Numerous studies by Russell and
Dennis (1939) with children of normal intelligence, with
American children and Zuni (Dennis and Russell, 1940) and
with Hopi children (Dennis, 1943) substantiate Piaget's
v i ew
.
The largest study supporting Piaget's results was
carried out by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962). Using five
hundred children between the ages of four and twelve, they
reinvestigated whether precausal thinking existed. Ani-
mistic explanations occurred with such frequency that the
existence of a qualitatively different form of thinking
in young children could not be doubted.
These authors also caution the ready acceptance of
the results of studies on physical causality. Factors such
as the following should be carefully examined in the experi-
mental situations: (1) methods of investigation, e.g., the
use of certain types of questions, questioning techniques
and questionnaire format; (2) types of subjects, especially
as regards age (some researchers used a questionnaire with
8 year olds since they could read and did not find any
precausal forms of thinking- - this is not unusual since true
causal thought begins to develop at about seven or eight
years); and (3) techniques of analysis, particularly in
the identification, classification and definition of the
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different forms of precausal thinking. Laurendeau and
Pinard conclude that the reality of the existence of pre-
causal thought is far from being definitely resolved since
the evidence for its prevalence is so controversial.
Factors That Influence the Children’s
Understanding of Physical Causality
Even though the information on pre-causal thinking
is not so clear-cut, the importance of children's develop-
ing notions of cause and effect relationships has been
acknowledged, particularly in the role of assisting children
to know the basic means by which the physical world func-
tions. To overcome some of the methodological problems
involved in the technique of investigation, various re-
searchers have tried to identify the influence of relevant
situational factors. Baldwin (1955) and Russell (1956)
have suggested that children revert to non-naturalistic
explanations when the phenomena that are being presented
are unfamiliar. Children are therefore unable to explain
the cause and effect relationship in a reasonable manner.
Berzonsky's studies (1971, 1975) which represent the most
recent research in physical causality, also support the
fact that a child’s familiarity with objects or events is
a decisive factor in causal reasoning. The role of experi-
ence in causal thought is related to that of familiarity
and
has been shown to be necessary when trying to investigate
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a child’s level of understanding of causal events (Mogar,
1960; Huang, 1943; Berzonsky, 1975; Inbody, 1963).
Researchers have also discovered that the psycho-
logical state of the child affects an understanding of
physical causality. Berger et al
.
(1969) found that
children with severe psychogenic learning inhibitions used
developmental ly less mature concepts than normal children
when presented with physical events. Reasons advanced for
this condition are that the disturbed parent-child rela-
tionship retards the initial development of causal con-
cepts, or that parents unconsciously thwart the child’s
attempts to know and understand sequences of painful reality
events, or that parents preferred to handle situations with
the child by secrecy, deception and the distortion of
reality. Nass (1956) found that the withdrawn child's
level of causal thinking was at a significantly less
mature level than a child who was not withdrawn. Children
with withdrawal symptoms tend to find the environment
threatening and retreat into their own world and thereby
revert to prelogical modes of thought.
A close relationship exists between a child's
understanding of physical causality and psychological
causality (Whiteman, 1970) which has later implications
for moral development. Kohlberg’s work on moral reasoning
and Selman's studies on social perspective- taking presup-
pose the development of physical causality especially in the
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progressive differentiation of the self and the external
environment. Children learn to consider other people and
their feelings when they realize that they themselves are
separate entities.
Children’s Application of
Scientific Method
It would be safe to conclude from the foregoing
discussion that the types of causal explanations that
children present reflect their level of scientific think-
ing. The assumption is that the qualitative differences
in the explanations at different stages of development are
the external manifestations of an internal pattern of
organization of thought processes. As was noted at the
beginning of this chapter, the scientist's mode of thinking
was inferred from the actions performed, i.e., scientific
method. The processes of observation, hypothesis-formation,
prediction, and theory formation have been well-documented
in adult scientific thought. In the case of young chil-
dren, the developmental progression of processes of scien-
tific method have not been thoroughly and systematically
investigated. However, some information is available from
Piaget's experiments with physical phenomena (in Ginsburg
and Opper
,
1969)
.
A pendulum problem was presented to subjects in
the pre- operational , concrete-operational and formal opera-
139
tional stages of development. The problem was to discover
the frequency of oscillation of the pendulum in relation
to four factors which could be manipulated-
-height of
pendulum, length of string, weight of suspended object
and force with which the pendulum could be pushed.
It is immediately evident that the problem is
beyond the capability of a 6 or 7 year old child, but it
does provide some insight into how the child might be
thinking. The pre-operational child acted in a haphazard
manner-
- testing was random, results were reported inac-
curately and expectations influenced observations. However,
the subjects did formulate hypotheses (even though they
were inaccurate), made observations, experimented by at-
tempting to manipulate variables and drew conclusions
which were not in accordance with the results. The concrete-
operational child showed a marked improvement- - a number of
variables were investigated, results were observed ac-
curately and the solution to the problem was partially
correct. The major deficiencies lay in poor experimental
design (which could be expected because there were too
many variables to manipulate) and incorrect inferences were
drawn. Finally, the formal operational subjects (adoles-
cents) design the experiment properly at first, then
observe the results accurately and draw logical conclusions
from the observations. - Hypotheses were carefully formulated,
variables were manipulated one at a time and the conclusions
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were "certain and necessary" (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969:
188) .
Clearly the pre-operat ional child's scientific
thinking is different from the adolescent's thought but
only in a matter of degree. Not being capable of abstract
thought, young children have difficulty in conceptualizing
hypothetical combinations and mentally manipulating vari-
ables. The concrete operational child has the beginnings
of abstract thought but is still tied to the concrete
situation. As the child develops more complex cognitive
structures, then true scientific thinking will gradually
emerge
.
The ability to think in a scientific manner can
prove to be an invaluable tool for children, not only when
they are young but throughout their lives. If children
are introduced to the application of the scientific method
when they are young, then they will have an opportunity to
gradually develop a critical attitude of mind in relation
to their experiences in the physical, human and unknown
environments. One of the goals of education, according to
Piaget, is "to form minds which can be critical, can veri-
fy, and not accept everything they are offered" (in Barber
and Hayes, 1973:13).
A critical mind will go a long way in helping to
free children (and adults) from error, superstition, pre-
judice, dogma and fear. Such beliefs, once established,
141
have a tendency to persist in how people think, feel and
behave in certain situations. The habitual patterned use
of energies in these directions then become very difficult
to eliminate. To avoid the harmful and destructive effects
that can accrue from acting on the basis of superstition,
error and fear, children should be encouraged, when young,
to question, investigate and verify statements as much as
possible. When errors are not detrimental to the life of
a child, they can serve as valuable experiences in learning
more about a particular event or phenomenon. Errors have
the capacity to act as lures so that further hypotheses
can be formulated to test out some problem and in this way
a solution that is closer to the truth, i.e., a closer
approximation to reality, can be achieved. The persis-
tence of the search after truth is described by Whitehead
when he claims that "It belongs to the self-respect of
intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final
unravelment" (1967c:185).
Situations will arise, more so with adolescents
and adults, when information about certain things will be
accepted even if all the facts are not known. Such in-
stances occur when results are reported from certain fields
of specialization or when experts give their advice and
opinions. Does a person have to blindly accept what is
heard or what is read, or is there some means by which the
information can be assessed? There appear to be three
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checks that can be fruitfully applied. Firstly, the
validity of the information will depend on the source of
the information, e.g., was it read in a reputable journal,
a not-so reputable newspaper, on television or from another
individual? Secondly, the potential replicability or the
actual number of replications of the results will have to
be assessed. Hearing of an isolated instance of a cure for
some disease does not lend authenticity or credibility to
the information because one does not know whether the cure
will be effective in other situations as well. Thirdly,
the operation of different variables will have to be
checked. If enough facts are available and there is a
sufficient level of understanding of the information, then
further examinations can be made. The three checks men-
tioned are all facets of a scientific mode of thinking.
Dewey comments that science and its methods involve "an
intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise current
beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous" (1966:19).
Whether children will try to check their ideas,
readjust their beliefs or extend their knowledge depends
to a large extent on the standard of explanation that
adults present (Isaacs, 1974). Adults can encourage or
discourage the child’s explorations; they "can rebuff,
confuse, mislead and stifle it in endless ways" (Isaacs,
1974:53). Isaacs concludes the section on children's 'why
questions and the development of their scientific thinking
143
by pointing out to adults that
But these are the factors that will beyond any-
thing else decide the general character and level
of his intellectual life. They will determine the
degree of control which actuality is allowed to
exercise over his notions and beliefs. Nothing
can be more fatal to growth in adequate know-
ledge, or in the capacity for objective judgment,
than the vitiation of that actual ity- control by
a low social standard of explanation. If it
sanctions explanation by pretentious tautologies,
by arbitrary selections of partial causes, by
imaginary and mythological causes; if it seems to
authorize endless irrelevance, the divorce of
explanation from its occasions and function, its
confusion with verbal and formal self- justifica-
tion (and the substitution of the latter for
enquiries into evidence) and if, moreover, it does
this all together in one anarchic medley- -the re-
sult will be self-evident. Such a social standard
must continually tend to blunt alertness; to
confuse the functioning of such native functional
standards as we may possess; to discourage an in-
terest which it hinders or leads astray from
achievement; and in general, to make us drift to-
wards a state of chaotic muddle-mindedness which
then in turn can only, in a vicious circle, re-
produce itself. By continuous efforts to counter-
act its consequences, impelled and sustained from
the one direction in which we have achieved suc-
cessful integrative growth, i.e., science, and
the scientific attitude and method, we may indeed
keep them under control and even very slowly and
laboriously gain a little upon them. But at the
very best, the most part of the work of our special
socially delegated organ of cognitive growth must
thus be wrasted, so long as we are content with a
general social and educational standard of explana-
tion which lags so far behind that which science
itself has reached, and which is the basis for all
its achievement. (1974:52-53)
The next chapter will outline the framework for a
natural science curriculum within the context of the over
all curriculum. This framework will form the basis from
which development ally- sequenced science concepts and ac-
tivities could be elaborated in greater detail.
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR A NATURAL SCIENCE
CURRICULUM BASED ON AN
ORGANISMIC APPROACH
From an organismic perspective, the natural science
curriculum should reflect the characteristics of wholeness,
integration and relatedness. It is important then that
these organismic characteristics be incorporated in the
organizational format of the natural science curriculum.
This chapter will outline one possible logical
structuring of the framework of the natural science cur-
riculum rather than a developmentally-based structure. The
reason for presenting the logical scheme first is that it
can provide a base from which developmentally- sequenced
science curriculum goals can be planned and implemented.
Developmental information on the nature of children’s
scientific thinking is vital if such curriculum goals are
to be outlined and executed (see Chapter IV) . Chapter
VI will present prototypical sequences of developmentally-
based science curriculum goals.
Before discussing the logical structure of the
framework of the natural science curriculum in the Anisa
Model, it will be useful to understand the nature of
curriculum in general. To provide the context for this
145
discussion, die Anisa Iheory of Curriculum will be pro*
sented and its relationship to' the framework for a natural
science curriculum will then be explored.
The Anisa Theory of Curriculum
In the Anisa Model, curriculum is defined as
being ’’comprised of two interrelated sets of educational
goals and what children do, usually with the help of peers
and adults to achieve these goals" (Jordan and Streets,
1973:30) The two sets of goals are: process goals and
content goals. Process goals refer to the "hows" of learn-
ing and depend on the classification of a person's poten-
tialities and how they become actualized. Content goals
refer to the information to be learned by the person. The
organization of the information (content) to be learned is
congruent with the classification of the environments
according to Whitehead's ontological levels (physical,
human and unknown) and upon the formation and utilization
of basic symbol systems (mathematics, language and the
arts) to convey the information. What children do (the
interaction component) represents those activities that
children engage in to attain the goals of the curriculum.
Process and content goals, specific formation and
utilization of symbols, and types of interactions are all
V
further exposition of the Anisa Theory of Cur-
riculum will be presented by Lawrence McCullough in a
forthcoming dissertation.
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determined by the overarching purpose of the higher-order
competencies, i.e., technological, moral and fiducial
competencies. The interrelated components of the Anisa
Theory of Curriculum, which are organized around the
higher-order competencies, may be outlined as follows:
I. Process goals
II. Content goals
III. Formation and utilization of symbols
IV. Interaction with particular environments
to achieve the goals.
Components of the Anisa
Theory of Curriculum
A description of the components of the Anisa Theory
of Curriculum will help to make clear their role in the
framework that is being proposed for the natural science
curriculum. The specificity of the process and content
goals, symbol formation and utilization, and particular
activities is determined by the higher-order competencies.
I. Process Goals
Five basic categories of potentialities have been
identified in the Anisa Model: psychomotor (moving), per-
ceptual (perceiving) , cognitive (thinking) , affective
(feeling), and volitional (willing) potentialities. The
internalization of processes underlying each category of
potentiality results in the attainment of learning compe-
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tence in that category. There are numerous processes
underlying each category which have to be mastered if
learning competence is to be achieved.
Since the notion of process is central in organ-
ismic philosophy and so crucial in the Anisa theory of
Curriculum, it will be useful to understand the way in
which the word is being used. Jordan defines process in
the following manner:
We use the word process to refer to the functioning
that is made possible by some structure in the
brain which is built up out of the organism's
particular interactions with particular environ-
ments. Process is not to be confused with activity
that is provided for the child. We reserve the
phrase interaction with the environment to de-
scribe what the child does. It is the purpose of
the process curriculum to specify what kinds of
environments and what kinds of interactions with
those environments are necessary for particular
structures to emerge, thereby endowing the child
with competence to function in terms of their
associated processes. (Jordan, 1976:277)
The process goals then are concerned with the "how"
of learning as opposed to the "what" of the content cur-
riculum. Children gradually learn how to move, how to
perceive, how to think, how to feel and how to formulate
goals and execute them. The basic processes in each cate-
gory of potentiality assist children in learning how to
learn, thereby becoming competent learners.
Learning competence has been defined as the con-
scious ability to differentiate aspects of experience
(psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and voli-
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tional experiences) and to integrate these aspects into a
pattern in some new way and then generalize the integrated
pattern to other similar situations. The word "conscious"
has been used to refer to knowing that one knows rather
than just knowing something without being aware of it.
Human beings employ symbols to represent what they do know
and the state of not knowing something. Learning compe-
tence therefore depends on the conscious ability to use
symbols to differentiate, integrate and generalize aspects
of experience.
The attainment of learning competence in each
category of potentiality will result in the achievement of
psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volition-
al competencies. Each competency will depend on the con-
scious ability to differentiate, integrate and generalize
aspects of experience related to a particular category.
The five basic competencies are very closely related and
will be implicated in each interaction with the environment.
I I . Content Goals
The content of the curriculum depends on the in-
formation to be learned. There are two basic types of
information: (1) descriptive information which includes
basic factual information, and (2) more formalized informa-
tion that can be generalized to different situations. The
information to be learned is organized according to the
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ontological levels of the universe as described by White-
head.
III. Formation and Utilization
of Symbols ~
The information that is to be conveyed will be
coded in symbols, i.e., mathematical symbols, language
symbols and the symbols of the arts. Depending upon the
purpose tha>_ the individual has in mind, different
symbolic forms will be utilized.
IV. Interaction with Particular
Environments to Achieve the
Goals
One of the basic propositions of the Anisa Theory
of Development is that development is sustained through
interaction with the environment. Children's interactions
with the environment will be organized in such a manner
so that the goals of the curriculum can be achieved. The
particular environment's to be interacted with will be de-
termined by (1) the information to be learned, (2) the
process goals to be achieved, and (3) the developmental
level of the child. Activities that are organized for
children will incorporate the fusion of process and content
goals, foster the development of symbolic capacities and
the formation of values and the higher order competencies
so that the act of learning is an integrated, holistic
isb
experience
.
As the child interacts with the physical, human
and unknown environments, material, social and philosophi-
cal values are formed respectively. On each of these
values rests the attainment of technological, moral and
fiducial competence, respectively (see Chapter III). This
dissertation deals only with the presentation of a possible
framework for a natural science curriculum, the goal of
which is. the attainment of technological competence.
Components of the Natural Science
Curriculum in Accordance With the
Anisa Theory of Curriculum
The interrelated components of the natural science
curriculum will be organized around the overarching purpose
of achieving technological competence. These components
are
:
I
.
Process goals
II. Content goals
Ill Formation and utilization
primarily mathematics and
language
of symbols,
discursive
IV. Interactions to achieve the goals
I . Process Goals
Each of the five basic competencies will be impli-
cated in each interaction with the physical environment.
A. Psychomotor competence will depend on the con-
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scious ability to use voluntary muscles in locomotion and
in manipulation, particularly fine motor skills for handl-
ing specimens and instruments.
Perceptual competence will depend on the con-
scious ability to process sensory data from the environ-
ment, i.e., visual, tactile, olfactory, auditory and
gustatory information. The foundation of natural science
rests upon careful and detailed observation.
C. Cognitive competence which is crucial in
science depends on the development of the intellectual pro-
cesses that can be consciously used for thinking and reason-
ing. Processes of scientific method such as observation,
hypothesis formation, experimentation, deduction, induction,
prediction and inference are vital in helping children dis-
cover the relationships between physical events. Other pro-
cesses such as classification, seriation and conservation
are also important, particularly in the understanding of
quantitative relationships.
D. Affective competence will depend on the con-
scious organization of emotions so that viability can be
accurately assessed. Emotions that relate to hope and fear
affect the release of potential. Hope-related emotions
lead to active involvement and enjoyment, whereas fear-
related emotions lead to avoidance reactions and anxiety.
To avoid the development of superstition, it is important
that the hope-related emotions become associated with
the
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principles and methods of science which arc designed to
discover error in belief and so generate new knowledge.
E. Volitional competence depends on the conscious
ability to attend to some aspect of experience, formulate
goals and persevere in the attainment of these goals.
The great discoveries in science are made by scientists
who toil laboriously over many years to achieve their goals.
Without volitional competence, the need to do things over
and over' again cannot be met.
Even though each of the competencies has been
separated for the sake of analysis and discussion, it must
be remembered that all of the competencies are implicated
in each interaction with the physical environment.
I I . Content Goals
In the natural science curriculum the content to be
learned is the knowledge or information that has been ac-
cumulated about the physical environment. The information
to be learned is of two basic types: (1) descriptive infor-
mation, i.e., basic facts and definitions; and (2) abstract,
general i zable information such as the basic laws and prin-
ciples of natural science, which express fundamental pat-
terns of relationships in the physical world. With the on-
set of more abstract thought processes, these laws and
principles can be learned and generalized to other similar
situations. A detailed outline and description of the two
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types of information will be presented in this chapter.
III. Formation and Utilization
of Symbols
A statement on the role of symbolization in natural
science was presented in Chapter III. Mathematics and dis-
cursive language are used primarily by scientists to convey
information about the physical environment. Music, visual
art, dance and poetic and dramatic uses of language con-
tribute to the development of sensitivity to, and apprecia-
tion of, forms, patterns and harmony in nature. Metaphor
and analogy are often the means of new discoveries in the
sciences
.
IV. Interaction to Achieve
the Goals
What children do to achieve the goals of the
natural science curriculum will depend on the kinds of
learning experiences that are planned. Experiences will
be organized to impart information and understanding
about the major laws and principles of natural science
(content goals) and to strengthen the processes underlying
the basic competencies (process goals)
.
To make natural science an exciting and challenging
experience for children, the activities that are planned
should be organismic in nature and relate to the lives of
children, to real problems that may be encountered, and to
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their developmental levels.
The overarching objective of the natural science
curriculum is the development of technological competence
in interacting with the physical environment, i.e., the
development of the conscious ability to understand, discover
and apply the laws and principles of natural science in
such a manner that greater control over the physical en-
vironment can be exercised.
Process Goals of the Natural
Science Curriculum
There are many basic processes that must be internal
ized if technological competence is to be attained in inter-
acting with the physical environment. The following brief
list identifies some of these basic processes that consti-
tute the process part of the natural science curriculum
(for definitions of each process see Jordan [1976]). This
is not an exhaustive list and is presented here to give
examples of the kind of processes involved.
Psychomotor processes: balance/posture, locomotion,
manipulation, vocalization.
Perceptual processes: visual, auditory, olfactory,
taste, tactile, intersensory
integration
.
Cognitive processes: object permanence, deduction,
— induction (includes observation
prediction, experimentation),
extrapolation, interpolation,
classification, seriation, con-
servation, number relations.
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Affective processes : evaluative (reflection, apprai-
sal)
,
regulative (facilitation,
inhibition, coping), empathic
(imitation, identification,
reciprocation)
.
Volitional processes : attention, goal setting, will
(self arousal, perseverance,
effecting closure)
.
Science activities that are planned for children
can foster the internalization of many of these basic
processes to a greater or lesser extent. For example, a
simple experiment on the expansion of metals will impli-
cate processes from each category of potentiality: proces-
ses of manipulation in the handling of materials (psycho-
motor)
,
visual processes of observation (perceptual)
,
thought processes such as classification, seriation, con-
servation, prediction, hypothesis- formation, experimenta-
tion (cognitive)
,
evaluative and regulative processes
involved in enjoying and coping with the task (affective),
and finally, persevering in the achievement of the goal
(volitional)
.
It is evident that the cognitive processes play a
crucial role in the natural science curriculum, largely
because of the need for the development and refinement of
the intellectual processes that are necessary for thinking
and reasoning. The particular expression of the cognitive
processes will be realized in the fusion with the content
part of the natural science curriculum. A detailed out-
line of the content goals will be presented in this chapter.
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A unique feature of the natural science curriculum
is that the cognitive processes that are stressed in the
natural science curriculum are also a part of other cur-
ricula, e.g., the cognitive development curriculum, moral
development curriculum, social science curriculum. From
an organismic point of view, such interrelationships are
inescapable and necessary.
Two examples will assist in clarifying the concept
of horizontal transfer of processes across various disci-
plines. The process of seriation* i.e., arranging things in
terms of ordered differences, can be applied to animals and
plants (largest to smallest), to people (tall to short,
happy to sad) and to ideas or goals (most significant or
important to the least significant or important). Predic-
tion (inference) is a cognitive process that can be applied
in a specific manner to investigating whether it will rain
or not given the prevailing weather conditions, or else a
prediction can be made about a person's general pattern of
behavior given certain information about personality, age,
and life experiences.
Being able to generalize processes from one area
of knowledge to another is one of the most outstanding
features of a competent learner. Understanding and apply-
ing the basic processes involved in scientific methodologv
will assist in the attainment of technological competence.
Content Goals of the Natural
Science Curriculum
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From the definition of technological competence
which was presented in Chapter III, it is possible to de-
termine the particular information that should form the
content part of the natural science curriculum. Since the
patterns of relationships between and among events were
identified as being the keys to understanding the operation
of the physical environment, then it becomes clear that
these patterns should be systematically described and or-
ganized. The numerous patterns of relationships are sum-
marized in the fundamental laws and principles of natural
science. If one of the goals of a natural science cur-
riculum is to impart this information, then a system of
categories or a classification scheme needs to be estab-
lished for the ease of learning and remembering the laws
and principles.
Proposed Classification Scheme for the
Fundamental Laws and Principles for
a Natural Science Curriculum
I have found that having a definition of a law or
principle can provide a basis upon which the major laws
and principles of natural science may be classified. A
law or principle is a statement about the organization,
storage, transfer, utilization or transformation of energy
that occurs during events in the physical environment. It
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should be emphas i zed that all events in the universe are
ultimately understood in terms of energy. Even the concept
of matter can really only be comprehended if we view
matter as organized energy configurations. However, in
the classification scheme that I am setting forth, matter
will be viewed as one type of energy configuration so that
events such as the interaction between matter and energy
or the transformation of matter or energy can be considered.
Laws and principles that relate to the organization
of matter, the storage of energy in matter and the transfer
of energy between matter may be grouped together to form
the study of physics. The interrelationship or interaction
between energy and matter, rather than structural changes
in matter, is usually examined in physics (except, of
course, in atomic physics, where the boundary between
physics and chemistry is less distinct and changes in
matter are studied)
.
Laws and principles that concern the organization
of matter, the storage of energy, and the transformation of
matter from one form to another constitute the study of
chemistry. The interaction between matter and energy
results in a structural change in matter with the ac-
companying release or absorption of energy.
Laws and principles that involve statements about
a living organism's capacity to utilize and store energy
by transforming matter or energy from one form to another
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comprise the study of biology. The energy which is ob-
tained by the living organism is utilized to support and
maintain the vital life functions. This definition of
the study of biology in physico-chemical terms is not
meant to be taken in an extreme reductionis tic sense.
Some of the basic functions of living organisms may be
analyzed in terms of physico-chemical reactions, but
there are other characteristics such as life, integration
and wholeness that are unique to living organisms and
which cannot be analyzed in such terms (see Chapter II).
The study of physics and chemistry may be combined
into the more inclusive group of physical sciences (i.e.,
non-living aspects of the physical world). Biology, which
is a study of living organisms, may be viewed as life
sciences. Physical sciences and life sciences may be
combined to form the larger category of basic theoretical
sciences
.
A distinction is being made in this framework
between the basic theoretical sciences (physics, chemis-
try and biology) and the integrative theoretical sciences
(astronomy, geology, ecology). In the integrative theo-
retical sciences aspects of the physical environment are
studied by using the laws and principles of physics,
chemistry and biology. In astronomy, the laws and prin
ciples of physics and chemistry are studied as they relate
to the celestial bodies, their composition, motions and
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evolution. In geology, the laws and principles of physics
and chemistry are studied as they relate to the solid
earth (internal and external processes) and the atmosphere
of the earth. In ecology, the laws and principles of
biology, physics and chemistry are investigated as they
relate to the interactions between the living and non-
living parts of the physical environment. Ecology may
really be viewed as the most integrated theoretical science
since if incorporates the laws and principles of physics,
chemistry, geology and astronomy.
The distinctions between the various sciences are
only made for the ease of classification and study. In
contemporary natural science some events in the physical
environment have to be analyzed from more than one per-
spective to be understood, and the need for real integra-
tion of knowledge is becoming apparent. For this reason
many interdisciplinary fields have become necessary to
develop a more complete understanding of relationships
among phenomena in the physical world. Some of these
fields are biophysics, biochemistry, molecular biology,
physical chemistry, physical geology or geophysics, and
astrophysics
.
Figure II presents a possible schematic outline
of the various categories of laws and principles proposed
for the natural science curriculum.
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PHYSICAL SCIENCES LIFE SCIENCES
Biology
BASIC
THEORETICAL
SCIENCES
INTEGRATIVE
THEORETICAL
SCIENCES
Figure II: A Possible Schematic Representation of the
Interrelationships Between the Categories
of Laws and Principles.
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Outline of the Classification Scheme
of the Fundamental Laws ancT
Principles for a Natural
Science Curriculum
BASIC THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
I. PHYSICS
A. Organization of Matter
B. Motion and Force
C. Motion and Work
D. Types of Force
E. Types of Motion
II. CHEMISTRY
A. Composition of Matter
B. Chemical Dynamics
1. Transformation of Solids in Liquids
2. Transformation of Liquids in Liquids
3. Chemical Reactions
4. Thermochemistry
5. Electrochemistry
LIFE SCIENCES
III. BIOLOGY
A. Functional Requirements
1. Life- supporting and Growth Functions
2. Interactive and Integrative Functions
3. Perpetuation of Life Functions
B. Structural Principles and Diversity
1. Structural Hierarchies
2. Patterns of Structural Diversity
INTEGRATIVE THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
IV. ASTRONOMY
A. The Solar System
B. Stellar Composition and Evolution
C. Galaxies
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V. GEOLOGY
A. The Solid Earth
B. The Atmosphere of the Earth
LIFE SCIENCES
VI. ECOLOGY
A. Ecosystem Ecology
B. Population Ecology
C. Community Ecology
D. Habitat Analysis
Detailed Description of the Classification of
the Fundamental Laws and Principles for a
Natural Science Curriculum
The laws and principles in this section are stated
in an abstract and complex form (particularly in physics,
chemistry and astronomy) and will need to be modified in ^
specific ways for teachers and for children, i.e., making
them simpler and less abstract. Developmental information
about specific children being taught a given law or prin-
ciple will be vital in modifying the laws and principles
so that the concepts will be appropriate to their develop-
mental levels. Children at the pre-operational stage of
development, for example, will require vastly simpler
concepts than those at the early formal operational stage.
The following scheme is organized on logical
grounds and not on developmental grounds. When this scheme
is used in planning learning experiences for particular
children, their developmental levels have to be assessed
in
terms of the processes that were outlined in the
process
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component of the natural science curriculum. This assess-
ment will enable the teacher to make the appropriate modi-
fication or simplification in the scientific law or
principle being taught.
Together with the statement of each law and prin-
ciple are certain definitions (or descriptive content in-
formation) which should be understood if the law or prin-
ciple is to be learned. The definitions are not an exhaus-
tive listing at this point in time, but such a listing will
become necessary as the framework is worked out more fully.
Many of the laws and principles include mathemati-
cal concepts. Rather than outline all the prerequisite
mathematical experiences, I have presupposed a certain level
of mathematical understanding appropriate to each category.
BASIC THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
I . PHYSICS
A. Organization of Matter
Certain types of energy configurations may be
identified as varying states of matter.
Definitions: organization, matter (solids,
liquids, gases), states, energy configurations.
B . Motion and Force
1. Newton’s First Law of Motion (or Law of
Inertia)
"A body remains at rest, or if already m
motion, remains in uniform motion with con-
stant speed in a straight line, unless it
is acted on by an unbalanced external force"
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(Asimov
,
1966:24).
or
:
if any change in motion occurs it is due to
some force.
Definitions: motion, force, speed or velocity,
friction, length, time.
2. Newton's Second Law of Motion
"The accel lerat ion produced by a force acting
on a body is directly proportional to the
magnitude of the force and inversely propor-
tional to the mass of the body" (Asimov,
1966:31) .
or
:
force is equal to the product of mass and
acceleration (F=ma)
.
Definitions: acceleration, mass, proportion.
3. Newton's Third Law of Motion (or Action and
Reaction Law)
"When two objects interact, the force exerted
by the first on the second (the action) is
equal in magnitude and opposite in direction
to the force exerted by the second on the
first (the reaction)" (Cons tant, 1963 : 110)
.
or
:
for every action there is an equal and oppo-
site reaction.
Definitions: interaction, action, reaction, equal,
opposite, pressure.
C. Motion and Work
1. Principle of Kinetic Energy
When particles are in motion they possess a
form of energy called kinetic energy.
Definitions: energy, heat, temperature, potential
energy, chemical energy.
a. Heat and Solids
When solids are heated they expand and
when cooled they contract.
Definitions: expansion, contraction, boiling
point, melting point.
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b. Meat and Liquids
When liquids are heated they evaporate
and when cooled they condense.
Definitions: evaporation, condensation.
c. Heat and Gases
Charles' (or Gay-Lussac's) Law
The volume of a gas expands when heated
and decreases when cooled.
2. Law of Conservation of Energy (or First Law
of Thermodynamics)
Energy may be transformed from one form to
another, but it cannot be created or destroyed,
or
:
The total energy content of a closed system
is constant.
Definitions: conservation, closed system, work
(simple machines transform small force into a
large force)
.
D . Types of Force
1. Force and States of Matter
a. Force and Solids
Hooke's Law
Strain is proportional to stress, i.e.,
objects undergo some deformation as a
result of a force.
Definitions: stress (deforming force), strain
(deformation caused by stress), elasticity,
limit of strain.
b. Force and Liquids
Archimedes Principle (Principle of
Buoyancy)
A solid body less dense than the fluid
that surrounds it will float when the
volume (weight) of the fluid it displaces
is equal to its own original volume
(weight)
.
or i
The upward force of liquids against sub-
merged objects makes objects float.
Definitions: density, buoyancy, float, sink,
volume, force, weight.
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Water particles are held closely together
by very strong forces (cohesion).
Definitions: cohesion, adhesion, surface ten-
sion, miniscus, capillary action.
c. Force and Gases
Boyle's Law
The pressure of a gas varies inversely
with the volume, that is, if the volume
increases the pressure decreases and
vice versa.
Definitions: pressure, volume, increase,
decreas e
.
2. Gravity
Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation
"Between any two objects in the world there
exists a mutual force of attraction that is
directly proportional to the product of the
masses of the objects and inversely propor-
tional to the square of their distances
apart" (F = Gm^m^/d^) (Constant
,
1963:131).
or
:
Every body in the universe attracts every
other body with a particular force.
(Specialized instance is the law of gravity:
all objects close to the earth are attracted
to the earth.)
Definitions: gravitation or gravity, weight.
3. Electricity
Coloumb's Law of Electrostatic Force
"Bodies with like charges repel and with
unlike charges attract one another; for point
charges (or small charged spheres) the force
of interaction is proportional to the product
of the charges and inversely proportional to
the square of their distances apart" (F
kqlqVr 2 ) (Constant , 1963:201).
or
:
Bodies with like charges repel each other
with a certain force and unlike charges
attract each other with a certain force de-
pending on the distance of separation.
Definitions: electrostatic, el ectric . charge , like
unlike, electric current, electric circuit.
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4. Magnetism
Coulomb's Law of- Magnetic Force (early
statement)
"Like poles repel, unlike poles attract, the
force being proportional to the product of
the pole strengths and inversely proportional
to the square of their distance of separation"
(F = const. (m,m
? /d2) (Constant, 1963:225).
or
:
Like poles of a magnet repel and unlike poles
attract depending on the distance of separa-
tion of the poles.
Definitions: magnet, attract, repel, poles.
5. Electromagnetism
a. Ampere's Law of Magnetic Force (more
recent statement in terms of electricity
and magnetism)
The magnetic force is attractive when
currents run in the same direction and
repulsive when the currents are opposite,
and the magnitude of the force is pro-
portional to the product of the currents
and inversely proportional to their dis-
tance apart,
or
:
Electric currents can produce a magnetic
field or force.
Definitions: field, magnetic field.
b. Faraday's Law of Electromagnetic Induction
Magnetic fields can produce electric
currents by induction.
Definitions: induction (causing an electro-
motive force)
.
E . Types of Motion
1. Simple Harmonic Motion
Some bodies vibrate through alternate move-
ment in opposite directions through the
action of an elastic restoring force.
Definitions: vibration, alternate, opposite,
restoring force, elastic, harmonic, music.
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2. Wave Motion
a. Huygen's Principle of Wave Propogation
A wave is a disturbance that is propa-
gated through space and/or a medium of
some kind.
Definitions: mechanical waves (waves in which
material particles are displaced, e.g., sound
waves and water waves)
.
Electromagnetic waves (waves that are propa-
gated in space, e.g., light).
Sound is created by mechanical waves which we
hear and interpret as sound.
Light is made up of electromagnetic waves
which we see and interpret as light.
Other electromagnetic waves: radio, televi-
sion, infrared, ultraviolet, x-rays.
b. Law of Reflection
When a wave encounters a new medium, the
wave is bounced off the medium in such a
way that the angle made by the incident
ray is equal to the angle made by the
reflected ray.
Definitions: medium, angle, incident ray,
reflection, reflected ray.
c. Snell's Law of Refraction
When a wave encounters a new medium and
can pass through it, the speed of the ray
changes
.
Definitions: refraction, color, spectrum.
(NOTE: Relativity (principle of relativity) ^ and
Atomic Physics (quantum principle and Pauli s
exclusion principle) involve complex concepts
and will not be included here.)
II . CHEMISTRY
A. Composition of Matter
Matter is made up of small particles which
are
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held together by bonds.
Definitions: particles, atoms, molecules, bonds.(Details on atomic structure will not be introduced
until the formal operational stage.)
B
. Chemical Dynamics
Matter can be transformed or changed by chemical
reactions
.
Definitions: chemical, dynamics, transformed, chemi-
cal reaction.
1. Transformation of a Solid in a Liquid
Solids may dissolve in a liquid to form a
solution when the bonds holding the solid
together are broken by the liquid particles.
Definitions: solution, dissolve, diffusion,
saturation, supersaturation, crystallization.
Solids may be scattered as fine particles in
a liquid if they do not dissolve.
Definitions: suspension, emulsion, colloid, gel,
sol, protoplasm.
2. Transformation of Liquids in Liquids
One liquid may dissolve completely in another
liquid (miscible).
Definition: miscible.
3. Chemical Reactions
a. Law of Mass Action
At constant temperature the rate of
reaction is proportional to the active
masses or amounts of each of the reac-
tants .
or
:
A chemical reaction depends on the amounts
of reactants that are present.
Definitions: chemical, reaction, reactant,
product, rate of reaction.
i7i
b. Reversible Reactions
A chemical reaction that can proceed in
two directions (forward and backward) is
reversible.
Definitions: reversible, forward, backward,
equilibrium.
4. Thermochemistry or Heat and Matter
When matter undergoes a chemical reaction, it
is transformed and heat is either absorbed or
released
.
Definitions: heat, absorbed, released, heat of
combustion, heat of neutralization, heat of solu-
tion, cooking.
5. Electrochemistry or Electricity and Matter
Certain substances conduct electricity when
they are dissolved in a liquid.
Definitions: electrolyte, acids, bases and salts,
indicators, neutralization, batteries.
(NOTE: A large part of chemistry will be included
in biology as biochemistry and in physics as
physical chemistry.)
LIFE SCIENCES
III. BIOLOGY
A. Functional Requirements
1. Life Supporting and Growth Functions
a. Energy Production and Related Functions
Living organisms must obtain energy to
maintain life.
i. Nutrient Procurement
Living organisms must either take in
or manufacture nutrients to obtain
energy for the maintenance of life.
Plants take in raw materials (water,
gases, light, minerals) to manufacture
nutrients
.
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Animals ingest manufactured nutrients.
Definitions: nutrients, living organisms,
energy, gases, light, minerals.
ii. Nutrient Manufacture
Plants synthesize their own nutrients
through the utilization of solar
energy or light and basic raw mater-
ials (photosynthesis).
Definitions: photosynthesis, solar energy.
iii. Nutrient Processing
Living organisms must process nutrients
into a simpler form so that they can
be utilized to obtain energy for
building new materials.
Plants utilize the manufactured
nutrients as they are in a simple
form already.
Animals have to digest the complex
nutrients which are taken in into
simpler forms so that they can be
utilized.
Definitions: processing, digestion,
enzyme action.
iv. Transportation of Nutrients
Living organisms must transport
nutrients in a simplified form to
each part of the organism where they
can be utilized.
Plants transport water and manufac-
tured nutrients throughout the plant
system (translocation)
.
Animals transport necessary gases and
simplified nutrients throughout their
bodies by the process of circulation.
Definitions: translocation, phloem, xylem,
circulation, blood, heart, blood vessels.
v. Energy Production in the Cell (Cel-
lular Respiration)
_
Living organisms must utilize (oxidize
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and reduce) the simplified nutrients
in the cell to produce energy which
can maintain the functions of life.
Definitions: oxidize, reduce, cellular
respiration, cell.
vi. Removal of Unwanted Material
Living organisms must remove un-
wanted material which may be harmful
to the maintenance of life functions.
Plants mainly remove excess water
(transpiration) and gases at certain
times. Solid waste products are
stored in certain parts of the plant.
Animals remove solid and liquid waste
products (excretion) and gaseous by-
products .
Definitions: transpiration, excretion,
waste and by-products, kidney action.
b. Structural Support Functions
Living organisms must support their
structures in the best possible manner so
that the functions of life may progress.
Plants possess specialized thickened cells
that function to hold the plant in a posi-
tion where the maximum amount of sunlight
may be obtained.
Animals may possess specialized hardened
cells which support the body of the or-
ganism in the best possible manner.
Definitions: structural support, specialized
cells, skeleton, cellulose, bone, cartilage.
c. Protective Functions
Living organisms must protect their more
delicate structures from environmental
influences so that the functions of life
may be maintained.
Plants need specialized outer cells that
protect and cover the delicate internal
structures
.
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Animals possess a variety of specialized
outer cells that protect and cover the
delicate internal bodily structures.
Definitions: protection, internal, external,
cellulose, cell walls, skin, scales, feathers,
fur
.
2. Interactive and Integrative Functions
Living organisms must interact with the
environment and coordinate the functioning of
their systems in relation to environmental
stimuli if life is to be maintained.
a. Chemical Coordination
Living organisms need an internal system
of chemical coordination to integrate
their growth and activity in response to
stimuli from the environment.
Plants integrate their growth and activity
through plant hormones (tropisms)
.
Animals utilize chemical hormones as one
means of integrating the various activi-
ties of their bodies.
Definitions: interaction, integration, hor-
mones, chemical coordination,, tropisms, taxes,
endocrine system.
b. Nervous Coordination
Animals only possess a nervous system to
coordinate the activities of their bodies
in relation to environmental stimuli.
i. Sensory Input
Animals may possess a system of sen-
sory receptors which receive and
transmit information about the en-
vironment .
Definitions: sensory receptors, informa-
tion, vision, audition, touch, taste,
smell
.
ii. Internal Coordination
Animals possess an internal system
of nerves which transmit information
from the external environment.
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Higher animals possess a complex
system of nerves which transmit
information to the brain where
interpretation takes place.
Definitions: nerves, transmission of
information, brain, spinal cord.
iii. Neuro-Muscular Coordination
Animals respond to stimuli from the
environment through neuro-muscular
coordination
.
Definitions: neuro-muscular, muscles,
muscle action, effectors.
c. Patterns of Behavior
Animals interact with and adapt to the
environment through various patterns of
action.
Animals may achieve mastery in their
interactions with the environment through
learning
.
Definitions: behavior, adaptation, mastery,
learning, biologic clocks and circadian
rhythm, hibernation, migration, communication.
3. Perpetuation of Life Functions
a. Reproduction
Living organisms need to produce offspring
so that the species may be perpetuated.
Animals and plants produce offspring
through asexual or sexual means. Varia-
tion in characters results from sexual
reproduction
.
Definitions: reproduction, perpetuation, off-
spring, asexual, sexual, pollination, fer-
tilization, gametes, zygote, male, female.
b. Growth and Development
Living organisms need to produce offspring
which can grow and develop through various
stages till they reach full maturity so
that they can also reproduce.
Definitions: germination, embryogenesis , meta-
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morphosis, growth, development, maturation
life cycles.
c. Heredity
Living organisms transmit character-
istics from parent to offspring via the
genes in the chromosomes.
Definitions: heredity, parent, genes, chromo-
somes, mitosis, meiosis, somatic cells, sex
cells, spermatogenesis, oogenesis.
i. Patterns of Inheritance
Living organisms follow certain pat-
terns of inheritance in the trans-
mission of characteristics from
parents to offspring.
Mendel's First Law of Segregation:
Genes exist in pairs and in the
formation of gametes, each gene
separates from its partner and passes
into a different gamete so that each
gamete has one and only one of each
kind of gene.
Mendel's Second Law of Independent
Assortment: Members of one pair of
genes separate during meiosis inde-
pendently of other pairs of genes
and come to be combined at random
in the gamete.
Definitions: inherited and acquired
characteristics, recombination, variation.
d. Evolution
Living organisms have evolved into their
present form over billions of years.
i. Law of Natural Selection: In the
struggle for survival only the or-
ganisms with the most successful
variations survive and are selected
to transmit their characteristics
to offspring.
The variations in living organisms
are introduced by mutations and
through the recombination of charac-
ters during sexual reproduction.
Definitions: variation, evolution, an-
cestor, survival, mutation.
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ii. Adaptive Radiation
Living organisms have evolved into a
variety of forms each of which is
adapted and specialized to live in a
unique way in a particular habitat.
Definitions: habitat, speciation, genetic
drift
.
B. STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES AND DIVERSITY
1 . Structural Hierarchies
Organisms are composed of small units which
are grouped together to form larger units.
Definitions: structural hierarchy, small units
(cells), tissues, organs, systems, organism.
2 . Patterns of Structural Diversity
Living organisms are classified according to
structural and functional similarities.
Definitions: patterns, structural diversity,
funct ions
.
a. Plant Kingdom
Organisms classified as plants usually
have stiff cell walls and chlorophyll,
and make their own nutrients.
Phylum Cyanophyta
Phylum Chlorophyta
Phylum Euglenophyta
Phylum Chrysophyta
Phylum Phaeophyta
Phylum Rhodophyta
Phylym Myxomycophota
Phylum Eumycophyta
Phylum Bryophyta
Phylum Tracheophyta
blue green algae
green algae
euglena
yellow-green 5
golden-brown algae,
diatoms
brown algae
red algae
slime molds
true fungi
mosses, liverworts
ferns, club mosses,
horsetails, pines
and flowering plants
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b. Animal Kingdom
Organisms classified as animals usually
lack a stiff cell wall and cellulose,
and have to ingest manufactured nutrients.
Phylum Protozoa
Phylum Porifera
Phylum Coelenterata
Phylum Platyhelminthes
Phylum Nematoda
Phylum Annelida
Phylum Arthropoda
Phylum Mollusca
Phylum Echinodermat
a
Phylum Chordata
unicellular organisms
sponges
true jellyfish,
corals
,
sea
anemones
f latworms
roundworms
segmented worms
arachnids
,
crus-
taceans
,
insects
snails, slugs,
clams
starfishes, sea
urchins
fishes, frogs,
reptiles, birds,
mammals
c. Protista and Monera
Classifications of organisms in each group
vary according to the preferences of
authors. Unicellular organisms which are
difficult to classify either because they
share plant and animal characteristics, or
because of their differing modes of nu-
trition, are placed in this group. This
follows Weisz (1967)
.
Protista euglenoids, proto-
zoans, golden algae,
diatoms
Monera bacteria, blue-
green algae
INTEGRATED THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
IV. ASTRONOMY
A. The Solar System
The gravitational force exerted by the sun holds
together the planets and their satellites, aster-
oids and comets in a system.
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Definitions: solar system, names of planets, asteroids
comets, satellites. ’
1. Planetary Motions
All the planets revolve around the sun, which
is at one focus of the solar system.
a. Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion (from
Wyatt, 1971:178)
i. Law of Areas
"The line joining a planet to the sun
sweeps out equal areas in equal times,"
i.e., the speed of a planet is greater
when it is closer to the sun and
slower when it is farther away.
Definitions: equal, areas.
ii. Harmonic Law
"The square of the orbital period of
a planet is proportional to the cube
of its mean distance from the sun"
(P^ = D^)
,
i.e., the time it takes for
a planet to revolve around the sun
depends on its distance away from the
sun.
Definitions: period of orbit, orbit, cube.
b. Rotation of the Planets and Satellites
Each planet rotates on its own axis once
in a certain period of time.
The earth rotates on its axis once every
twenty-four hours.
The moon rotates on its own axis once
every 28 days.
Definitions: rotation, axis, day, night,
phases of moon.
c. Revolution of the Planets and Satellites
Each planet revolves around the sun once
in a certain period of time.
The earth revolves around the sun once in
365 days.
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The moon revolves around the earth once
in 28 days.
Definitions: revolution, one year, lunar
calendar, solar calendar, the seasons (spring,
summer, autumn, winter).
d. Newton's 3 Laws of Motions
e. Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation
2. Planetary Composition
The composition of the planets depends upon
their position in relation to the sun.
. Definitions: terrestrial planets, Jovian planets,
composition
.
3. Earth-Moon System
a. The earth, when it is positioned between
the sun and the moon, casts a shadow on
the moon.
Definitions: sun, shadow, eclipse.
b. The moon, when it is in certain positions
relative to the earth, exerts a gravita-
tional pull on bodies of water of the
earth's surface.
Definitions: tides (high, low).
B . Stellar Composition and Evolution
1. Stellar Composition
a. Our understanding of the composition of
stars depends upon the kind of light that
they emit.
Definitions: light, stars, light emission.
b. The bright light of the sun is caused
by nuclear reactions in the interior of
the sun.
Definitions: sun, nuclear reaction (fission,
fusion)
.
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2. Stellar Evolution
Stars evolve through various stages before
they finally cease emitting light.
Definitions: evolve, white dwarf, supernova,
neutron star, pulsar, black hole.
C . Galaxies
Stars
,
gases and dust exist in great groups which
revolve in space.
Definitions: galaxy, Milky Way.
(NOTE: When children are formal operational, part of
the curriculum will be devoted to relative frames of
reference and the use of standard measurement of time
and distance (some time measurement is included in the
principles on rotation and revolution of the earth and
the moon)
.
)
V. GEOLOGY
A . The Solid Earth
1. Interior of the Earth: Internal Processes
High temperatures, pressure and molten
material exist in the interior of the earth.
Definitions: layers of the earth (core, mantle,
crust, atmosphere), interior, temperature, pure,
molten
.
a. Earth Movements
Increasing temperatures and pressures
cause major movements in the earth’s
crust
.
Definitions: earthquakes (release of elastic
strain)
,
volcanoes (release of heat and pres-
sure)
,
mountains.
b. Formation of Earth's Crust
Molten material that cooled rapidly formed
the crust.
Definitions: crust, rocks (igneous, sedimen-
tary, metamorphic) , minerals.
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c. Origin of the Continents
The continents may have drifted apart from
one continental plate billions of years
ago.
Definitions: continent, continental drift,
continental plates.
2. Exterior of the Earth: External Processes
The surface of the earth (or crust) has been,
and continues to be, gradually worn away and
sculptured
.
Definitions: sculptured, external processes.
a. Weathering
Rock waste is produced, partly by mechani-
cal breaking and partly by solution and
chemical decay.
Definitions: rock waste, mechanical breaking,
chemical decay.
b. Erosion
The surface of the earth is destroyed
when transporting agents carry away rock
waste
.
Definitions: erosion, transporting agents
(water, ice, wind), valley, desert and coastal
development
.
c. Deposition
Rock waste carried away from higher levels
is deposited at lower levels.
Definitions: deposition, flood plain, deltas.
B . Atmosphere of the Earth
The atmosphere above the earth is held in place
by the gravitational force of the earth.
Definitions: atmosphere, gravitational force.
1. Composition of the Atmosphere
Gases float in the atmosphere above the earth.
Definitions: gases, carbon dioxide, oxygen,
nitrogen gas.
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2. Temperature of the Atmosphere
Solar radiation warms the atmosphere.
Definitions: solar radiation, temperature, heat.
3. Atmospheric Circulation
Air moves from an area of high pressure to
an area of low pressure.
Definitions: circulation, pressure, air, wind,
convection.
4. Moisture in the Atmosphere
When water is heated it evaporates into water
vapor (gas) which escapes into the atmosphere.
Definitions: moisture, water, water vapor, evapora
tion, clouds, humidity.
5. Changes in Atmospheric Conditions
Changes of temperature, pressure and moisture
conditions in the atmosphere create weather.
Definitions: changes, heating, cooling, condensa-
tion, precipitation (snow, sleet, rain), hurri-
canes, tornadoes, weather.
LIFE SCIENCES
VI . ECOLOGY
General principles in ecosystem, population and
community ecology.
A . Ecosystem and Cyclic Use of Matter
1. Ecosystem
Exchange of materials between living and non-
living parts follows a cyclical path.
Definitions: producers, consumers, decomposers.
2. Habitat and Ecologic Niche
Place where organism lives and its status in
the community depends on structural adapta-
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tions, physiologic responses and specific
behavior
.
Definitions: habitat, ecologic niche, structure,
physiology, behavior.
3. Biogeochemical Cycles
Elements (organic and inorganic) circulate
in the atmosphere and back to the environ-
ment and the organisms in it.
Definitions: water cycle, nitrogen cycle, carbon
cycle, phosphorus cycle.
4. Energy in the Ecosystem
Energy is circulated in a cyclic manner so
that it is neither created nor destroyed
(cf
.
,
First Law of Thermodynamics)
.
Definitions: food chain, food pyramid, energy,
cyclic
.
B . Population Ecology
1. Species Population Level
Individuals of the same species compete for
resources in the environment.
Definitions: species, density, birthrate, mor-
tality, age distribution, population.
2. Interspecies Population Level
a. Interaction Between Species
Organisms living in the same environment
interact with each other in many ways.
Definitions: beneficial association, negative
interaction
.
b. Competition Between Species
Gause’s Rule: only one species exists in
an ecologic niche.
Definitions: competition, ecologic niche,
species
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C
. Community Ecolog y
Diverse species and populations can live together
in an orderly fashion.
Definitions: ecological succession, climax.
D . Exemplifications of Ecological Principles in
Different Habitats
Organisms live in different habitats.
Definitions: fresh water habitat, marine habitat,
terrestrial habitat.
Integration of the Natural Science
Curriculum with the Overall
Curriculum in the Anisa
Model
The overall curriculum in the Anisa Model is com-
prised of the following separate, but interrelated curricula
Basic Competencies Curricula
Psychomotor competence curriculum
Perceptual competence curriculum
Cognitive competence curriculum
Affective competence curriculum
Volitional competence curriculum
Formation and Utilization of Symbol Systems Curricula
Mathematics curriculum
Discursive language curriculum
Arts curriculum
H igher Order Competencies Curricula
Natural science curriculum (leads to technological com-
petence) .
Human science curriculum (leads to moral compentence)
Philosophical science curriculum (leads to fiducial
competence)
In the overall context, the natural science curncu
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lum is only one facet that contributs to human growth and
development. The natural science curriculum can foster the
development of the other curricula and vice versa. From
an organismic point of view, all the components of the over-
all curriculum should be interconnected so that learning is
an integrated experience. This is one of the unique
features of this natural science curriculum.
Each of the five basic competencies may be strength-
ened and. developed by science activities. For example,
cognitive competence may be developed by science activities
that focus on the use of cognitive processes such as clas-
sification, seriation, prediction and experimentation.
Similarly, other activities (i.e., in the arts) which
strengthen these cognitive processes also help to support
the natural science curriculum.
The formation and utilization of symbols may also
be enhanced by science activities and vice versa. Mathe-
matical understandings of basic concepts of number, space
and time can become an exciting and challenging experience
when integrated with science activities. Discursive
language, vocabulary, grammar and reading can become more
meaningful to the child when interrelated with other ex-
periences such as natural science. The arts and aesthetic
uses of language can also be developed by using themes or
ideas from natural sciences.
As discussed in Chapter III, technological compe-
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tence cannot be considered apart from moral and fiducial
competence. The relationship between natural science and
the social sciences (morality, ethics, psychology, anthro-
pology and sociology) and the philosophical sciences
(religion and philosophy) require discussion and investi-
gation far beyond the scope of this dissertation. The
basic principles for their integration, however, have been
presented. What is needed now is a systematic application
of the organismic principles in filling out the details.
The next chapter will discuss how the proposed
framework for the natural science curriculum presented in
this chapter can be implemented.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE
CURRICULUM: GENERATING LEARNING
EXPERIENCES
Implementation of the natural science curriculum
will necessitate the developmental sequencing of process
and content goals, planning appropriate experiences for
children so that the goals can be achieved and identifying
the kinds of integrations that can be made with the over-
all curriculum. Developmental information that was pre-
sented in Chapter IV on the nature of children's scientific
thought can now be applied to the components of the frame-
work of the natural science curriculum as outlined in
Chapter V.
Careful sequencing of the content component of the
natural science curriculum is necessary if children are to
learn information about the physical environment. Re-
searchers report that children can be introduced to the
fundamental ideas in natural science if the information to
be learned is developmentally- sequenced and accompanied by
materials that children can manipulate themselves (Inhelder,
in Bruner, 1960; Victor, 1971). The laws and principles
that were identified in Chapter V can be presented to
children in simplified (but not trivial) forms that match
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their developmental levels. This means that young children
can be introduced to the necessary, pre-requisite experi-
ences that will make i t poss ible for them to understand more
fully a given law or principle at each of several later
stages, until it is finally understood fully.
The natural science curriculum that I am proposing
rests on the idea that developmental sequencing of content
(so that children progressively encounter similar but more
complex ideas) can be organized in a spiral. According to
Bruner (1960)
,
a natural science curriculum can be developed
so that certain basic ideas can be examined repeatedly and
gradually built upon to achieve more complex understandings.
Bruner states that if students are to study physics or
biology later in high school, there is no reason why these
subjects should be a totally new experience and present a
block to learning. With careful planning and the applica-
tion of developmental principles it is possible to provide
certain basic ideas when children are young so that they
can be prepared for later studies.
Steps in Planning Developmental ly Sequenced
Experiences to Achieve Technological
Competence
The planning of developmental sequences of learning
experiences can be guided by the theoretical framework
that was presented in Chapter V. Ultimately, such planning
teachers, their knowledge of andwill depend on classroom
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previous experiences in, and attitudes towards natural
sciences. The issue of adequate teacher preparation pro-
grams in science education is too vast and complex a
subject to be addressed in this dissertation (see Carney,
1977 )
.
However, the reason for the theoretical framework
presented in the previous chapter is that it will allow
teachers to be more generative. Rather than being attached
to specific activities for all the children in the class,
teachers can be guided by the theoretical principles of
development and curriculum to meet the needs and interests
of children of varying abilities. To achieve success in
planning appropriate sequences of learning experiences in
natural science, teacher preparation programs will need to
expose teachers in a systematic manner to the major laws
and principles of natural science.
It should be made clear at the outset that there is
no "one specific way” of planning science activities for
children. The direction of the planning process may be dic-
tated by the purposes that the teacher has in mind or by
what the children would like to do. Teachers will have to
be flexible and gain the most mileage out of any activity,
be it science or moral education. From an organismic per-
spective, all of life is the ground for learning and any
form of narrow compartmental i zat ion of subjects will tend
the full development of the child. To writeto suppress
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about a natural science curriculum," then, may seem to he
a contradiction. However, what should be emphasized is that
the natural science curriculum is inextricably connected
to the overall curriculum and this will be reflected in
the planning process.
The attainment of technological competence may be
facilitated by following the general guidelines provided in
the proposed framework in Chapter V. There are several
possible starting points for developing a natural science
curriculum. However, in emphasizing the attainment of
technological competence, the following three starting
points may be the most useful: (1) focusing on content to
be learned; (2) focusing on processes to be strengthened
and (3) focusing on some application. In most cases, pro-
cess and content will be fused as it is not possible to
teach some content without some process and vice versa.
The sequences of steps that follow from each of
the starting points mentioned above will now be presented.
The reason for outlining all three sequences is to illus-
trate how the pitfall of adhering too rigidly to one linear
set of steps in planning experiences can be avoided.
I . Focus on Content
A. Select the law or principle (content) to be learned.
B. Identify the developmental levels of the children
to be taught (i.e., pre-operat ional , concrete operational,
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formal operational).
C. Break down the law or principle into concepts that
are appropriate for each developmental level (i.e., break-
down into content goals).
D. Identify the specific processes to be strengthened
and state the accompanying process goals to be achieved in
accordance with each developmental level.
E. State the learner objectives for each developmental
level, i.e., statements which are fusions of specific pro-
cess and content goals which provide evidence for the
achievement of the goals.
F. Identify the symbol systems to be developed as they
relate to the content to be learned at each developmental
level
..
G. Outline the points of integration of the content
with the overall curriculum.
H. Describe the learning experiences that children will
engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.
II. Focus on Process
A. Identify the developmental levels of the children
to be taught.
B. Identify the processes to be strengthened and
state the accompanying process goals to be achieved at
each developmental level.
C. Select the law or principle to be learned.
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D. Break down the law or principle into concepts that
are appropriate for each developmental level (i.e., into
content goals) .
E. State the learner objectives for each developmental
level, i.e., fusion of process and content goals.
F. Identify the symbol systems to be developed as
they relate to the content to be learned at each develop-
mental level.
G. Outline the points of integration of the content
with the overall curriculum.
H. Describe the learning experiences that children
will engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.
III. Focus on Application
A. Select the area of application, e.g., a problem or
issue to be solved such as pollution, building shelves,
developing a vegetable garden.
B. Identify the laws or principles that are related
to the selected area of application.
C. Identify the developmental levels of the children
to be taught.
D. Break down the laws or principles into concepts
that are appropriate for each developmental level (i.e.,
into content goals)
.
E. State the learner objectives for each developmental
level, i.e., fusion of process and content goals.
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F. Identify the symbol systems to be developed as they
relate to the content to be learned at each developmental
level
.
G. Outline the points of integration of the content
with the overall curriculum.
H. Describe the learning experiences that children
will engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.
Example of a Sequence of Learning
Experiences in Natural Science
To make the process of planning learning experiences
explicit, a more detailed elaboration will be presented in
this section, using the steps A-H outlined in the sequence
that started with the selected law or principle, i.e.,
Focus on Content (see page 191)
.
Since the emphasis of this dissertation is on
elementary school science, only two cognitive develop-
mental levels will be discussed in detail, namely, the pre-
operational stage (about 3-5 years) and the concrete opera-
tional stage (about 6-11 years).
I
.
Focus on Content
A. Select Law or Principle
I have selected Huygen's Principle of Wave Propa-
gation from the area of Physics. This is a general prin-
ciple about the transmission of a disturbance (wave motion)
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through a medium and/or space, and as such it applies to
water waves, sound waves and light waves. In the specific
example to follow, I am going to focus on Huygen's Prin-
ciple as it relates to the phenomenon of sound.
Huygen's Principle of Wave Propagation may be
defined in the following manner:
A wave is a disturbance that is propagated through
space and/or some medium.
B. Developmental Levels of Children
A diagnosis of the children's stages of cognitive
development will indicate different levels of mental
functioning, i.e., pre-operat ional and concrete operational
levels. Whatever content and process goals are established
will have to fit these developmental levels.
C. Breakdown of Principle According
to Developmental Levels (Content
Goals)
Since Huygen's Principle is so complex, the task is
to find out what concepts essential to this principle as it
relates to sound can be comprehended by children at the
pre- operational and concrete operational levels. This means
that the principle has to be broken down into simpler con-
cepts to fit the developmental levels. In this example, I
will present the concepts for the formal operational stage
as well, so that continuity of the levels of complexity
may be seen.
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The concepts of "wave" and "propagation" arc very
abstract and far too difficult for young children to com-
prehend. However, simple analogies with general types of
waves can be introduced, e.g., water waves, skipping rope
waves, slinky waves. When children are at the earlier
developmental levels, the connection between general waves
and sound waves should not be made as this will only serve
to confuse them. However, when they can think in a more
abstract manner, the connection can be made.
It should be emphasized that there is great varia-
tion in the levels of understanding even within one de-
velopmental stage. Thus, the statements of content goals
will have to match the developmental needs of children,
say at the early, middle and late pre-operat ional stages.
The following general content goals state what
concepts children should know about Huygen’s Principle and
Sound at different developmental levels:
Pre-operational Stage
Children should know that:
1. Many different kinds of waves can be created,
e.g., waving arms, streamers, throwing stones
into water.
2. When objects collide or hit each other, they
shake (vibrate) and produce sound.
3. There are many different kinds of sounds that
we can hear with our ears.
Concrete Operational Stage
Children should know that:
.
1. Sound is caused by the vibration of objects.
2*. Certain parts of the ear vibrate and hearing
then occurs.
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3. A disturbance in a tank or pool of water moves
outward in the form of waves, such that a
large disturbance creates many, big waves and
a small disturbance creates fewer, little waves.
4. Sound can be reflected off objects.
5. Sound has different dimensions, each of which
can vary: pitch, quality (timbre), loudness
and duration.
Formal Operational Stage
Students should know that:
1. Sound is created by a disturbance that moves
outward in the form of a wave in some medium
such as air or water and not in a vacuum.
2. Water particles and particles that create
sound differ in their direction of vibration,
i.e., water particles vibrate vertically in
the same place, whereas particles that produce
sound vibrate horizontally in the same place.
3. The pitch of a sound is determined by the
number of waves that pass a certain point in
one second (i.e., notion of frequency, wave-
length) .
4. The speed of sound is determined by the medium
in which the wave is being propagated.
5. Sound waves transmit energy to the surrounding
medium
.
(At the formal operational stage, complex ideas
on sound and wave motion can be introduced,
since abstract concepts can now be processed.)
D. Processes to be Strengthened
and Process Goals
Diagnosis of the developmental levels of children
gives an indication of the kinds of cognitive processes that
are being internalized. Different processes will be
strengthened at the various developmental levels. Again,
there is a great variation in what children are capable
of understanding, even if they are all pre-operational or
concrete operational.
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The following process goals related to sound arc
stated in terms of what children should be able to do at
a particular developmental level:
Pre-operational Stage
Children should be able to:
Psychomotor processes: manipulate materials;
Perceptual processes
Cognitive processes
vocalize sounds
discriminate auditory figure
and ground; perceive loudness
and the localization of sound
classify; make simple pre-
dictions; perform simple
tests (or "experiments")
;
make simple comparisons; dif-
ferentiate simple cause and
effect relations.
Concrete Operational Stage
Children should be able to:
Psychomotor processes: manipulate materials;
vocalize sounds
Perceptual processes: discriminate auditory figure
and ground; perceive loudness
pitch, timbre, duration and
localization of sound.
Cognitive processes: classify; seriate, conserve;
formulate simple hypotheses;
make simple predictions; per-
form simple experiments; make
comparisons; draw conclusions
and differentiate cause and
effect relations.
E. Statement of Learner
Ob j ectives
Learner objectives are operationalized statements
which constitute fusions of specific process and content
goals. Since an objective serves the purpose of determin-
ing what evidence is acceptable to the teacher that certain
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goals have been achieved, then it has to be stated in the
form Children will be able to" actually do something that
is observable. To know whether a content goal has been
achieved, the child will have to perform some action to
let the teacher know that the content has been assimilated
and understood. A process goal by definition means that a
Cjiild will perform some action from which the internaliza-
tion of a process may be inferred.
Since there are numerous learner objectives that
can be listed, I will just present two examples that show
the fusion of process and content goals:
Pre- operational Stage
Children will be able to produce and describe
6 different sounds by using 6 different kinds
of materials.
Concrete Operational Stage
Children will be able to set up various simple
experimental situations where the vibration of
different materials can be observed and matched
on the dimension of pitch. They will be able
to explain what they had to do to make the
pitches match.-
F. Formation and Utilization
of Symbols
Information about Huygen's Principle, as it relates
to sound, will be conveyed largely through the use of words
(language) and mathematical symbols. When children are at
the pre-operational level, mathematics will not play a
great part, that is, in terms of number relations. However,
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pre-requisite mathematical processes like classifying or
grouping will be strengthened, and the understanding of
words related to sound can be enhanced. Simple quanti-
tative relationships about sound can be introduced at
the late concrete operational stage, e.g.
,
frequency graphs
and measurements.
The following statements are some of the objectives
to be achieved in the formation and utilization of symbols:
Pre-operat ional Stage
Children will be able:
Mathematics: to classify sounds (group into a set)
according to one dimension at a time.
Language: to label sounds.
to describe different sounds.
Arts: to compose simple rhyming sounds.
to follow simple rhythms (e.g.,
clapping, tapping).
Concrete Operational Stage
Children will
Mathemat ics :
Language
:
Arts
:
be able:
to measure distances across which
sound travels.
to plot frequency graphs, initially
on general topics.
to explain the meaning of words re-
lated to sound, e.g., vibration,
loudness, pitch, direction, source,
etc
.
to describe in words the moods
created by music,
to write stories on sounds,
to describe patterns in sounds.
G . Integration With the
Overall Curriculum
Within the theoretical framework of the Anisa Model,
the natural science curriculum is integrally connected to
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other areas of learning, such as mathematics, language,
arts, cognition, perception, etc. Natural science is
also closely related to the human and philosophical
sciences. When children are young, the emphasis will be
more on the interrelationship between sound and its effects
on people and society (human sciences), rather than on
abstract philosophical issues. Even within the natural
sciences, integrations can be made between sound (physical
science) and the life and earth sciences.
Examples of the kinds of integrations that can be
made now follow:
Pre-operational Stage
Human sciences: understanding the value of sounds,
speech, and music in the life of
man
.
Life sciences: understanding the role of sounds
in animal life.
Concrete Operational Stage
Human sciences: understanding the vital role of
speech in human life i.e., in
communications
.
understanding the role of music in
civil i zat ion
.
understanding the concept of noise
pollution.
understanding the relationship
between sounds and the creation of
fear in people.
understanding how knowledge of the
principles of sound transmission
have affected our lives, e.g.,
radios, televisions, telephones, etc
Life sciences: understanding in a simple manner the
working of the ear and the vocal
cords
.
understanding the role of sound in
the animal world, e.g., echolocation
communication, calls in mating, etc.
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Earth Sciences: understanding how knowledge of
principles of sound transmission
can assist in the detection of
earthquake centers, location of
submerged objects (sonar), etc.
H. Interactions or Learning
Experiences to Achieve
the Goals
The learning experiences or activities that are
planned by the teacher should meet the goals that are to
be achieved. In some cases, the whole class may do the
same activity and at other times, groups of children may
work on different activities. There will also be instances
where a child may wish to work alone on some activity, or
it may be that a particular child needs individual atten-
tion, in which case specific activities will have to be
planned. Knowledge of the cognitive, as well as the emo-
tional and social needs of the children will be an immense
asset to the teacher in planning activities in natural
science
.
Learning experiences, such as the following, can
assist in children’s understanding of sound and wave con-
cepts. These are general activities presented here as
examples. However, when a teacher adopts a specific goal,
specific activities will be planned to meet that goal
directly
.
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Pre- operational Stage
1. Provide children with opportunities to create
waves of different types, e.g., movement
activities, tubs of water, or field trip to
a pond.
2 . Provide a variety of materials that children
can experiment with and identify objects that
shake to produce sound.
3. Take field trips to different settings so
that children can hear a variety of sounds
and identify the sources of the sounds, e.g.,
go to a large kitchen, to a game park, a bird
sanctuary, stand safely near a road, etc.
4. Place different types of sounds on a casctte
tape and have children listen and identify
them.
5. Encourage children to play with simple musical
instruments and identify sounds that they
enjoy and do not enjoy.
6. Invite musicians to come to the school to play
and explain about musical instruments to the
children
.
Concrete Operational Stage
1. Provide opportunities for children to set up
various simple situations in which they can
identify the vibration of objects and describe
the sounds created.
2. Provide a simple model of the ear so the
vibrating parts can be observed.
3. Provide opportunities for children to create an
indoor or outdoor situation where they can
investigate and observe the motion of waves,
e.g., indoor water tank.
4. Children can play with a "Slinky" (a walking
spring) and observe the wave-like motion.
5. Allow children to describe and go out and
locate places where sound is reflected and
echoes are created.
6. Provide materials and musical instruments that
children can play with and create sounds of
different pitch, loudness, quality and duration.
7. Take children on a bird-watching trip so that
they can locate the birds that are singing.
8. Children can learn the conservation of pitch
while varying the quality of the sound--they
can use a xylophone, metal lophone , recorder
and a human voice.
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9. Provide pieces of music (recordings) or
pieces that children create for the analysis
of moods, atmosphere, rhythm, etc.
10. Children can undertake individual or class
projects on noise pollution, e.g., they can
visit an airport, interview people, etc.
The detailed elaboration just presented was de-
veloped by selecting a particular principle as a content
goal
,
and then following through a predetermined sequence
of steps. If certain processes of scientific method were
to be taught, then the sequence entitled "Focus on Process"
(see page 192) would be followed. In both cases, the ac-
tual learning experience or activity constitutes a fusion
of some principle and some processes. While it is impos-
sible to separate process and content, it is possible to
emphasize one more than the other.
Starting with an area of application (i.e., tuning
a violin, dealing with a real problem in living) presents
an opportunity for making many integrations at the same
time. Rather than just focusing on one principle in
physics or one law in biology, the selection of a problem
like pollution will include many principles from physics,
chemistry, biology, geology and ecology. Once the key
principles have been identified then the sequence of steps
outlined in the detailed elaboration can be followed. In
some instances the area of application may not be very
broad and in this case one or two major principles may be
isolated, e.g., in the building of shelves, principles
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relating to force, gravity and balance may be learned
(together with many mathematical concepts)
One of the most important aspects of the imple-
mentation of the natural science curriculum as proposed
in this dissertation is that teachers will be involved in
actually building the curriculum. Essentially, the laws
and principles, and the statements of the content and
process goals will be outlined in simple, understandable
language by the curriculum specialist so that teachers can
work with the ideas. Teachers will then take the content
and process goals and generate their own learner objectives
and learning experiences to meet the developmental needs of
the children. A resource file of activities should be
organized so that teachers will have easy access to a
variety of ideas of what they can do to achieve the goals
of the natural science curriculum.
My purpose in this dissertation has not been to
list a set of activities or to present a fully developed
natural science curriculum. What I have tried to do is
present a basic framework that will enable curriculum
specialists and teachers to work together in generating
and implementing a comprehensive natural science curriculum.
In this way the organic nature of the process will be
insured
.
The next chapter presents the distinguishing features
of an organismic approach to science curriculum development.
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CHAPTER VII
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF AN ORGANISMIC
APPROACH TO SCIENCE CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT BASED ON THE
ANISA MODEL
I would like to state at the outset that the frame-
work that I have proposed in this dissertation is only one
alternative approach to the organization of a natural
science curriculum. This is not intended to mean that the
efforts exerted over the last decade in science education
have been without merit and value. It is reasonably clear
that as the complexity and the sheer volume of our knowledge
increases, the necessity of making broader syntheses and
integrations becomes vital, especially in the educational
process. My intention has been to draw on the knowledge
of the past and try to present one possible approach that
could assist in answering some of the issues in science
education, particularly in relation to our newly- emerging
world view.
Comparison of the Proposed Framework for
a Natural Science Curriculum with Other
Science Curricula
The distinctive features of an organismic approach
to science curriculum development can be most adequately
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assessed by comparing it with the science curricula that
were developed during the sixties. Components of the
framework presented in Chapter V, namely, process and
content goals, formation and utilization of symbols and
types of interactions, will be compared and contrasted with
three major science curricula: The Science Curriculum
Improvement Study, Elementary Science Study and Science-
-A
Process Approach.
I
.
Process and Content Goals
Many of the new curricula developed in the sixties
were instrumental in breaking away from the traditional
nature study approach and rote memorization techniques
involved in science study. Processes of discovery and
cognitive reasoning were emphasized together with a more
systematic organization of the most important ideas in
natural science that could be learned by children. How-
ever, these curricula have not emphasized process and
content goals equally. For example, Scicnce--A Process
Approach, as its name implies, focuses on the development
of processes which can be transferred to other areas of
study. Such a goal is vital if children are to become
competent learners and take charge of their own learning.
However, the content of natural science is equally impor-
tant if knowledge is to be generalized and utilized in
other situations. In S-APA, content is not as important
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as process. The Science Curriculum Improvement Study
emphasizes the learning of content to achieve scientific
literacy. Processes are not neglected, but they do not
constitute the primary focus. The Elementary Science
Study curriculum developers recognize the important of
o 1 gani zing a curriculum around the developmental levels of
children. However, content and process goals are not pre-
sented in a systematic manner.
In the framework for the natural science curricu-
lum based on the organismic view, process and content goals
are both emphasized, and the means of achieving them inte-
grated in the interaction component are spelled out. The
process goals are in fact more extensive than in the other
science curricula. Cognitive processes are emphasized but
not to the exclusion of other developmental processes.
Each interaction with the physical environment implicates
psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volition-
al processes, and these implications are exploited to en-
rich the natural science curriculum.
The content goals in the proposed framework were
presented in a detailed manner for two reasons. (1) Pro-
cesses, if they are to be strengthened, must be applied
to some content. From an organismic point of view, compre-
hending the relationships between and amongst events is the
key means of understanding the physical environment. The
laws and principles which express these relationships and
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which form the basis and content oi the natural science
curriculum were therefore identified in detail. Focusing
on laws and principles rather than on activities in natural
sciences facilitates the generalization of content.
According to Bruner (1960), the knowledge of the
structure of a subject is vital as it calls for the iden-
tification of the most fundamental ideas that will be
included in the curriculum. If the fundamentals are com-
prehended, then later understandings can be built on them.
The point is that the fundamentals, verbally stated, com-
prise content and can be memorized by rote. To understand
or comprehend fundamentals, however, requires that related
processes be developed as well. Without the integration of
process with content, there will be little generalization
and content will be easily forgotten: rote memory can take
a child only so far.
Learning a general idea is powerful because it can
form the basis for recognizing and applying the idea in a
similar but new situation (generalization). Bruner claims
that the ’’teaching of specific topics or skills without
making clear their context in the broader fundamental
structure of a field of knowledge is uneconomical (1960.
31) . The reasons for this are that students cannot gener-
alize what has been learned and that the sense of intel-
lectual excitement is lost without a grasp of general
principles
.
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lo avoid the danger of just focusing on the logical
structure of natural science, the framework presented in
this dissertation relies heavily on knowledge of how
children’s scientific thinking develops. A great deal of
work remains to be done in this area, but the developmental
knowledge that we do have can be used in a more fruitful
manner to present the fundamental concepts of natural
science to young children in appropriate sequences. Making
the connection with children’s developmental levels will
avoid boring them on the one hand or setting them up for
a guaranteed failure on the other.
II. Formation and Utilization
of Symbols
The development of symbol systems (mathematics,
language, the arts) that convey information about the
world does not receive a clear emphasis in previously
developed science curricula. Mathematics is considered to
be a most important tool in science and therefore receives
more attention than language and the arts in these science
curricula. In the framework presented in Chapter V,
mathematics, language and the arts are integral parts of
the overall curriculum and also play a definite role in the
natural science curriculum. Mathematics is used to convey
quantitative information; language conveys descriptive
information (words), and the arts are used to develop
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aesthetic sensitivity and appreciation of patterns and
order in nature.
III. Interactions to Achieve the
Goals of the Curriculum
In many of the previously mentioned science
curricula (S-APA, SCIS, and ESS), learning experiences are
described for all children to engage in if they happen to
be in a particular grade and in a certain age group. Yet
age levels are not the appropriate criterion for grouping
children for instructional purposes. The reason for the
detailed description of science activities is probably
based on the assumption that teachers are not familiar
enough with the concepts of natural science to plan their
own activities in accordance with developmental levels.
It is also probable that by not preparing teachers to
teach on the basis of a framework for a natural science
curriculum, the tendency is to become attached to specific
activities assigned to- age levels. The students are then
left with a "bits- and-pieces" idea of natural science.
Teachers prepared in the framework for the natural
science curriculum that is based on an organismic perspec-
tive are exposed to the fundamental laws and principles of
natural science in a concrete and meaningful way together
with detailed developmental information on children. The
activities that they plan will fit the children and in addi
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tion be drawn from sources related to problems and issues
that face man. These sources would be the applied sciences
such as agriculture, engineering (highway, bridge, dam
construction, etc.), animal husbandry, horticulture, etc.
A focus on such applied fields would not have to be a drain
on teachers, since this would provide a wonderful oppor-
tunity of utilizing community people who are trained in a
variety of fields. They could be invited to present and
discuss .the basic principles of their work in a manner
appropriate for children.
Applied sciences are such a pervasive force in
our lives that they should be included in the natural
science curriculum. The definition of technological com-
petence that was discussed in Chapter III reflects the
concern for including the notion of applications in inter-
actions with the physical environment. The importance of
the inclusion of the applications of scientific knowledge
is emphasized by Hurd. He states that many of the science
curricula of the sixties excluded applications in their
schemes. However, there is a great need to involve
children in understanding the role of science and its rela-
tion to human welfare. This can be accomplished by " . . .
using its concepts to attack the persistent problems of
human experience, and stressing its potential for improv-
ing the ’quality of living'" (Hurd, 1975:27).
From an organismic perspective, the relationships
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between knowledge and its application are vital since they
reflect the reality of living.. For Whitehead, the crucial
aspect of education is not the acquisition of inert ideas
but "the art of the utilization of knowledge" ( 1967b : 4 )
.
Concluding Remarks
From the discussion in the previous section, it
should be evident that an organismic approach to science
curriculum development has certain distinctive features
that are missing in the numerous other science curricula.
The approach presented in this dissertation is not a
wholly radical departure from previously developed schemes.
It does, in fact, incorporate elements from many of the
other science curricula; but it also adds significant
new features that can address the issues of relatedness,
integration and wholeness- -all of which are necessary if
science education is to be a meaningful experience for
children.
A major focus of this dissertation has been the
presentation of the philosophical and theoretical framework
of the Anisa Model, the central thesis of which is the
actualization of human potential. In the Anisa Theory,
the natural science curriculum occupies a central role
with a clearly defined overarching objective which is the
attainment of technological competence. The natural
science curriculum is also integrally connected with other
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areas of learning such as cognition, perception, volition,
mathematics
,
language, the arts, human and philosophical
sciences. The organismic nature of the type of framework
that I am proposing is captured in the following statement
by Whitehead:
The solution which I am urging, is to eradicate
the fatal disconnection of subjects which kills
the vitality of our modern curriculum. There
is only one subject matter for education, and
that is Life in all its manifestations. Instead
of this single unity, we offer children- -algebra
,
from, which nothing follows; geometry, from
which nothing follows, science from which nothing
follows; history, from which nothing follows, a
couple of languages, never mastered; and lastly,
most dreary of all, literature, represented by
plays of Shakespeare, with philological notes and
short analyses of plot and character to be in
substance committed to memory. Can such a list
be said to represent Life, as it is known in the
midst of living it? (1967b:6-7).
Disconnection between the developmental levels of
the children and the demands of the curriculum is equally
fatal. I have tried to show how the natural science cur-
riculum I am proposing, because of its genetic epistemo-
logical basis, can be tailor-made to suit the developmental
needs of children so that the actualization of their po-
tential can be continually sustained and nourished. To
accomplish this goal fully calls for renewed efforts in
the training of teachers, who are not only exposed to the
fundamental ideas of natural science and developmental
knowledge, but who are also incorporated in the very pro-
cess of curriculum-building. Teachers are the people who
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are in closest touch with the developmental needs of
children and as such, must become an integral part in the
organic evolution of the natural science curriculum.
There is one last point that I feel has been an
important focus in this dissertation. I have stated that
the overarching objective of the natural science cur-
riculum is the formation of material values upon which
rests the attainment of technological competence. As
children, interact with the physical environment, they will
learn certain patterned ways of using their energy. All
such patterned uses of energy (i.e., material values) are
not equally acceptable. Some are more effective than
others as determined by two criteria: (1) do they insure
survival? and (2) do they lead to the kind of technological
competence that can improve the quality of life? It there-
fore becomes crucial that the formation of material values
should not be left to chance. Material values that meet
these two criteria should be developed in children when
they are young so that there exists a deep regard for the
pursuit of truth in understanding the operation of the
physical environment, a heightened awareness of the need to
protect the environment and its resources, and a sincere
concern for the problems and challenges that face mankind.
It is upon such material values that the attainment of
technological competence rests. The hallmark of learners
who are technologically competent is that they will under-
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Stand, d isco\ ei and apply their knowledge of scientific
laws and principles to effect changes in, and gain control
over, the physical environment. When technological compe-
tence is subordinated to moral and fiducial competence,
there is reasonable assurance that the quality of life on
this planet can be continually improved for all human
beings.
In terms of the framework that I have proposed for
a natural science curriculum, there are many issues yet to
be resolved. Teacher preparation programs in natural
science, evaluation instruments that can measure the process
of learning, more complete developmental knowledge about
howr children learn to think, and diagnostic instruments to
assess developmental levels more accurately are some of
the issues that will have to be worked upon in the years
to come.
It is my conviction that the role of natural science
in the lives of children is of paramount importance. Every
attempt is worthwhile if it serves to assist children to
understand the physical world in which they live so that
they can make a contribution to improving the quality of
life.
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